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To all of you who carry the torch of enlightenment
∞
Wszystkim Wam, którzy niesiecie kaganek os´wiaty
1Introduction
As theories, they are all equal in the presence of computational demons0
The assumption that a mind is a computational system has been a central point in the
development of cognitive science since its dawn in the 1950s (Turing, 1950; Miller,
1956; Chomsky, 1957; Newell et al., 1958; Minsky, 1961). The influence of computer
science, and especially, back then, the newly emerging field of artificial intelligence,
helped to shape the view that the mind is essentially an information processing
system. When the cognitive revolution was taking place, and psychology was trying
to shake off the dark days of behaviorism, Alan Newell and Herbert Simon were
already using computers to simulate cognitive processes (Simon and Newell, 1958;
Newell and Simon, 1961). Ever since then, cognitive science (CogSci) and artificial
intelligence (AI) go hand in hand to unravel the mystery of the workings of the mind1.
As put by Casey and Moran (1989), Solso (1988) pointed out that AI and CogSci
developed “a kind of symbiotic relationship, each profiting from the development
of the other”. CogSci can guide AI in “the identification of cognitive structures and
processes that can ultimately be implemented as part of an AI-based model” (Poison
et al., 1984, p. 280). While AI can provide “conceptual tools necessary to formalize
assumptions about representation and process that are basic to all of the cognitive
sciences” (Poison et al., 1984, p. 290).
Even if the status of the symbiotic relationship between AI and CogSci is dis-
turbed nowadays2, the core hypothesis that a cognitive system is a computational
0Inspired by Publilius Syrus: “As men, we are all equal in the presence of death".
1The main implication of the computational nature of mind and cognition is its multiple realizability. It
means that a given computation (like a cognitive process) can be realized on any other (than our brains)
physical system. This implication binds CogSci and AI together.
2This is both the author’s personal view and the view of the founders of CogSci. For example, Noam
Chomsky in his speech during the 150th anniversary of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
symposium on "Brains, Minds and Machines" (2012), displayed his lack of enthusiasm for the current
developments in AI, and how it disrupts the relationship between AI and CogSci. Yarden Katz (2012),
in his article for The Atlantic, very accurately summarized Chomsky’s speech: “Chomsky critiqued
the field of AI for adopting an approach reminiscent of behaviorism, except in more modern, compu-
tationally sophisticated form. Chomsky argued that the field’s heavy use of statistical techniques to
pick regularities in masses of data is unlikely to yield the explanatory insight that science ought to
3
system has remained the status quo3 for decades (Turing, 1950; McCulloch, 1965;
Marr, 1982; Minsky, 1985; Dennett, 1991; Metzinger, 2004; McDermott, 2001; Minsky,
2007; Edelman, 2008a; Griffiths, 2015). Every computational system, by definition,
realizes computations. There are two main traditions of using the word ‘computa-
tion’ in cognitive science. It is used either in ‘information processing’ sense or in
‘manipulation of representations’ sense (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2010). The second
sense presupposes the first but adds an additional commitment to a representational
nature of cognition. As argued by Piccinini (2004), “computation per se, in the sense
implicitly defined by the practices of computability theory and computer science,
does not require representation” (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2010, p. 239.). Here, we do
not make any explicit commitments towards representations, and we define the term
‘computation’ or ‘computational process’ as a transformation of input to output by
a computational (cognitive) system (see Fig. 1.1). Further, we call a ‘computational
problem’ a description of a problem the system is facing, in terms of a characteriza-
tion of inputs and outputs. Crucially, the inputs of the problem are usually not the
same as physical, observable, and measurable inputs to the system (see Fig. 1.1). The
same physical inputs can serve, after some processing, as inputs to different com-
putational problems. For example, a collection of light-waves patterns is a physical
and an observable input to the system, and it may further be an input to a prob-
lem of depth perception, as well as to a problem of visual abduction. In case of the
latter, the input would take a form of discretely expressible observations. Similarly,
the same observable outputs of a system (behavior) might be a result of different
computational problems. To define, describe and analyze an unobservable process,
given only observable physical inputs and outputs of the system, is a great challenge
in cognitive science. For this challenge to ever end with success, the computational
process of interest, as well as its observable counterparts, need to be precisely defined
and formalized.
Characterization of a computation and study of a computational system, such
as a cognitive system, requires analysis on multiple levels of abstraction (Marr and
offer. For Chomsky, the “new AI” – focused on using statistical learning techniques to better mine and
predict data – is unlikely to yield general principles about the nature of intelligent beings or about
cognition”. More recently, a similar point was raised by Judea Pearl during his talk at the conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, when he emphasized that without a higher level theory,
statistical learning techniques are severely limited (Pearl, 2017).
3Edelman (2008a) argues that there is no other viable alternative.
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physical 
inputs
INPUT OUTPUTCOMPUTATIONALPROCESS
Computational system: a person
observable 
outputs
Deﬁnition of a computational problem
Fig. 1.1.: An illustrated definition of a computational problem and a computational system. A
computational problem is a transformation, by a computational process, of an input into an
output of a problem. Inputs and outputs of the problem are usually not the same as the physical
inputs and outputs to the system. This distinction highlights the importance of formally
defining the computational problem and precisely establishing its relation to the observable
and measurable physical inputs and outputs.
Poggio, 1976; Marr, 1982). Here, we give only a short preview of these levels (so-called
Marr’s levels of explanation), as detailed analyses and commentaries are presented in
a multitude of versions and places, e.g. Marr (1982), Anderson (1990), McClamrock
(1991), and Edelman (2008a). Marr’s levels of explanation consist of three levels.
Starting from the definition of a computational problem the system is facing in terms
of input-output mapping (so-called computational level), through analyzing algorithms
that can solve the problem (so-called algorithmic level), to physical mechanisms that
implement the algorithmic solution (so-called implementational level). As proposed by
Marr (1982), and elaborated by Edelman (2008a, p. 71), “[the computational level]
is the most proper place to start thinking about any instance of computation: if we
don’t understand why the computation happens and what its inputs and outputs are,
even a good understanding of the mechanisms involved (assuming it can be achieved
without any idea of the “big picture”) would still leave the entire process shrouded in
mystery”. Here, we also focus on the computational level. The computational level
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is important for formalizing and defining a computational problem that a cognitive
system is facing, and analyzing how difficult the problem is.
Intuitively, it’s easy to imagine that not all computational problems are equal in
their difficulty. For example, multiplying two numbers is more difficult than adding
two numbers. Adding two 10-digits numbers requires 10 logical operations (for
each pair of digits the summation needs to be performed) while multiplying two
10-digits numbers requires 100 logical operations (each digit from one number is
multiplied with each digit from the second number). In general, we can say that some
computational problems are inherently easy. Both multiplication and addition, or
checking whether an item is on a list (regardless of how long the list is), or sorting a list
according to some rules, are considered easy. They are easy because the solution can
be realized in a polynomial number of computational steps (logical operations). To
assess the difficulty of a computation, a special branch of computer science is devoted
to study computations and their computational complexity (Garey and Johnson, 1979).
With computational complexity analysis, one can theoretically derive a lower bound
on the number of computational steps needed for the best possible algorithm to solve
that computational problem. If an algorithm, for a given computational problem, runs
in a realistic amount of time regardless of the size of the input, the computational
problem is considered easy or tractable.
Not all problems are tractable, many problems are provably difficult to solve,
as they require a non-polynomial number of computational steps to solve. These
problems are called intractable, and it means that there does not exist a computational
system (a person, a supercomputer, the Universe) that can solve the problem in a
reasonable amount of time. Contrary to what one might expect, intractable problems
are all around us. For example, when playing chess, assessing whether our next move
is the best given a setup on a chessboard, is intractable. Similarly, planning a road trip
is difficult. If one wants to plan a trip to visit a number of cities in the shortest tour,
given the distances between all pairs of the cities, assembling the tour that would
be the shortest, is proven to be intractable. The solution would require trying all
combinations (permutations) of possible tours, to see which one is the shortest. If
we want to visit three cities (A, B, C), the number of computational steps required to
calculate the shortest tour would be 6 (3!), as we need to check all of the combinations
(A-B-C, A-C-B, B-C-A, B-A-C, C-A-B, C-B-A). If we plan a bigger road trip, with e.g.
20 cities, that would require 20! ≈ 1018 computational steps.
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It is important to realize that the difficulty of a problem does not (only) come
from the input size, but it also comes from the structure of the input. This observation
can be illustrated with the vertex cover problem (Garey and Johnson, 1979, Problem
GT1), where the input of the problem is a graph, and the output is a subset of vertices
such that for every edge either start- or end-point is in the subset (Fig. 1.2). We can see
that even if the size of the input is the same (the number of vertices = 6), the way the
graph is structured, can change how difficult a given instance is (compare ‘input 1’
vs. ‘input 2’ in Fig. 1.2). This observation that manipulating the structure of the input
can change how difficult a problem is, is crucial, as it gives a chance of redefining the
inputs to be constrained to only some special structures (or parameters) for which
we can show that restricting these parameters would make it possible to solve the
problem in a reasonable amount of time (Garey and Johnson, 1979).
Why are these considerations important for cognitive science? They are univer-
sal for any computational problem, including problems that cognitive systems need
to face. Most of the cognitive theories, models, and frameworks, however, ignore the
complexity side of computations and the limitations of computational systems. This
results in postulating computations that are too hard for a cognitive (or any other)
system to realize. To realize the proposed computations, the cognitive system would
have to possess unlimited computational power, knowledge, memory and have more
than all the time in the universe at its disposal. This creates an apparent paradox:
on the one hand, the proposed (unrealistic) computations aim at describing, and
ultimately explaining human cognitive processes, yet they require unhuman amount
of resources. These kinds of resources that can be attributed to demonic entities (see
Box 1). Postulating demonic computations puts cognitive science in a difficult posi-
tion: either the researchers assume that humans are indeed demon-like omniscient
and omnipotent beings, or the theories postulate mischaracterized computations. In
what follows, we assume the latter.
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input 1:
input 2:
Is this the best 
you can do?!
I do not 
know...
Fig. 1.2.: The figure illustrates examples of easy (tractable) and difficult (intractable) problems.
Checking whether an item is on a list is an example of an easy problem. Playing perfect chess
is an example of a difficult problem. The right picture highlights the relevance of the input
structure of a computational problem. Here, we present two instances of the vertex cover
problem: input 1 and input 2. Given a graph, the vertex cover problem involves finding a
subset of vertices such that for every edge either start- or end-point is in the subset. Green
vertices represent solutions to these instances. We can see that, even if the size of the input
(the number of vertices) is the same for both instances, the instances differ in their difficulty.
This observation, however, does not change the fact that the general vertex cover problem is
still a difficult (intractable) problem. To use this observation requires explicitly redefining and
constraining the problem to only a special subset of possible inputs.
The aim of this dissertation is to expose and analyze different manifestations of,
what we will call from now on, computational demons. A computational demon is
a postulated intractable computation that cannot be realized by a cognitive system
within a realistic amount of time. It is necessarily a property of a formally defined
theory or a model, not of the system itself. In this thesis, we expose different mani-
festations and implications of computational demons that are hiding particularly in
two influential theories from cognitive science: Adaptive Toolbox (AT) and Predictive
Processing (PP). Both theories give a conceptually broad account of a human function-
ing in an uncertain and complex world. Interestingly, the main premise of Adaptive
Toolbox is, that the theory is free from computational demons while pointing to the
demons in theories like PP. We will show that neither AT nor PP has battled their
demons yet and that the demons manifest in different assumptions of the theories.
In what follows, we will first revisit the history of demons and bounded ratio-
nality. Then, we briefly present both theories (AT and PP), and their origins, hint to
the demons’ manifestations and conclude with an outline of the rest of the thesis.
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Box 1: The history of demons.
Throughout the ages, philosophers, and
physicists have often anthropomorphized
problems by bringing to existence creatures
of unrealistic powers, such as demons. The
main characteristic of these creatures was
the ability to accomplish something that
would seemingly violate the standards of
knowledge and would challenge the cur-
rent level of understanding of a considered
issue. This form of a thought experiment
encourages exorcising the demon, and there-
fore providing a solution to the apparent
paradox the demon represents. The most fa-
mous demons from physics and philosophy
are perhaps Maxwell’s demon, who chal-
lenged the laws of thermodynamics and
Laplace’s demon, who represented causal
determinism.
Maxwell’s demon was a creature that sup-
posedly defied the second law of thermo-
dynamics by being able to decrease the en-
tropy of a system (Bennett, 1987). In a hy-
pothetical scenario, the demon could ac-
complish this by manipulating a small trap-
door between two chambers filled with
the same gas. The demon would separate
fast moving molecules from slowly moving
molecules resulting in having one hotter
and one colder chamber (faster molecules
are hotter). This ordering of particles vio-
lates the second law of thermodynamics,
according to which the temperature of the
two chambers should remain equal (and
hence disordered). It took more than 100
years to show that the demon could not ex-
ist. The final (theoretical) solution has been
proposed by Bennett (1987). To work, the
demon would have to collect information
about the speed of the molecules and reg-
ister it in some sort of memory. With time,
the demon would run out of the memory
space and would need to start deleting in-
formation. Since deletion is an irreversible
process, it always leads to an increase in en-
tropy (disorder). It means that the demon
could exist, but only for a limited time until
it runs out of the memory (Bennett, 1987).
Laplace’s demon was imagined to be om-
nipotent and omniscient, being able to de-
terministically predict the future of the uni-
verse based on the knowledge it had about
the past configurations of all the particles in
the universe. Laplace’s demon was refuted
mainly by Heisenberg uncertainty princi-
ple (Brillouin, 1959) that poses limitations
on the precision with which one can mea-
sure position and momentum of a particle
at the same time. It means that the demon
could not actually be omniscient, and could
not have the perfect knowledge to make the
fully deterministic predictions. Moreover,
the demon could not be computationally
omnipotent, because there are limits to the
computational power of the universe itself
(more specifically to how much information
can be registered and how many logical op-
erations performed by the universe since
the big bang, assuming that the universe is
a physical system (Lloyd, 2002)). It means
that by principle, the demon is not omnipo-
tent, as it cannot register more information
and perform more logical operations than
the Universe itself.
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The origins of computational demons
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 
THEORY
the ﬁt between 
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toolbox adaptation
LOGIC BASED AI
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PROBABILITY 
THEORY
uncertain reasoning
heuristics
approximations
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of small experiments
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
promise
‘as-if’ explanations
Bernoulli, 1713
Bayes, 1763
Bayesian inference
logical omniscience
Cognitive Science is born. 
Researchers focus on investi-
gating the nature of cognition, 
including human rationality
Unbounded rationality
realm
Rationality based on optimality 
and internal coherence of beliefs 
and inferences.
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t 
probabili
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aches
Fig. 1.3.: The figure represents a historical overview of different accounts of rationality with
their manifestations of computational demons. Accounts that stem from logic include epistemic
logic and logic-based AI theories. Historically, these accounts have been rejected due to their
assumption of unbounded resources (demons). Their main opponents, the probability-based
theories, promised a bounded approach to rationality. Formally, however, this class of theories
still belongs to unbounded rationality realm, as it postulates countless forms of different
manifestations of computational demons. Seemingly outside of the unbounded reality realm
lies the Adaptive Toolbox theory that is built on the bounded rationality premise. The status of
this theory as a (finally) demon-free theory has been challenged however by our recent results
(see Chapter 5).
Computational demons, as used here, are inspired by Gigerenzer’s ‘demons of ratio-
nality’. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) introduce the notion of ‘demons of rationality’ to
describe classical theories of rationality that do not take into account human limited
resources (so-called theories of unbounded rationality, see Fig. 1.3). Demons of ratio-
nality are closely related to Laplace’s demon (see Box 1), as they assume that humans
are omnipotent and omniscient creatures. This is, of course, not stated explicitly,
rather necessarily entailed by the assumptions the unbounded rationality theories
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make. In the view of unbounded rationality, the laws of probability xor axioms of
logic describe and prescribe how the ‘rational’ behavior, reasoning, judgment and
decision making should look like.
In the case of logic-based unbounded rationality theories, historically, we can
distinguish two fractions. First, philosophical logic’s attempts to formalize human
rationality with, e.g., a branch of epistemic logic. The problem with this approach
is that from the epistemic axioms, it (logically) follows that humans are omniscient
beings (Hintikka, 1975). In general, these theories have been given little attention
in the mainstream CogSci, but in logic, they are still under development (Benthem,
2006). The second kind of logic-based rationality theories comes from proof theory, a
monotonic logic-based AI, e.g., Newel’s and Simon’s General Problem Solver (Newell
et al., 1958; Newell and Simon, 1961), including a heuristic approach (Newell et al.,
1957; Simon and Newell, 1958), that later will constitute a foundation of the Adaptive
Toolbox approach (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). Other examples include the (formal)
‘language of thoughts’ of Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), or Inhelder’s and Piaget’s ideas
of logical reasoning as an ultimate stadium of human development (Inhelder and Pi-
aget, 1958). As argued by Oaksford and Chater (Oaksford and Chater, 1991; Oaksford
and Chater, 1998; Oaksford and Chater, 2007; Chater and Oaksford, 1993), logic-based
theories of rationality need to be rejected and erased from the cognitive science tool-
box for several reasons: (a) logic-based theories cannot explain experimental data, (b)
logic deals with certainty, while humans need to survive in an uncertain world, (c)
checking consistency of sets of propositions is intractable, and therefore cannot, by
principle, underlie any cognitive theory, as human rationality is bounded. Oaksford
and Chater proposed an alternative view on human rationality, featuring Bayesian
probability theory, claiming that this approach is free from the problems of logic-based
theories. Probability-based theories build on embracing the uncertainty of the world
humans need to deal with every day and have been by now mostly accepted in con-
temporary CogSci, especially due to their empirical successes, e.g., Yuille and Kersten
(2006), Tenenbaum et al. (2006), and Temperley (2004). Interestingly, the omniscience
problem (that was visible in epistemic logic approach) is still present in probabilistic
theories. Whenever an agent believes in a set of propositions X, and a proposition
k logically follows from X, then the agent also needs to believe k. Moreover, proba-
bility functions assign equal probabilities to logically equivalent statements (Bartha,
2010). This means that if two proposition/pieces of information (p, q) are logically
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equivalent (p ⇐⇒ q), then a rational agent, if beliefs in one with certain probability
(P(p)), is obliged to believe in the other (P(q)) with equal probability (P(p) = P(q)).
These formal issues are not even the biggest problem of probabilistic theories. It has
been proven that similar to consistency checking in logic-based approaches, both
Bayesian inference (Cooper, 1990) and approximate Bayesian inference are intractable
(Abdelbar et al., 2000). This fact, however, has not led to a general rejection of the
probability-based unbounded rationality theories in the field. To why this is the case,
we try to answer in the next paragraph. Not all researchers, however, have conformed
to accepting demons as valid explanations of human cognitive processes. Gigerenzer
and Todd (1999) proposed a new research program in the studies of rationality, that
makes human limited resources their main premise. Adaptive Toolbox theory (which
we discuss further in details) proposes to redefine rationality in terms of ecological
rationality (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). The theory features fast and frugal heuristics,
that opposed to e.g. complicated expected utility models, arrive at decision fast with
limited information. According to various expected utility probabilistic frameworks,
an agent, to make a decision, must determine all possible consequences for every
decision the agent is considering, evaluate probabilities and estimate subjective utility
to each of the decisions, multiply each utility by its associated probability, and sum all
these numbers together (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). To best illustrate the problem of
unbounded rationality, we present an anecdote from Gigerenzer and Todd (1999, p.
9):
The greatest weakness of unbounded rationality is that it does not describe
the way real people think. Not even philosophers, as the following story
illustrates. One philosopher was struggling to decide whether to stay at
Columbia University or to accept a job offer from a rival university. The
other advised him: “Just maximize your expected utility–you always write
about doing this.” Exasperated, the first philosopher responded: “Come
on, this is serious.”
The question of why computational demons are so omnipresent in cognitive science
requires a careful treatment. Here, to answer this question, we adopt Edelman’s
(2008; 2012) observations, and argue two reasons: (1) leaving out computational level
analysis of a problem, (2) expressing theories verbally, not formally. These two points
are related, as (2) is needed for (1), but it is important to make these two points
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separately explicit. As pointed out by Edelman (2008b, p. 5) “the failure to distinguish
algorithm- or implementation-level descriptions from complete theories is endemic
in cognitive science writing.” Further, Edelman (2008b, p. 5) writes:
“Any explanation that leaves out the [computational] level [...] is incom-
plete in a more profound sense than an explanation that misses some
implementational details. It is interesting to note, therefore, that it is the
[computational] level that tends to be left out of the accounts of cognition
– presumably because a theory-less mechanistic description is more eas-
ily mistaken for a complete explanation than an implementation-neutral
[computational] theory.”
The reason why leaving out the computational level analysis of a problem may lead to
computational demons, is because computational demons occupy the computational
level. Demons, defined as intractable computational problems, can be found and
addressed during computational level analysis. Researchers who choose to ignore
the computational level analysis, and focus on the algorithmic or implementational
level instead, lose the chance to see, recognize and prevent the demons. What is, and
what is not, possible at the algorithmic level is strictly (Blokpoel, 2017) defined at
the computational level. Ignoring the demons on the computational level, or starting
the analysis of a problem at the algorithmic level brings (unavoidable) risk of ending
up with unreasonable algorithms that not only cannot serve as algorithmic level
explanations but also might be wrongly mistaken for actual demons. The latter usually
motivates addressing the ‘demons’ at the algorithmic level, which effectively means
borrowing methods from a rich toolbox of machine learning techniques designed for
general purpose algorithms. This involves evoking approximations or heuristics*4 as
methods of dealing with demons, or claiming that humans work only ‘as if’ they were
resource unbounded demonic beasts. As it has been argued multiple time, neither
approximations (Rooij, 2008; Rooij and Wareham, 2012; Kwisthout et al., 2011), nor
heuristics* (Rooij, 2008; Rooij et al., 2012), nor ‘as-if’ explanations (Rooij, 2008; Rooij
4Not to be mistaken with fast and frugal heuristics postulated by the Adaptive Toolbox theory. It is
important to highlight the distinction between these heuristics and the AI heuristics. As phrased
by Goodie et al. (1999, p. 327) “AI treats heuristics as general-purpose demons. Although they are
not expected to exhibit godlike perfection, they are admired for and evaluated on, their ability to
approach perfection in any given domain, regardless of the time and resources required”. Henceforth,
the Adaptive Toolbox heuristics will be referred to as ‘heuristics’, and heuristics-demons will be referred
to as ‘heuristics*’.
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et al., 2018) are a valid way of addressing computational demons. Such practices, in
the face of computational demons, are like tilting at windmills.
On a more positive note, neither should the researchers feel helpless nor their
theories be doomed when facing computational demons (Rooij, 2008). This includes
both unbounded and bounded theories of rationality. Rooting out the computational
demons, however, needs to come from computational level problem definition con-
straints (recall Fig. 1.1), not from the algorithmic level. There is a formal methodology
devoted to it, that has been proposed, described and explained in, e.g., Rooij (2008),
Rooij and Wareham (2007), and Rooij (2015). But before the methodology can be
applied, the theories need to be formalized.
Edelman (2012, p. 2) argues that many (explanatory) struggles in cognitive
science happen “[...] because too often theories are stated in a conceptually inadequate
language, which in turn stems from glossing over interdisciplinary issues.”
Theories that are not expressed formally, since they must rely on a subjective
understanding of implicit assumptions, are in danger of incorporating the subjective
knowledge into the theory. It means that some level of understanding of the world of a
researcher needs to account for imprecision delivered by a theory expressed in natural
language. What is promised by a verbal theory (a conclusion based on premises and
assumptions) very often cannot be met anymore once the theory is formalized. It is
not because there is something ‘wrong’ with the formal theory, but because once the
assumptions are formalized, they don’t hold as promised (see Fig. 1.4).
Formalization of a verbal theory is a process of transcribing vague assumptions
expressed in natural language, into formally expressed precise theory. The ultimate
goal of formalization is to remove from the verbal theories all inconsistencies, gaps,
holes and inner contradictions that were present in the verbal version and accounted
for by using imprecise natural language. Most importantly, computational demons can
be found, and dealt with, only in the formal theories. For these reasons, formalization
lies at a heart of this thesis.
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FORMALIZED
THEORYVERBAL THEORY gaps holes
contradictions
inconsistencies
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION
Fig. 1.4.: The figure represents the process of formalizing a verbal theory. Turning a verbal,
intuitively stated theory into a formalized theory is a long process of eliminating inconsistencies,
resolving contradictions and identifying conceptual gaps and holes hidden in the ambiguity
of natural language and commonsensical knowledge. Crucially, the conclusions that can be
drawn from a verbal theory usually become incompatible with conclusions drawn from its
formal version.
The voices of computational plausibility
Despite the general state of obliviousness, not all cognitive theories ignore the demons
situation. There are research programs built explicitly around psychological (com-
putational) or physical constraints and limitations of a cognitive system. In this
dissertation, we analyze two influential theories/frameworks: Adaptive Toolbox (AT)
focusing on computational limitations, and Predictive Processing (PP) focusing on
physical limitations. Each of the theories comes from a different background, and
a different school of thought, and is influential in a different subfield of cognitive
science. PP, having its roots in physics, dominated (theoretical) cognitive neuroscience,
while AT with roots in behavioral economics, is more popular in psychology, espe-
cially in research on decision making and rationality. Both frameworks focus on
explaining how cognitive systems, such as humans, can survive, make inferences and
take actions in an uncertain world. The proponents of the Adaptive Toolbox account,
Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC research group, propose that “the mind resembles
an adaptive toolbox with various heuristics tailored for specific classes of problems –
much like the hammers and screwdrivers in a handyman’s toolbox” (Gigerenzer, 2008,
p. 20). A heuristic is an information-processing mechanism that works by ignoring
information. More specifically, a heuristic uses only a few pieces of information to
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arrive at a decision. The heuristics are assumed to be built into the mind by evolution
to work in specific domains of inference and reasoning (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999).
The ideas behind AT stem from the ideas on bounded rationality as proposed
by Simon (1972) and Simon (1990a). It is the same Simon that contributed to the
foundations of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Classical or unbounded
accounts of rationality model human decision making with probability theory, by e.g.
maximization of expected utility or Bayesian models (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999),
leaving little or no regard to the limited nature of human resources, such as time,
knowledge and computational power (see Box 1). Bounded rationality, on the other
hand, explains human rationality especially in terms of limited resources and the
adaptive nature of an interaction between humans and their environments. Simon
believed that “Human rational behavior...is shaped by a scissors whose two blades
are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor”
(Simon, 1990b, p. 7). The Adaptive Toolbox features a notion of ecological rationality,
that abstractly speaking, captures the fit between the two blades of Simon’s scissors
(Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012). Ecological rationality is defined as a match between
heuristics from the toolbox and different environmental structures. The heuristics
exploit the environmental structures in a frugal way, to arrive at a solution/decision
fast.
Predictive Processing, on the other hand, rather than being concerned with
explicit psychological or computational limitations, cares more for fundamental phys-
ical constraints. PP builds on and draws ideas from physics. It is not necessarily an
unjustified practice, since every computational system is essentially a physical system,
and what the computational-physical system can and cannot do might be a valid
question to be answered by physics. The problem with this approach, however, is
that in general, physics is concerned neither with a complexity of a computation nor
computational limitations. As pointed out by Gefter (2014, p. 553): “[computational
complexity] is not a subfield to which physicists have tended to look for fundamen-
tal insight.”. This may inevitably lead to developing a closed formal account of a
computational process that might follow principles of physics but cannot serve as a
psychologically plausible explanation.
PP, rooting its formal premises in, among others, thermodynamics, builds on
the observation that biological systems ‘resist a natural tendency to disorder’, unlike
a snowflake that is melting, or a candle burning away (Allen and Friston, 2016).
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To explain this phenomenon, PP proposes that a biological system is a priori con-
strained to visiting only a limited —relevant for maintaining homeostasis — number
of sensory/computational states. This a priori constrained state space is built in the
biological system by evolution in a form of prior expectations as a part of the agents’
(systems’) generative models. The function of the generative models is to generate
predictions about agents’ sensory inputs, making the PP-agents prediction machines
that try to uncover the hidden causes of the inputs (since the world cannot be directly
observed, only inferred). If an agent finds itself in a surprising (not predicted) state,
the agent will try to change this state by minimizing surprise (defined as a negative
log-evidence). Minimizing surprise over a longer period of time is equivalent to
minimizing entropy. Evaluating surprise directly, however, would require performing
a Bayesian inference (inferring what caused the sensation), that is known to be in-
tractable (Cooper, 1990). To (seemingly) avoid this demon, PP borrows from physics
another quantity, free energy, which is an upper bound on surprise. This way, it is
promised, that the agents need to minimize only the upper bound, which implicitly
minimizes surprise as well (Friston, 2010; Friston, 2012b). The assumption is that the
agents do not have to evaluate the surprise directly, as long as the agents minimize
prediction error (a divergence between prediction and observation), they minimize
surprise, and consequently, entropy.
The choice to analyze these two frameworks is not accidental. Both of them are
(a) influential and successful in their subfields, which makes them both significant for
general CogSci; (b) built around the adaptive nature of human cognition, featuring
the importance of the relationship between environments and agents, and (c) more
(AT) or less (PP) explicitly concerned with avoiding computational demons. Lastly,
and interestingly, in the face of AT criteria, PP is an example of a demon, because PP
assumes domain-general Bayesian inference. What we will show in this dissertation
is that the demons, even if being actively avoided, still hide in different corners of
theoretical assumptions.
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What not to expect
Readers, who are expecting to find here demon-free theories explaining how the
brain works, definite answers to which of the theories is ‘better’ (however defined),
or any sort of positive message (in terms of ‘making something work’), might be
disappointed. It does not mean, however, that we don’t provide any optimistic
outlook. At a first glance, our methods and methodologies might come as a more
disruptive approach compared to what a reader might traditionally be used to. A
careful reader, however, will find the constructive side of our approach, attempting
at making cognitive science better. The methods presented in this dissertation aim
at challenging, analyzing, formalizing and testing assumptions of the theories for a
presence of computational demons. We focus on analyzing postulated assumptions
of AT and PP theories, to uncover different manifestations of computational demons.
We show that regardless of the conceptual commitments of the theories, they hide
the same kinds of demons. For our analyses, we employ different methodologies,
such as formal modeling, conceptual analysis, evolutionary simulations, agent-based
simulations, robo-havioral simulations, and computational complexity analysis.
Outline
In Chapter 2, we open with a discussion about the evolvability of adaptive toolboxes.
According to proponents of AT, evolution has endowed adaptive toolboxes with
‘ecological rationality’, defined as the ability to make good quality decisions in their
specific environments. In this chapter we explore to what extent the mechanisms
of evolution alone can produce ecologically rational toolboxes. We present a formal
argument for why evolution is unlikely to produce ecologically rational toolboxes
given the astronomically large space of possible toolboxes. The probability of finding
one or more ecologically rational toolboxes in this space is negligibly small, even
granting an evolutionary time scale of searching for it. We furthermore present
artificial evolution simulations results that show that evolution can produce toolboxes
of heuristics that are ‘good enough’ to survive, but that those toolboxes are not
ecologically rational (in agreement with our formal argument).
Comparable results, but for the PP theory, we provide in Chapter 3. Here,
we show that PP-agents can survive in the world without successfully minimizing
entropy. This seems to violate the main premise of PP stating that in order to survive,
agents must minimize entropy. Current developments and advances in PP indicate
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that the interaction between agents and their environments is a crucial component of
entropy minimization. In this chapter, we explore by means of computer simulations,
what kinds of structures and environments are exploitable by PP-agents. We argue
the need to redefine the notion of success in PP in terms of entropy, behavioral and
cognitive success, as we show that the environmental conditions that lead to entropy
success, are different from conditions that lead to behavioral or cognitive success.
Furthermore, we show that being equipped in and applying the mechanisms to
minimize prediction error, does not in practice guarantee that the agents will be
successful in any sense (entropy, cognitive or behavioral).
Further, as we continue with the PP theory, in a short Chapter 4, we point out
another problem PP-agents have to face when interacting with their environments.
In order to avoid computational demons, Friston’s conceptualization (Friston et al.,
2007; Friston, 2017a) of PP is based on a Laplace assumption. This means that causes
of sensory inputs are assumed to be represented as unimodal probability density
functions. We explain why this assumption poses an unrealistic simplification of a
perception of the world and how it would prevent PP-agents from distinguishing
between simple objects. We argue that Predictive Processing theory needs to let go of
the Laplace assumption, and redefine the density functions in terms of multimodal
distributions.
In Chapter 5, we revisit the discussion about Adaptive Toolbox and follow up
on our results from Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, we show that an ecologically rational
adaptive toolbox are highly unlikely to be adapted by evolutionary processes only. In
Chapter 5 we provide an extended proof, showing that not only evolution but none of
the other adaptation processes (such as learning or development) could result in eco-
logically rational adaptive toolboxes. This finding puts the AT theory back with other
intractable classical theories of human rationality based on logic or probability theory.
We believe that this finding is of general interest for the cognitive science community,
as it can serve to reopen the debate between logicists, Bayesians, and heuristicists
on what genuinely constitutes the computational strengths and weaknesses of their
respective approaches. In this chapter, we also present a methodology with which all
three accounts can battle their respective demons.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we propose a novel research methodology based on robot
simulation, that aims to strengthen, improve and revise a theory, and help bridge the
gap between theoretical and empirical research. The methodology is summarized by
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four keywords: Formalize verbal theories into computational models; Operationalize
this computational model into a working robot implementation; Explore the conse-
quences of various design choices and parameter settings to generate empirically
testable hypotheses; and finally Study these hypotheses in behavioral or imaging
experiments. We lay out a research program that aims at investigating various open
issues in PP and exemplifies our approach in a simple case study.
Lastly, in the Discussion Chapter, we provide a short comparison between AT
and PP; explain how to reconcile the existence of computational demons in the face
of empirical success; elaborate more on different manifestations of computational
demons; give the last summary of our results, and share the take-home message.
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Abstract
Gigerenzer and colleagues have proposed the ‘adaptive toolbox of heuristics’ as
an account of resource-bounded human decision-making. According to these
authors, evolution has endowed such toolboxes with ‘ecological rationality’, de-
fined as the ability to make good quality decisions in their specific environments.
Here we explore to what extent the mechanisms of evolution alone can produce
ecologically rational toolboxes. We present a formal argument for why evolution
is unlikely to produce ecologically rational toolboxes given the astronomically
large space of possible toolboxes. The probability of finding one or more eco-
logically rational toolboxes in this space is negligibly small, even granting an
evolutionary time scale of searching for it. We furthermore present artificial
evolution simulations results that show that evolution can produce toolboxes
of heuristics that are ‘good enough’ to survive, but that those toolboxes are not
ecologically rational (in agreement with our formal argument). Our results do
not rule out that ontogenetic adaptation processes (development and learning)
may yield ecologically rational toolboxes, but it does put into question the idea
that phylogenetic processes (evolution) could. We discuss the implications of our
findings for future theoretical research on heuristic decision-making.
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Introduction
We make decisions every day, ranging from selecting an outfit or choosing groceries
to deciding whom to marry. Even though our decisions aren’t always optimal, they
seem to be more often right than wrong in everyday contexts. One prominent account
of how we are able to make good quality decisions, despite our bounded resources, is
the adaptive toolbox of heuristics account proposed by Gigerenzer and colleagues
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer, 2004). According to this
account, an adaptive toolbox is a collection of specialized cognitive mechanisms—
called fast and frugal heuristics—that evolution has built into the human mind
for purposes of decision making (Gigerenzer, 2001; Gigerenzer and Sturm, 2012),
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999, p. 30). The heuristics are called ‘fast’ because they can
reach decisions with only a few computation steps, and ‘frugal’ because they use little
information. Furthermore, the heuristics in the adaptive toolbox are believed to be
‘ecologically rational’ (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2002), i.e. tailored to
the contexts in which they are used.
The adaptive toolbox account has had many empirical and explanatory suc-
cesses in cognitive science (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999; Bröder, 2000; Pohl, 2006;
Bergert and Nosofsky, 2007; Dieckmann and Rieskamp, 2007). Yet, the plausibility of
the claim that humans would have evolved adaptive toolboxes of heuristics seems to
be so far unexplored. Instead, proponents of the account seem to take the evolutionary
plausibility of their cognitive explanation for granted. In this paper we show that
the account’s evolutionary plausibility is not self-evident, and even questionable.
To see why this is so, we start by considering the notion of ecological rationality
as Gigerenzer and colleagues conceptualise it. Next, we explain why evolution is
unlikely to produce adaptive toolboxes with the feature of ecological rationality so
construed.
Unlike classical notions of rationality that are based on optimality and internal
coherence of beliefs and inferences, the adaptive toolbox account defines ecological
rationality in terms of the fit between actions and the world. For instance, Gigerenzer
and Todd (1999, p. 13) state it as follows: “A heuristic is ecologically rational to the
degree that it is adapted to the structure of an environment.” Here, ‘adapted’ refers
both to the property of being able to produce actions that fit the environment (i.e.,
being adapted), and to the process by which the toolbox comes to have that property
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(i.e., an adaptation process that leads to the property of being adapted to the structure
of the environment).
With respect to the fit between heuristics and the environment, Gigerenzer and
colleagues claim consistently that this fit (adapted in the property sense) is so good
that the quality of decisions is high, and even can outperform optimisation methods
(Todd, 2002a, Todd and Gigerenzer, 1999, p. 361), at least in those environments
to which the heuristics have been adapted (in the process sense). It is because of
this good quality that adapted heuristics can be genuinely said to have ecological
rationality. With respect to the nature of the process of adaptation, two general
variants need to be distinguished: phylogenetic adaptation processes (evolution) and
ontogenetic adaptation processes (development or learning). Although both types
of processes have been claimed to be able to produce adaptive toolboxes that are
ecologically rational, here we focus specifically on the (im)plausibility of the idea that
a phylogenetic adaptation process would do so.
Clearly, evolution can produce organisms with ecological rationality. By a com-
bination of random variation and selection, organisms can come into existence that
have decision tendencies that are particularly tuned to particular environments. How-
ever, it is highly implausible, that organisms (especially humans) would come to have
such high degrees of ‘fitness’ if their decisions were based on toolboxes of heuristics
and evolution was to set the parameters of these toolboxes directly. The reason is that
toolboxes of heuristics have an enormous amount of degrees of freedom: A toolbox
can vary in terms of the number of heuristics it contains, and each heuristic can vary in
terms of both the possible environmental cues to which it responds and the different
possible actions it can perform. Given that the number of possible cue-heuristic-action
mappings grows exponentially in these parameters, the number of distinct possible
toolboxes does as well.
Given these considerations, what are the odds of evolution producing toolboxes
that are ecologically rational? This depends on how many toolboxes in the vast space
of possible toolboxes are ecologically rational. As we will show, the vast majority
of possible toolboxes aren’t ecologically rational. Even though the mechanisms of
natural selection are not random, the only evolutionary mechanisms that can produce
different toolboxes—such as mutation and crossover—are random. This means that
the chance of creating, and subsequently selecting, ecologically rational toolboxes
is so nanoscopically small that even on an evolutionary time scale it is extremely
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improbable that evolution would yield ecologically rational toolboxes. In this paper,
we elaborate on this argument both formally and using computer simulations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present a formalization
of the notion of an adaptive toolbox, to be used both in our formal argument and our
computer simulations. Next, we put forth a formal argument for the implausibility
of the idea that evolution could produce ecologically rational toolboxes based on
illustrative numerical estimates for even small toolboxes. We then describe the setup of
an artificial evolution environment that we use to empirically validate our argument.
We present results of simulations for three different setups, each demonstrating that
even though evolution can produce toolboxes that are ‘good enough’ to survive, these
toolboxes do not display any notable ecological rationality. We close by discussing
the broader implications of our findings for research into resource-bounded decision
making.
Formalizing the Adaptive Toolbox
In this section we will present a formalization of the adaptive toolbox account, which
involves formalizing components of the adaptive toolbox (heuristics with a selector)
as well as its environment. We represent each of the components as a fast and frugal
tree (see Figure ??). Each internal node in such a tree stands for a boolean function; a
tree evaluates only a limited set of statements (cues; which can be either true or false)
and a particular action is triggered by a particular sequence of cues progressing from
the root-node to the leaf representing that action.
Environment
The environment consists of a set of events (environmental cues) E = {e1, e2, . . . , en},
every event can be either true or false. A truth assignment for each event is called
asituation s. That is, a function s assigns truth values to each event in E, s : E→ {T, F}.
We denote the set of all possible situations by S = {T, F}n, where S is the set of
all possible n-length vectors of truth-values. For every situation there is a certain
favored action a to perform, where a is an element of the set of all possible actions
A = {a1, a2, . . . , am}. A function D : S → A maps each situation s ∈ S to an action
a ∈ A.
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Heuristics
Each heuristic in the toolbox is represented as a f ast and frugal tree (Martignon
et al., 2003; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011), a chain of cues with associated actions.
Each cue is a boolean function, evaluating whether an event e ∈ E is true in a given
situation, c(e, s). When executing a heuristic, the tree is traversed starting at the top.
Step by step the cue functions are passed, checking whether the cue holds. If the cue
c(e, s) evaluates to true for event e is in situation s, then the action a associated to that
cue c is executed. If the cue is false the next cue is evaluated until the bottom cue is
reached. If this last cue is false, the last action in the tree is performed.
c1
a1 c2
a2 a3
T F
T F
Fig. 2.1.: A single heuristic represented as a fast and frugal tree. The tree contains cues
C = {c1, c2} and associated actions {a1, a2, a3}. Each cue c ∈ C is a simple boolean function
which evaluates whether an event ej ∈ E is true or false, depending on the situation c(ej, sk). If
the cue function returns ’true’, the tree traversal stops and the action associated with the cue is
executed; otherwise the next cue function is executed. For example, if c1 is false, but c2 is true,
then the action a2 will be executed.
Selector
A selector determines which heuristic to use in a given situation. We represent the
selector as a fast and frugal tree as well1; the internal nodes are cues associated with
heuristics (see Figure 2.2). A heuristic is executed in the case a cue is evaluated to be
true.
1Hypotheses about the exact nature of the selector mechanism haven’t been developed to the same extent
as hypotheses about the structure of individual heuristics. Nevertheless, the common idea seems to be
that the selector, like the heuristics, is fast and frugal. For our purposes, and without loss of generality,
we assume that the selector can be modelled by a fast and frugal tree as well.
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¬c2
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¬c3
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a5 ¬c5a7
a10
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HEURISTIC 1
HEURISTIC 2
HEURISTIC 3
HEURISTIC 4
F
F
T
Fig. 2.2.: The adaptive toolbox selector and heuristics as fast and frugal trees. The selector is
represented by the pink nodes. The tree is traversed from left to right (selecting a heuristic) and
from top to bottom (executing a heuristic). For instance, let’s assume a situation such that c4("it
is sunny outside") = F, ¬c2("I have not read any book in a while") = T, and c5(‘my favorite
book is on the shelf") = T; in such a case the action a2 = "read the book" will be executed. Note
that when the last cue of the selector (c3) returns false, the first heuristic is executed by default.
Mathematical analysis
In this section we present a formal argument for the implausibility of generating
the ecologically rational adaptive toolboxes by means of evolutionary processes
alone. The argument is composed of three parts: search space argument, probability
argument and time argument.
Part 1: Search space and location-sensitivity
Let’s assume a simple environment (10 events, 50 actions).2 For the purpose of the
analysis we use the simplification that environments are structured such that at least
one adaptive toolbox would be able to act perfectly in it. Then there are 210 = 1024
situations an individual may encounter during its lifetime (see section Environment).
Further, let’s assume a simple toolbox of a size 12 = 3 (number of selector cues) +
(3 (number of heuristics) × 3 (number of cue/action pairs in each heuristic)). The
2Here, 50 actions may seem like a lot, but taking into account the number of different things one can do
e.g. with any given object (grasp it, throw it, squeeze, cut it, etc.) it is actually a moderate estimate.
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number of all possible different toolboxes is 1012(cues)×509(actions) = 1027. Let’s
consider a toolbox to be ecologically rational if it performs actions which are more
often right than wrong. Given that we define the fitness score as the proportion of the
number of situations in which a toolbox executes a correct action to the total number
of all possible situations, the fitness is in a range 0 to 1 inclusive, and a score of ≥ 0.5
indicates ecological rationality.
Table 2.1a represents a toolbox of size 12. We set the probability of a given cue
being true or false to 0.5. That means that for the first cue of the selector (S1 in the
Table 2.1a) there is a 50% chance that it will be true (and the first heuristic will be
executed) and 50% chance that it will be false (and the next selector (S2) cue will be
evaluated). We can now estimate the degree to which cues and actions contribute to
the toolbox’s fitness as a function of their location in the toolbox. If the first selector
cue (S1 in Table 2.1a), the first heuristic cue (H1:C1) and the first action of the first
heuristic (H1:A1) are correct,3 that already ensures performing a correct action in 256
situations (25% of a total number of 1024 situations) and it is worth 25% of the overall
fitness score (see Table 2.1b).
Given these dependencies, it is enough for a toolbox to have three actions and
five cues correct in order to reach the 0.5 score of fitness (see Table 2.1b). The search
space for mapping three actions to five cues is of size 503 × 105 = 1010. This number
holds given the assumption of equally distributed chances for a cue being true or
false. In case one takes, say, a 1:10 ratio instead, the first action (H1:A1) is no longer
worth 25% of fitness, but only 1%, which makes the search space grow drastically.
Part 2: Probabilities
Given the size of the search space for adaptive toolboxes, what is the probability that
a random process—à la mutation and crossover—generates a toolbox of a certain
level of fitness? To estimate these probabilities, we considered the fitness scores of
any toolbox with cues and actions at each position of the toolbox being either correct
or incorrect. Only a correct action can positively contribute to the overall fitness score
of the toolbox. If all cues leading to this action are also correct, it increases the fitness
by the relative probability of this action being executed. For example, if H1:A2 is
3Note that, if for instance, the first heuristic cue (H1:C1, Table 2.1a) is incorrect (e.g., instead of C1, there is
C3; and they are both either true or false), then it can still lead to execution of the first, and say, correct
action (H1:A1). However, in half of the cases, where those cues are either true and false or false and
true, that will not lead to execution of correct (H1:A1) action.
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S1 S2 S3
H1:C1 H1:A1 H2:C1 H2:A1 H3:C1 H3:A1
H1:C2 H1:A2 H2:C2 H2:A2 H3:C2 H3:A2
H1:C3 H1:A3 H2:C3 H2:A3 H3:C3 H3:A3
50% 25% 12.5%
25% 25% 12.5% 12.5% 6.25% 6.25%
12.5% 12.5% 6.25% 6.25% 3.125% 3.125%
6.25% 6.25% 3.125% 3.125% 1.6% 1.6%
Tab. 2.1.: (a) A schematic representation of a toolbox of size 12. In this toolbox, S1 is the first
selector cue, H1:X is the first heuristic, H1:C1 is the first heuristic cue and H1:A1 is the first
action in the first heuristic. (b) A representation of contribution of cues and actions to fitness
depending on the their locations in a toolbox. The blue color indicates the minimal requirement
for an ecologically rational toolbox.
correct and all of the cues S1, H1:C1 and H1:C2 are as well, the fitness of the toolbox
is increased by the corresponding 12.5% points (see Table 2.1). However, if one of
the cues leading to this action is incorrect, it will be executed in half of the cases. If
two cues are incorrect, only in a quarter of the the cases will the action be executed,
and so on. Given the total number of actions and cues, the correct actions only occur
in 2%, and correct cues in 10% of all possible toolboxes. That means that toolboxes
with a larger number of incorrect actions and cues are much more likely to happen.
Using these probabilities, we computed the probabilities of randomly generating a
toolbox with a certain level of fitness. For example, the probability of generating an
ecologically rational toolbox (fitness ≥ 0.5) is 1.9× 10−9 and the probabilities decline
super-exponentially for higher fitness scores (see Table 2.2).
fitness ≥0.1 ≥0.2 ≥0.3 ≥0.4 ≥0.5 ≥0.6 ≥0.7
fitness score probability 0.09 0.008 0.0002 10−6 10−9 10−13 10−18
# toolboxes per fitness score 1026 1025 1023 1021 1018 1014 109
total # of possible toolboxes 1953125000000000000000000000 (1027)
Tab. 2.2.: Probabilities of randomly generating a toolbox with a certain fitness score.
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Part 3: Time
Evolution operates on a time scale of billions of years. To estimate how long it
would take to generate a toolbox with a certain level of fitness, we assume that the
environment is constant and the average size of the population is 500. Furthermore,
the duration of one generation is assumed to be 15 years, and mutations happen for
almost all individuals in every generation. With these values, the expected time to
evolve a toolbox with a 0.5 level of fitness is:
time0.5 =
generation length
prob× population size =
15y
1.9× 10−9 × 500 ≈ 10
7y
Here, prob is the probability of generating a toolbox with a certain level of fitness
in one generation. Time grows super-exponentially for higher scores of fitness (see
Figure 2.3). This means that given the odds of randomly generating an ecologically
rational toolbox, a random process is expected to take on the order of 10 million years
to, by accident, produce a single ecologically rational individual.
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Fig. 2.3.: Time (in years) required to generate toolboxes with a certain level of fitness.
With this numerical examples we wish to illustrate the implausibility that evolution
would generate ecologically rational toolboxes. Even though adaptive toolboxes have
apparently simple structures, they are still characterized by extremely many degrees
of freedom. As we have shown, this makes it highly improbable that an evolutionary
adaption process would endow them with ecological rationality.
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Simulations
To support our theoretical point using computer simulations we designed an evolu-
tionary algorithm (for more details, see Section 2A at the end of this chapter). In our
setup, we randomly generate environments. As in our formal argument, we use the
simplification that environments are structured such that at least one adaptive toolbox
would be able to act perfectly in it. We achieve this by generating the environment
with a toolbox. The size of that toolbox is always constant. The number of selector
cues (5), the number of heuristics (5) and the number of cue/action pairs in each
heuristic (5) gives the total size of the environment 5+ 5× 5 = 30. Each individual in
a population is represented as a toolbox as well (the size of an individual may vary
from generation to generation and it is not restricted to ≤ 30). The first generation of
individuals are randomly generated simple toolboxes. More detailed description of
our setup is available at the end of this chapter, in the section Simulation Details.
Results
We designed three different conditions and ran 20 simulations for each one. In the
first, baseline condition we set the parameter ‘death rate’ based on evolution science
literature (normal death rate condition). In the second condition (higher death rate),
the death rate was increased relative to the normal death rate condition. Finally, for
the third condition (higher chances of offspring), the death rate was normal, but
the growth rate was increased. Other parameters (e.g., size of the world generating
toolbox, mutation rate) are always constant.
Condition 1: normal death rate
The initial size of a population was 500 and the death rate was 0.0004. The chances of
dying was a function of both death rate and fitness. For instance, individuals with a
fitness score 0 (no correct decisions) had 65% chance of survival and reproduction,
individuals with a fitness score 0.2 had 73% chance of survival, and individuals with
a fitness score 0.5 had 81% chance of survival. Each of the parents always generates at
least one child, and the probability of getting a second child is 33.3% per individual.
This number creates the minimal conditions for a population to be able to grow.
Under this condition 0% of the populations survived. Table 3 represents an
overview of all results, and Figure 2.4 shows the variation in fitness of populations
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of toolboxes throughout the different generations. As the Table 3 shows, fitness of
the populations is overall remarkably poor. The average fitness was 0.028, which is
considerably lower than the 0.5 threshold that we defined for ecologically rational
toolboxes. The fitness of the ‘best’ toolbox (from each generation) oscillates in the
range [0.1, 0.4].
All simulations ended far before one thousand generations, often even before a
hundred. All of the above indicate, that toolboxes perform poorly and do not improve
with time. We explored two parameters which potentially could have influence the
results. First, we reasoned that this effect might be due to a relatively low death rate.
Such a low death rate (i) may ensure the survival and possibility of reproduction
of individuals with lower fitness and (ii) imposes a lower pressure to select better
toolboxes. Second, we explored the possibility of giving toolboxes more offspring.
This change may lead to more populations surviving but we would not expect it
to improve the overall individuals’ fitness. To test these predictions we ran two
simulation studies, Conditions 2 and 3.
Condition 2: higher death rate
In this condition the death rate was increased (p = 0.00045; we opted for this rel-
atively small increase in death rate, because a higher death rate would not afford
successful runs, because none of individuals would survive the first survival-selection
phase). In total, 20% of the simulations ended with a surviving population (Figure
2.4). The average performance of the surviving populations is 0.071, and the aver-
age performance for the dying out populations is 0.031. In order to calculate the
average performance scores, we considered results from all the runs of simulations
for surviving populations and all for the dying out populations separately (for a
given condition), taking into account all the possible individual scores per every
generation. Comparing the fitness in this Condition 2 with the fitness from Condition
1, it becomes clear that even if the higher pressure does improve performance of the
toolboxes, as we had expected, the improvement is of a very small magnitude and
does not bring the toolboxes anywhere closer to the 0.5 fitness.
Condition 3: higher chances of offspring
In this condition, the probability of generating a second child was increased to 47.4%
per an individual. In total, 80% of the populations survived. As expected this survival
2.0 Results 33
rate was higher than in Condition 1 and 2. The average performance of the surviving
populations is 0.044, and the average performance for the dying out populations is
0.027. In sum, the simulations in Condition 3 show that a large growth rate leads to
large populations, but it does not make the individuals more ecologically rational.
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3
% of Survival: 0% 20% 80%
Average FitS: – 0.071 0.044
Average FitD: 0.028 0.031 0.027
Total average: 0.028 0.041 0.041
Tab. 2.3.: Results from the simulations for the three different conditions (1: normal death
rate; 2: higher death rate; 3: higher chances of offspring). Starting from the top, the rows show:
percentage of surviving populations for every condition; the average fitness score (FitS) for a
set of surviving populations per condition; the average fitness score (FitD) for a set of dying
out populations per condition; the total average of a fitness score per condition.
Discussion
Using both formal argument and computer simulation, we have demonstrated the
implausibility that phylogenetic processes (i.e., evolution) alone would ever produce
ecologically rational adaptive toolboxes. Our simulations showed that populations
of toolboxes that are ‘good enough’ to survive can evolve without these toolboxes
showing any signs of ‘ecological rationality’ (defined as the ability to make choices
that are more often right than wrong; i.e. ≥50% correct). In our simulation maximum
fitness of populations hovered around 0.2 (20% correct decisions) and never got
anywhere close to 0.5, let alone anything higher than that. The simulation results
align well with our formal derivations: the expected number of generations needed
to produce a toolbox grows exponentially. That means that even for only 10 possible
cues and 50 possible actions the expected number of generations needed to produce
at least one toolbox in the entire population with a fitness of at least 0.5 is 2,000,000
generations. For more possible cues or actions, the number of expected generations
needed to produce at least one ecologically rational toolbox is even vastly large.
Crucially, we refer here to the expected number of generations for producing
a single toolbox with the feature of ‘ecological rationality’. Even if evolution would
beat all odds and such an individual would be generated, the changes of its existence
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Fig. 2.4.: Examples of the simulations of dying out populations (a-c) and surviving populations
(d-e). The plots show the changes of fitness over the time of many generations, including scores
from the best ( ), worst ( ) and average ( ) fitness per generation. For the normal
death rate condition there is no surviving population.
leading to a population with that feature are nanoscopically small. The reason is
that toolboxes can survive with much lower fitness, and the chances of mutation
and crossover leading to fitness below 0.2 is very high. With every new generation
mutation and crossover occur, leading to a high probability that even if there is one
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ecologically rational individual in the pool that its offspring will be non-ecologically
rational individuals that can again survive and procreate.
Does this mean that the adaptive toolbox account is implausible as an account
of resource-bounded (human) decision making? Certainly not. Our findings do not
rule out that adaptive toolboxes could be produced by ontogenic processes (learning
and development), or even ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes combined (i.e.,
evolution could have produced those learning mechanisms that can produce adaptive
toolboxes on a developmental time scale). After all, ontogenetic processes–unlike
phylogenetic processes–are able to more actively search the space of possible parame-
ters settings, e.g. by building a model of the environment and using that model to
guide the search in a way that ensures ecologically rationality. However, in such a
case it seems that one has to use a non-frugal learning mechanism to explain the
emergence of adaptive toolboxes of fast and frugal heuristics. Resolving this tension
seems an important target for future research in the area of resource-bounded decision
making.
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2A. Simulation Details
In this supplementary section we describe the details of the design of the evolutionary
algorithm used to simulate the evolution of adaptive toolboxes. First, we provide a
general introduction to our setup. Later, we give a short overview of the evolutionary
algorithm, and we introduce the formula used to derive parameters used in our
simulations. We also include the pseudocode describing the step-by-step procedure
of one run of the algorithm. Lastly, we present more detailed information about
algorithm’s phases and present a detailed description of derived parameters used in
the simulations.
Preliminaries
Let’s assume a simple environment (10 events, 50 actions). For the purpose of the
analysis we use the simplification that environments are structured such that at least
one adaptive toolbox would be able to act perfectly in it. Then there are 210 = 1024
situations an individual may encounter during its lifetime. The environment, from
now on called world generating toolbox, is of size 30. The number of selector cues (5),
the number of heuristics (5) and the number of cue/action pairs in each heuristic
(5) are constant in the environment. Individuals are represented as toolboxes as
well. This ensures that it is possible for individuals to be perfectly adapted to the
environment. Individuals from the first generation are randomly generated simple
toolboxes, each containing only one heuristic with only one action. The size of these
toolboxes may vary from generation to generation. The number of individuals in the
initial generation is 500. The simulation ends when either a population dies out (size
= 0), or the size of a population grows above a certain threshold (120% of the size on
an initial population).
Evolutionary algorithm
To simulate the evolution of adaptive toolboxes we used an evolutionary algorithm.
Evolutionary algorithms simulate the process of natural selection and evolve a popu-
lation of individuals over generations based on their fitness. The algorithm consists
of three phases per generation: the survivor selection phase in which poorly performing
individuals are removed from the population with a certain probability, the parent
selection phase in which parents are selected based on their fitness, and the variation
phase in which a new generation is constructed based on the previous one.
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Size of the next generation. The expected size of the next generation is calculated by
the formula:
|Gn| = |Gn−1| ×
>1︷ ︸︸ ︷
∑(di)
|Gn−1| × c
|Gn| is a size of a new generation; |Gn−1| is a size of the previous generation. di =
(1− p)mi is the survival rate: the chance of survival of an individual during one
generation. di is based on the chance p that an individual dies when performing a
wrong action in a given situation, and a number of mistakes mi made by an individual.
∑(di)
|Gn−1| is the average survival rate of a population. Growth rate c is the average number
of offspring an individual creates.
Function evolve
1 world← a world generating toolbox ;
2 population← set of 500 simple toolboxes ;
3 while 0 < size (population) < 600 do /* maximum population = 120% */
4 situations← set of 1000 random situations ;
5 foreach individual in population do
6 fitness← fitness (individual, world, situations) ;
7 d← survival (fitness) ; /* compute the chance of survival */
8 k← random value between 0 and 1 ;
9 if k > d then /* chance of dying is 1-d */
10 population← population \ individual ; /* remove individual */
11 newPopulation← empty set ;
12 foreach individual in population do
13 parent1 ← individual;
14 #children← 1 ;
15 k← random value between 0 and 1 ;
16 if k ≤ 0.474 then /* second child with 47.4% probability */
17 #children = 2 ;
18 for #children do
19 parent2 ← random other individual from population;
20 k← random value between 0 and 1 ;
21 child← crossover (parent1, parent2) ;
22 child← mutate (child) ;
23 newPopulation← newPopulation ∪ child ; /* add child to newPopulation */
24 population← newPopulation ; /* replace population with newPopulation */
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Phase I: Survivor selection phase
At the beginning of each generation one thousand situations are randomly selected
from the set of all possible situations (210). Then the fitness of each individual is
evaluated based on these situations. The fitness is defined as a ratio of the number of
situations in which a toolbox executes a correct action to the total number of situations
a toolbox encounters. A decision is correct if an individual executes the same action
as the environment (world generating toolbox, see function fitness). In this phase,
individuals may die with a certain probability, calculated with a death rate.
Function fitness(toolbox, world, situations)
1 score← 0 ;
2 foreach situation in situations do
3 if action (toolbox,situation)==action (world,situation) then
4 score← score + 1 ;
5 fitness← score / size (situations) ;
6 return fitness
Death rate. Each individual has a certain probability 1− di of dying based on its
fitness. This chance is computed with the formula di = (1− p)mi , using the number
of mistakes mi (a number of incorrect actions) an individual makes in one generation
and the chance p of an individual dying in one situation.
The p value was chosen based on a study of the evolutionary biology literature.
According to Burger et al. (2012), the annual probability of dying is 1.3% for a 15-year-old
hunter gatherer. Assuming that the time span of one generation is 15 years and that this
survival rate is approximately the same over the first 15 years, the chance of survival
throughout the whole generation is, on average, (1− 0.013)15 = 0.82. From this we
calculated the value of p. In order to do this, we assume that in a population, all
individuals are uniformly distributed on an x axis (see Figure 2.5). Furthermore, we
assume that an individual encounters a thousand situations. With these assumptions,
we calculated p = 0.0004, using the following formula:
∫ 1000
0 (1− p)mdm = 0.82×
1000.
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Fig. 2.5.: Chances of survival of an individual given a number of mistakes (incorrect actions)
it makes. Green line (olive) represents chances of survival of an individual who makes 1000
mistakes in one generation; red line (red) represents an idealized, average individual, who has
82% chances of survival
Phase II: Parent selection phase
All surviving individuals from the survivor-selection phase become parents and
produce offspring. Each of the survivors creates at least one offspring. The chances of
generating a second child per parent is determined by the growth rate (either 33.3% or
47.4%). One pair of individuals therefore generates between two and four children.
Phase III: Variation phase
The variation phase involves creating a new generation based on the parent generation.
When children are created, crossover and mutations occur with a fixed chance of 0.1%
and 0.11% respectively. If neither crossover nor mutation occurs, the children become
clones of the parents. First, crossover occurs and then mutations happen.
Crossover. We considered two types of crossover (that happen with equal probability).
First, crossover of the parents’ selectors, where the toolboxes of both parents are split
at a random position and recombined such that the first part of Parent 1 and the last
part of Parent 2 constitute the new toolbox. Second, crossover of all heuristics, where
a part of each heuristic from Parent 1 is combined with a part of each heuristic from
Parent 2. The corresponding selector cues are chosen randomly from the parents (see
Function crossover and Fig. 2.6).
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Fig. 2.6.: Example of a crossover of heuristics.
Mutations. We considered several kinds of mutations both for the selector and the
heuristics. First, mutations of the selector, where one of the following changes is
applied: changing a selector cue, inserting a new selector cue/heuristic pair (with a
trivial heuristic, containing only one action), deleting a selector cue/heuristic pair, or
swapping a selector cue/heuristic pair with another pair within the same individual
(see Function mutate.) Second, mutations of the heuristics, where each cue/action
pair in each heuristic is mutated with a fixed chance. It involved one of the following
changes: changing the cue, changing the action, inserting a new cue/action pair,
deleting a cue/action pair, or swapping a pair with another pair within the same
heuristic (see Function mutate and Fig. 2.7). If a mutation would result in an empty
heuristic or toolbox, the mutation is ignored.
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Function crossover(parent1, parent2)
1 p1 ← random value between 0 and 1 ;
2 if p1 ≤ 0.10 then /* perform crossover with 10% chance */
3 p2 ← random value between 0 and 1 ;
4 if p2 ≤ 0.50 then /* selector crossover */
5 choose random heuristic in parent1 and dispense of all following ones ;
6 choose random heuristic in parent2 and dispense of all prior ones ;
7 combine both parts to child toolbox ;
8 return child toolbox ;
9 else /* heuristic crossover */
10 foreach heuristic in parent1 and parent2 do
11 choose random cue/action pair in parent1 and dispense of all following ones ;
12 choose random cue/action pair in parent2 and dispense of all prior ones ;
13 combine both parts to heuristic in child toolbox;
14 choose random selector from either parent as selector in child toolbox ;
15 return child toolbox ;
16 else /* child toolbox becomes clone of parent1 */
17 return parent1
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Fig. 2.7.: Examples of the five different kinds of mutations of the heuristics: cue change, action
change, cue/action pair deletion, cue/action pair insertion, cue/action pair swap.
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Function mutate(toolbox)
1 foreach selector in toolbox do /* selector mutation */
2 p← random value between 0 and 1 ;
3 if p ≤ 0.11 then /* mutate each selector with 11% chance */
4 choose randomly from one of following ;
5 change selector cue;
6 insert new selector and heuristic;
7 delete selector and heuristic;
8 swap two selector cues;
9 foreach heuristic in toolbox do /* heuristic mutation */
10 foreach cue-action pair in heuristic do
11 p← random value between 0 and 1 ;
12 if p ≤ 0.11 then /* mutate each cue-action pair with 11% chance */
13 choose randomly from one of following ;
14 change cue;
15 change action;
16 subinsert new cue/action pair;
17 delete cue/action pair;
18 swap two cue/action pairs;
19 return mutated toolbox
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Abstract
The Predictive Processing (PP) framework offers a unifying view on the existence
and working of all living systems. The core premise of PP states that as long
as agents minimize prediction error, and consequently entropy, they are suc-
cessful. Current developments and advances in PP indicate that the interaction
between agents and their environments is an important component of entropy
minimization. In this chapter, we explore by means of computer simulations,
the interaction between PP-agents and their environments under different con-
ditions. We argue the need to redefine the notion of success in PP in terms of
entropy, behavioral and cognitive success, as we show that the environmental
conditions that lead to entropy success, are different from conditions that lead to
behavioral or cognitive success. Furthermore, we show that being equipped in
and applying the mechanisms to minimize prediction error, do not in practice
guarantee that the agents will be successful in any sense (entropy, cognitive or
behavioral).
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Conceiving of the brain as a prediction machine (Clark, 2013) has become a widely
spread and influential view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience (Montague and
Sejnowski, 1994; Grasso et al., 1996; Poppenk et al., 2010; Friston and Kiebel, 2009).
A rapid development of the Predictive Processing (PP) framework has contributed
to establishing this perspective, by offering a unified formal guide to explaining
mechanisms underlying cognitive processes (Friston, 2009). According to PP, a brain
(or an agent), makes predictions about its (sensory1) inputs and minimizes the dif-
ference (prediction error) between these predictions and actual observations (Friston
and Kiebel, 2009). This minimization happens either internally (agents update their
current beliefs about the world) or externally (agents make a change in the environ-
ment to make the observations match their predictions). Minimizing prediction error
is a way by which an agent can minimize entropy23, which is conjectured to be a
unifying principle of how the brain works (Friston, 2009). Recent developments in
PP framework indicate a crucial role of the environment in entropy minimization
(Friston, 2011; Clark, 2015). The environment is assumed to be structured such that
PP-agents make accurate and informative predictions, and select actions that influ-
ence the environment to minimize entropy (Friston et al., 2015). In this chapter, we
take the first attempt to investigate this assumption, research the interaction between
specific environments and PP-agents, and analyze which conditions make the agents
successful.
Traditionally, the role of the environment in achieving success by PP-agents was
either ignored or, in the best case, implicitly taken for granted. An example of the
first scenario is visible in case of comparator-based models (Allen and Friston, 2016)
where actions are chosen based on the internal model, not actual observation (Clark,
2015). These accounts “[...] at best ignore embodied and enactive cognition and are at
worst irreconcilable.” (Allen and Friston, 2016, p. 4). On the other side of the spectrum,
environments are simply taken for granted to match with agents’ prior expectations
and generative models via adaptation processes (Calvo and Friston, 2017). This lack of
1Here, sensory inputs include both exteroceptive and interoceptive inputs.
2Formally, entropy, here, refers to conditional entropy, a quantity conditioned on an agent’s model. This
distinction is important conceptually — for different agents, different states are surprising. For example,
for a fish, a surprising state will be to be out of the water, while for a cat the surprising state would be
to be in the water. More on conditional entropy can be found in the supplementary section at the end of
this chapter, Section 3A.
3For more information about how minimizing prediction error contributes to minimizing entropy, see
Box 1.
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explicit and formal embedding of environments in the PP framework has led to, what
Friston calls ’revolutionary views’ (Allen and Friston, 2016, p. 5). Clark (2015) proposes
to distinguish Conservative Predictive Processing (CPP) from Radical Predictive
Processing (RPP). The main distinction between these two accounts lies in the different
conceptualization of generative models, and what follows, the involvement of the
environments in agents’ success. In CPP, generative models mirror the environment
by building its detailed representation, with the assumption that the more detailed
the ‘mirror’ is, the better the predictions are and the more successful the PP-agents
are (Clark, 2015). The environment, here, is treated like a passive cue-sender or
feedback provider to the agents about the quality of their predictions. RPP, on the
other hand, postulates that generative models do not mirror the environment, but
they are structural complements of the environment (Calvo and Friston, 2017; Clark,
2015), focusing on the dynamic nature of the interactions between agents and their
environments. The RPP-models build up fast and frugal strategies that can quickly
exploit and interact with environmental structures. Recently, Calvo and Friston (2017)
presented a very illustrative example of applying RPP to explain interactions between
plants (an example of the PP-agents4) and their environments:
Vines provide the sharpest contrast with conservative PP scenarios. Grasp-
ing, say, a phone, according to Hohwy (2013b) can only be explained
via the exploitation of an internal representation of the phone itself. But
once PP is fully developed with fast and frugal, morphological, and non-
neurally decentralized resources, we can see that detailed internal rep-
resentations may not be necessary: a climbing plant does not grasp a
support because it has an internal representation of it, but rather because
of the soft-assembling of the plant body-environment in the context of
the approaching manoeuvres. [...] Plants are a good example of radical
predictive processing because they are not in the business of enriching a
neurocentric model of their surroundings (this is effectively outsourced
to natural selection); rather, they are in the business of appropriately
coupling with it. (Calvo and Friston, 2017, p. 9)
4PP-agents are defined as any self-organizing systems, such as brains, humans, plants or cells (Calvo and
Friston, 2017)
47
The emphasis on exploitability of environmental structures directs a new path of re-
search within the PP framework. With our simulation studies, we aimed to contribute
to this line of research, by analyzing the role of different environmental properties5 in
achieving success by PP-agents.
In the PP-framework, the predominant view is that entropy minimization is
identified with agents’ success; as long as agents minimize entropy, they, by definition,
are successful on this view. From achieving entropy success, it follows that (a) the
agents are able to survive because they minimize entropy, and (b) they are able to
minimize entropy, because they have sufficient knowledge about the environment
and themselves, to do so. (We analyze these implications in the next paragraph).
The notion of entropy success comes from a proposed solution to the classical dark
room problem (Friston et al., 2012a). The dark room problem challenges entropy
minimization assumption by describing a hypothetical situation in which an agent
is sitting in a dark room, where it can perfectly predict all its sensory inputs. Why
would the agent ever move from this spot where it can fully minimize the prediction
error? The classical reply is that the agent’s prior expectation is not to be in a dark
room. Sitting in a dark room would drastically violate these priors (Friston et al.,
2012a). This assumption instantly raises a concern, that has already been pointed out
by Allen and Friston (2016, p. 15), that “any behaviour can be described as optimal,
because one can always write down a prior that prescribes any behaviour in a ‘just so’
fashion”. Allen and Friston (2016), however, further explain and specify that the PP
framework is free from this ‘just so’ circularity, because the framework is built on a
“provable definition of living systems” (Allen and Friston, 2016, p. 15), that “living
beings are those that maintain an upper bound on the entropy of their possible states”
and “it follows that the only possible prior belief an agent can entertain is that it will
behave so as to minimize surprise” (Allen and Friston, 2016, p. 16). The agents are
equipped (by evolution, learning or neurodevelopment (Friston, 2012b)) with prior
expectations of how to act to minimize surprise, and consequently entropy. As long
as the agents perform actions that fulfill these expectations, they are, by definition,
successful.
5In our simulations, we analyze more general environmental structures, not the structures specific to an
individual or a species, like, e.g., in the case of vines and plants. The environmental structures exploited
by vines are different from the structures exploited by humans.
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Success defined in such a way, however, is not unproblematic. It relies on two
implicit assumptions about what is needed for acting to minimize entropy or the
entropy success. First, it requires that the agents need to have (in some sense) a
veridical or otherwise ’good’ model of their environments (however represented).
Only then, the agents are able to reliably predict the consequences of their actions,
and make the decision based on these predictions. Second, the outcomes of the actions
need to be not only believed to be true by agents, but actually true in the environment.
Otherwise, the agents would not even be able to survive. On the other hand, the
agents can take actions based on a wrong or untrue model and still survive, without
minimizing surprise.
For the purposes of our simulations, we separate these two implicitly assumed
components of entropy success, and we propose to distinguish three definitions of
success: behavioral, cognitive and entropy. (1) Behavioral success. For agents to be
successful, minimally, they need to be able to survive. If the agents display behaviors
that lead to their survival, we say they are behaviorally successful. (2) Cognitive
success. The agents are successful in this sense if they learn causes of their sensory
inputs and learn which action to perform in a given environmental situations. Agents’
knowledge is encoded in their generative models and expressed in terms of degrees
of beliefs. (3) Entropy success. This notion of success is captured by conditional
entropy conditioned on agents’ generative models. The lower the conditional entropy,
the more successful agents’ models are in terms of predicting the sensory inputs. If
the premise of the PP-framework holds true, our simulations should show that the
entropy success entails cognitive and behavioral success.
The results from our simulations show that on the contrary, entropy success
does not imply behavioral or cognitive success. This means that the distinction of
the three notions of success is not only conceptual, but also factual. Our simulation
design (for more detailed description, see Section 3A at the end of this chapter) is rel-
atively simple, but complex enough to show how different environmental conditions
contribute to agents’ (behavioral, cognitive and entropy) success. We implemented
PP-agents equipped with basic mechanisms to minimize prediction error. These
mechanisms include the ability to change predictions to match observations, and
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the ability to act in the world to bring about the predicted observations6. The agents
have a basic repertoire of actions and mental states; and can perform actions, that in
consequence of interacting with the environment, can change agents’ mental states
and the environment itself. The environment is populated by three types of objects:
edible, changeable and neutral. Agents’ task was to learn which objects to eat, and how
to make an inedible, but changeable, object edible. This motivates to further distin-
guish three sub-definitions of success within cognitive and behavioral success (see
Fig. 3.1): (1) successful eating; when agents learn which object to eat. (2) successful
changing; when agents learn which object to change. (3) temporal success; when
agents learn to combine (2) and (1): changing an object in time t, and eating the next
object in time t+1. For entropy success, we distinguish entropy related to an edible
object and to a changeable object, separately. Furthermore, we implemented three
types of environments: ’learnable and changeable’, ’learnable only’, and neither, to
see whether the ’learnable and changeable’ environment is always the environment
that ensures agents’ success. Only in ’learnable and changeable’ environments are
agents able to learn the generative models and change the environment to bring it
closer to the predictions. Technically, only these environments are realistic. These
three types of environments vary in terms of the distribution of edible objects, and the
environments’ exploitability7 (see Fig. 3.2). We analyze how the interaction between
different environments and PP-agents determines agents’ behavior and success on all
dimensions: eating, changing, temporal across the three notions: behavioral, cognitive,
and entropy8.
Our simulation results point to four important issues:
1. Being equipped with the mechanisms to minimize prediction error does not
guarantee success in any sense.
6A wider variety of the mechanisms to minimize prediction error has been proposed by Kwisthout et al.
(2017), but they are not part of the original, core assumption proposed by e.g. (Friston, 2009; Friston,
2011), and hence, we decided to leave them out in this version of the implementation.
7Traditionally, the exploration-exploitation dilemma is considered an internal problem that agents need
to face. Notably, this dilemma is claimed to be resolved by PP theory, as when to explore and when
to exploit is implicitly built in agents’ prior expectations: being in a surprising state enforces state-
exploration until an unsurprising state is reached (Friston, 2010). In our simulation, the exploitability of
an environment, or exploitation-exploration rate, is a (general) property of the environment. It means
that there are some environmental structures (not directly identified, as they will differ from agent to
agent) such that by interacting with these structures, an agent, in turn, will explore or exploit more.
8 Given that entropy is measured over a longer period of time, we do not distinguish a temporal success
here. As for the notions of eating and changing success, they map to entropy of an action given edible
or changeable objects, respectively. For more details, see Section 3A at the end of this chapter.
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Fig. 3.1.: The figure represents the full overview of the notions and dimensions of success we
distinguish. The first level: behavioral, cognitive and entropy success distinction is independent
of our simulations. The eating, changing and temporal success level is specific to our simulation
setup. It can be thought of as a descriptive measure to compare behavioral, cognitive and
entropy success.
2. Entropy success does not entail cognitive or behavioral success.
3. Different environmental conditions lead to different levels of success both across
and within the same definition of success.
4. The agents don’t know or learn which action to take to minimize the prediction
error
The full analysis and description of the results can be found at the end of this chap-
ter, Section 3A. Here we give only a preview of the main points of the results and
focus specifically on the ’learnable and changeable’ environments only. The results
show that from simply trying9 to minimize entropy, does not follow that agents will
achieve entropy success, nor that they will be successful behaviorally or cognitively.
Moreover, the results indicate that entropy success does not entail cognitive nor
behavioral success. In our simulations, different conditions led to different levels
of behavioral, cognitive and entropy success10. On average, for behavioral success,
9Trying in a sense of being equipped in the mechanisms for minimizing entropy, and applying them.
10When we refer to a ’successful condition’, we mean a condition that has led to a greater success on
a given dimension than any other condition on that dimension. There is no normative threshold for
success. For example, under the best condition for behavioral eating success, the agents performed
the successful action — eating — only in 30% of all situations. Intuitively, one could not consider it a
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Fig. 3.2.: The figure represents all 9 conditions we implemented in our simulation. In total, we
proposed two parameters: exploration-exploitation rate (see footnote 8) and food distribution.
These two parameters can take three values: uniform, low and high.
the most successful condition was high exploitation rate and high food distribution
condition. For cognitive success, on average, the most successful condition was high
food distribution and high exploration rate condition. For entropy success it was
both the condition with high exploitation rate and high food distribution, as well
as the condition with high exploitation rate and low food distribution. On a single
dimensions of success (eating, changing, temporal), different conditions resulted
in different level of success (cognitive, behavioral, entropy). For example, the most
successful condition for entropy success related to the edible object, is the condition
with high exploitation rate and low food distribution. For behavioral eating suc-
cess, it is the condition with high exploitation rate and high food distribution; and
for cognitive eating success, it is the condition with high exploration rate and high
food distribution. Furthermore, we observe that environmental conditions that led to
agents’ success in terms of eating a correct object are different from conditions under
success, but since there was no other condition that would lead to a greater success than this, we call
this condition a successful condition.
52 Chapter 3 Maximizing entropy of the Predictive Processing framework
which agents were successful in terms of changing a correct object, both across and
within the same definitions of success. For example, the most successful condition for
cognitive eating success was the condition with high exploration rate and high food
distribution. While for cognitive changing success, the most successful was condition
with high exploitation rate and uniform food distribution.
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Fig. 3.3.: The figure shows agents’ degrees of beliefs under the most successful environmental
conditions per query. The left plot captures degrees of beliefs in the successful action given the
observation. P(eat|green triangle) represents agents’ degrees of beliefs that the edible object
(green triangle) is to be eaten. P(change|green square) represents agents’ degrees of beliefs that
the changeable object (green square) is to be changed. P(eat|changet−1) represent temporal
knowledge of the agents, that after changing a changeable object, the agent should eat the
edible object that appears next. We can see that the agents did not learn to eat the edible object.
The degrees of beliefs, even under the best conditions, are still rather low (less than 0.3). The
most successful condition for learning to change the changeable object led to only a relatively
higher degrees of beliefs (less than 0.7). The right plot represents agents’ degrees of beliefs in
’green’ color and ’triangle’ shape in time t, given that the previous action in t−1 was ’change’.
We see that the agents expect with a very high certainty (0.9) that they will encounter green
triangle in time t.
Moreover, we discovered that it is relatively easy for an agent to learn sensory
effects of their causes; but it is not trivial to choose which sensory inputs to bring
about next to best reveal their causes: which action to take to minimize the prediction
error. In our simulations, the former refers to the conditional probability distribution
of a sensory state (shape and color) given previously taken action (actiont−1); the
latter refers to the conditional probability distribution of an action given sensory
state (see Fig. 3.3). Notably, this problem has been recently acknowledged by Friston
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(2017b)11. The fact that PP-agents do not know which action to take to minimize
prediction error, seems like a problem for the PP-framework; and especially for the
assumption that entropy is minimized through action (Calvo and Friston, 2017).
Given our results, it becomes apparent that the many implicit assumptions
that the Predictive Processing framework is built on, upon a closer investigation,
do not hold as promised. We can see that the conditions under which the agents
achieve entropy success are different from conditions that lead to behavioral or
cognitive success. Moreover, we can conclude that being equipped with mechanisms
to minimize prediction error seems to be not enough in making decisions which
action to take to actually minimize the prediction error. In terms of environmental
conditions, we learned that conditions with high exploration rate, on average, lead
to a greater cognitive success. And the conditions with high exploitation rate lead to
a greater behavioral success. The food availability parameter is more important for
behavioral than cognitive or entropy success. For example, for entropy success, the
agents are equally successful both in conditions with low food distribution as well
as in conditions with high food distribution. These results show that, contrary to the
PP-assumptions, achieving success is not guaranteed by simply applying mechanisms
to minimize prediction error, and that entropy success does not entail behavioral or
cognitive success.
All in all, it is clear that the theory needs further specification, and revising
implicit, unreliable assumptions is a starting point. We can speculate that (1) there are
some underspecified parts of the theory missing, that once formally explicated will
account for the problems, (2) there is something special about the environments, that
by interaction with the special structures, it’s somehow making agents successful. It is
crucial for the future research to focus on exploring what this special something could
be, and analyzing how the somehow could work.
To conclude, once PP mechanisms were implemented in a relatively simple
setup, the premise that minimizing entropy will lead to agents success, does not
hold anymore. It still remains an open question of how, by interacting with the
environment, PP-agents are able to learn successful, or otherwise veridical, generative
models.
11Friston (2017b, p. 11) points out that “The real problem [for an agent] is [...] to select the data that best
discloses its causes”. The results of our simulations revealed this problem independently and before
Friston’s claim was published.
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Box 1. The diagram explains the relation between Free Energy, prediction error, surprise and (con-
ditional) entropy. Free Energy quantity is defined as prediction error (Kullback-Leibler divergence
between predictions and observations) plus surprise (negative log-evidence). By minimizing predic-
tion error, the agents minimize free energy and consequently, surprise. (Friston, 2011). Minimizing
(conditional) entropy is equivalent to minimizing average surprise over a longer period of time. This
implies that for most of the time, agents will choose the actions they can predict the consequence of,
resulting in visiting a limited number of (unsurprising) sensory states (Friston, 2011).
55
3A. Formalization and Simulation Details
In the following supplementary sections, we describe the details of the simulations.
First, we present the setup of the simulations including formalization of PP-agents,
environments, and conditions. Later, we explain the simulation procedure. Finally,
we present results of the behavioral success, cognitive success, and entropy success.
Setup
In this simulation study, we implemented a simple PP-agent embedded in a simple
environment, and manipulate different environmental parameters to investigate
which conditions make an agent successful. We define three notions of success: (a)
behavioral success; (b) cognitive success; (c) entropy success. The agents have a basic
repertoire of actions and mental states; and can perform actions, that in consequence
of interacting with the environment, change agents’ mental states. The environment
is populated by three types of objects: edible, changeable and neutral. Edible objects
can be eaten by an agent (that would lead to a change in a mental state of the agent),
changeable objects can be changed by an agent to ensure the appearance of an edible
object in next time frame. This means, if an agent changes a changeable object in time t,
then an edible object appears in time t+1. Furthermore, there are three different types
of environments: (i) causal (which is learnable and changeable), (ii) correlations (which
is only learnable but not changeable), and (iii) random (which is neither learnable
nor changeable), and two types of environmental parameters: (i) exploitation rate
and (ii) accessibility to edible objects. In this section, we will first explain the reasons
behind the choices we made in our implementation, and further, we will discuss the
individual components of the simulation.
Agents
Each agent is formalized as a dynamic causal Bayesian network (CBN) representing
the set of beliefs the agent has about the world. A CBN is a probabilistic graph model
which represents causal relations between variables as a directed acyclic graph (DAG),
where nodes represent variables and directed edges represent the causal relations
between them (Pearl, 2009). The network consists of five variables: (1) Actions =
[‘change’, ‘eat’, ‘nothing’], (2) Mental state = [‘full’, ‘hungry’]; (3) Edible = [‘yes’, ‘no’];
(4) Color = [‘green’, ‘red’]; (5) Shape = [‘triangle’, ‘square’]; (6) Prev Action = Actiont−1
(see Figure 3.4a). The network can further be divided into two levels of a hierarchy.
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At each level of the hierarchy, we can distinguish hypothesis nodes and prediction
nodes (Kwisthout et al., 2017). The value of prediction nodes given hypothesis nodes
is a prediction at that level. Predictions at a higher level are hypothesis nodes at the
level below.
The PP-agents try to minimize entropy by minimizing prediction errors between
predictions and observations. The prediction error is used to update and revise agents’
beliefs and to update agents’ hyperpriors (see Section 3). These hyperpriors represent
the information the beliefs are based on; that is, they describe probability densities
over the probabilities that indicate how confident the agents are that the probability
of the belief is correct. Hyperpriors are described by hyperparameters, which can
be based on frequency information as well as so-called pseudo-counts or ‘virtual
observations’ that represent agents’ background knowledge (Koller and Friedman,
2009).
a: An agent’s Bayesian network
le
ve
l1
le
ve
l2
}
}
}
}
hypothesis
node
hypothesis
nodes
prediction
nodes
prediction
nodes
b: A hierarchy of the network.
Fig. 3.4.: Figure 3.4a represents an agent’s model about the world in a form of a causal Bayesian
network. There are two kinds of nodes: regular (Color, Shape, Mental State, Edible, Action) and
temporal (Previous Action). Temporal node takes a value of a node Action from a previous
time frame. Figure 3.4b represents the model in a form of a two-level hierarchy, where the
predictions on the level 1 are hypothesis on the level 2.
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Environments
There are three types of environments: causal, correlations and random. Each envi-
ronment consists of a set of objects {N N  }, some of the objects are edible =N,
and some changeable = .
Causal Environment
There is a temporal- and action- dependency between changeable and edible objects.
If an agent performs action ‘change’ on a ‘changeable’ object in time t, then in time
t+1, the edible object will appear. In case on non-edible and non-changeable objects,
i.e., N, the action performed by an agent does not influence the next observation.
Below we present a list of action-observation dependencies:
• N AND ACTION=“EAT"→ MENTAL STATE = “FULL”, NEXT OBSERVATION: RAN-
DOM
• N AND ACTION!=“EAT"→ MENTAL STATE = “HUNGRY”, NEXT OBSERVATION:
EDIBLE=“NO"
•  AND ACTION=“CHANGE"→ MENTAL STATE = “HUNGRY”, NEXT OBSERVA-
TION: EDIBLE=“YES"
•  AND ACTION!=“CHANGE"→ MENTAL STATE = “HUNGRY”, NEXT OBSERVA-
TION: EDIBLE=“NO"
•  orN→ MENTAL STATE = “HUNGRY”, NEXT OBSERVATION: EDIBLE=“NO"
Correlations Environment
There is only a temporal dependency between a changeable and an edible object. The
edible object always appears after the changeable one, regardless of the action taken
by the agent.
• N→ MENTAL STATE = “FULL”, NEXT OBSERVATION: RANDOM
• → MENTAL STATE = “HUNGRY”, NEXT OBSERVATION: EDIBLE=“YES"
•  orN→ MENTAL STATE = “HUNGRY”, NEXT OBSERVATION: RANDOM
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Random Environment
There is no temporal dependency between changeable and edible objects. They appear
at random, and the actions taken by the agents cannot influence the environment.
Conditions
We define two environmental parameters: the exploitation rate and food accessibility.
In Figure 3.5b, the x-axis represents a dimension of food accessibility, or a ratio of not
edible to edible objects. This parameter can take three values: (i) uniform distribution
of food and no-food; (ii) more food (5 times more food than no-food); (iii) less food
(5 times less food than no-food). The y-axis represents the exploitation rate. This
dimension can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can be seen as an agent’s internal
bias to exploit or to explore more. Second, it can be interpreted as a result of an agent’s
interaction with the environment; meaning there is something in the environment that
makes the agent exploit or explore more. The nature of this ‘something’ is left without
further specification. The simulation results for exploitation rate are interpreted in
the second sense (see the main text). There are some structures in the environment
that would make agents explore or exploit more. For the simplicity of the simulations,
these structures are not defined. The exploitation rate can, similarly to food availability,
be (i) uniformly distributed; (ii) low: more exploration (0.8 chance); (iii) high: more
exploitation (0.8 chance). In total, there are nine conditions × three environments.
Figure 3.5 represents the interaction of these two dimensions resulting in the definition
of individual conditions (1 – 9).
The simulations
In this section, the basic simulation procedure is explained. Each of the agents is given
the network structure and needs to learn the conditional probabilities. The agents are
granted unlimited memory – they remember all the observations and actions they
take. However, to decide on the action, an agent has access only to its previous action
and a current observation. The agents start off with uniform hyperpriors and uniform
probability distributions. The lifespan of each agent takes 300 time units (300 runs). In
every t, an agent, based on its generative model tries to predict the next observation
and choose the best action given the prediction. Then, given the observation, an agent
(1) performs an action; and (2) calculates prediction error (the divergence between
prediction and observation). In case of causal environment (CE) agents, (1) results
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Fig. 3.5.: The figures show (a) verbally described environmental conditions (the left figure),
and (b) a numerical representation of (a). For example, the environment with high exploration
rate and high food distribution is referred to as condition 5.
in (a) determining the observation in t+1, (b) changing agent’s current mental state,
and (c) updating agents memory. (2) results in (a) hierarchical updating of the agent’s
beliefs, and (b) updating the generative model by adjusting hyperpriors. At the end
of each time t, the agent updates its probabilities distributions.
Action Selection
An agent performs the action based on the current observation. There are two ways of
deciding on the action. One of these two ways is chosen depending on the exploitation
rate parameter. If the exploitation parameter is high, and the agent will exploit, rather
than explore, then the agent chooses its actions that have the highest probability. If
the exploitation parameter is low, and the agent will explore rather than exploit, then
the action is chosen based on the whole probability distribution. For example, if the
distribution of actions is [‘eat’ = 0.2, ‘change’ = 0.7, ‘nothing’ = 0.1], then the next
action would be a weighted random choice with [0.2, 0.7, 0.1] weights.
The observation in time t+1 depends on the action taken by an agent in time t.
The observation is defined in terms of whether or not the next object will be edible. If
the observation in time t was a green square, and the action taken by the agent was
‘change’, then (in case of CE agents), the next observation will be an edible object. The
only edible object is a green triangle, so the next observation will be a green triangle.
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If the next observation is determined to be not edible, then the actual shape and color
of the next object are assigned randomly.
Moreover, with every performed action, there is a change (or not) in the mental
state of the agent. For example, if the agent eats a green triangle, then it instanta-
neously changes its mental state to ‘full’. It means that change still happens in time t.
In time t+1, the agent will be ‘hungry’ again.
Hierarchy
As it’s shown in Figure 3.4b, the network is divided into two levels of the hierarchy. At
each level, there are a hypothesis node and a prediction node. Formally, a hypothesis
node is a prior joint probability distribution, and a prediction node is a posterior
probability distribution (Kwisthout et al., 2017). The prediction nodes at the higher
level, are the hypothesis nodes at the lower level.
When observing an object, an agent calculates a difference, so-called prediction
error, between the observed (or inferred) distribution (PObs) and predicted distribution
(PPred) at each level of the hierarchy. Formally, the distance is defined as Kullback-
Leibler divergence DKL = (PObs||PPred). The result is the prediction error, i.e., the net
difference between prediction and observation, and it is used to update the agent’s
generative model (Kwisthout et al., 2017).
After the prediction error is computed, that amount is used to update agent’s
beliefs about the world. This means to find such a value assignment for hypothesis
nodes that ensures that the prediction error is minimized. To calculate this, we use a
local search algorithm for minimizing a scalar function. The output is a new value
assignment for a hypothesis node and the new divergence measure. Since there are
two levels of the hierarchy, some of the nodes (Color, Shape and Mental State) are
both the hypothesis and the prediction node. To update the beliefs on both levels, we
need to recalculate probabilities distributions of Color, Shape and Mental State. We
do it as follows:
1. Calculate marginal probability of a variable V, P(V) from the original probabil-
ity distribution
P(V) =∑
p
P(V|p)× P(p)
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2. Calculate marginal probability of a variable V, P′(V) after revision, here P′(V)
doesn’t have any parents, since it’s a hypothesis node.
P′(V) = val
3. Calculate the ratio of P(V) to P′(V)
P(V)
P′(V) = ratio
4. Calculate a new P(V):
P(v|p)
ratio
× P(p) + P(v|¬p)
ratio
× P(¬p)
After belief revision, we perform a basic form of model revision (Kwisthout et al.,
2017), that involves recalculating of conditional probabilities given the new observa-
tion. Lastly, the hyperpriors are updated.
Hyperpriors
Hyperpriors represent second-order information about the beliefs and are represented
in the form of (conditional) hyperparameters of a Dirichlet distribution that describes
the confidence the agents have that the probability assessment is correct. These
hyperparameters are based on both sequences of observations (frequency information
or counts) as well as background or innate knowledge (pseudocounts) that alter the
frequency information. For example, for a variable V with possible states V = [v1, v2],
and a sequence of observations, O = [v1, v1, v1, v2], the probability distribution that
can be derived purely from the frequency information without hyperpriors is P(V =
v1) =
#v1
#total =
3
4 and P(V = v2) =
#v2
#total =
1
4 . In this case, P(V = v2) < P(V = v1).
Pseudocounts for variable V, PCV , are defined as a tuple representing a number
of additional “virtual” observations for each variable state: PCV = [(v1, 1), (v2, 5)].
The probability distribution, when taken these pseudocounts into account changes
as follows: P(V = v1) = 3+14+6 = 0.4 and P(V = v2) =
1+5
4+6 = 0.6. In this case,
P(V = v2) > P(V = v1). For PP-agents, if an agent performs a successful action (e.g.,
eats a green triangle), then this will be added both to counts (#(eat∧ green triangle)+ 1
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for eating a green triangle), and to pseudocounts (PC(eat ∧ green triangle,+1) for
eating a green triangle). In case of an unsuccessful action, only counts will change.
The notions of success
Given the setup and that the agent’s task is to learn when and what to eat, there are
three ways in which an agent’s behavior can be successful: (1) successfully eating
the edible object, (2) successfully changing the changeable object, (3) performing a
sequence of (2) and (1). Furthermore (1)–(3) can be assessed on the (a) ‘behavioral’ or
(b) ‘cognitive’ scale, expressed in terms (a) taking successful actions, (b) degrees of
beliefs about the world. Finally, an agent can be successful in terms of (4) minimizing
conditional entropy. We are interested whether the same environmental conditions
will result in agents’ success on all of the dimensions.
Results: Behavioral Success
As explained in previous sections, there are three ways in which an agent can be
successful: (1) behavioral success, (2) cognitive success, and (3) entropy success. In
what follows, we analyze (1)–(3), present the results and provide a summary and
conclusions.
‘Behavioral Success’: General overview
The basic measure of the behavioral success – absolute success – can be expressed in
terms of simple counting: how many times an agent performed a successful action
given an observation. Here, a successful action is the action that is considered correct
given environmental conditions. Henceforth, a successful action will be referred to as
a correct action. Each agent always performs 300 actions. The total number of actions
per condition is 7800, and per environment 70200. The second measure of success is a
relative measure – ratio – of success: how many times an agent performed the correct
action given an observation to the times it had had the chance to perform it.
We distinguish:
1. Successful eating: performing action ‘eat’ given ‘green triangle’ (see Table 3.1)
2. Successful changing: performing action ‘change’ actions given ‘green square’
(see Table 3.2)
3. Temporal success: Performing the sequence of actions (see Table 3.3):
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a) Action ‘change’ actions given ‘green square’ in time t−1
b) Action ‘eat’ given ‘green triangle’ in time t
Tables 3.1 to 3.3 show the absolute and relative scores, together with a mean and
a standard deviation measure. We can see that in case of successful eating, correla-
tions environment (CorrE) agents are the most successful. However, the average ratio
of success is rather low: only in 30% of the time the agents used the opportunity to
eat, when observing green triangle. A similar trend is visible for random environment
(RE) agents. For causal environment (CE) agents, the success is low, even comparing
to the other environments agents. The agents performed the correct action only in
13% of the time.
In case of successful changing, the causal environment (CE) agents improved.
Here, all three environments (CE, CorrE, RE) agents performed similarly, performing
the successful action almost 50% of the time. In case of temporal success, again all
three environments agents performed the correct sequence of actions around 11%
(causal)–15% (correlations) of the time.
In the next section, we analyze how these results are spread among different
conditions. Which conditions did contribute to the success of the agents?
Scores per conditions
In the previous subsection, we compared the ratio scores between different environ-
ments. We observed that for successful eating and temporal success, the ratio scores
were much lower in the causal environment compared to the correlations and random
environments. In this section, we analyze how the different conditions contributed to
the success of agents. We look at (a) the differences between ratio scores (Tables 3.6
to 3.8) per condition per environment, (b) whether the difference between different
environments in (a) is significant (Tables 3.9 to 3.11). To analyze (b), we applied
two-sided t-test for the null hypothesis that two independent samples have identical
average values. We ran a pair-wise comparison between: (i) causal-correlations, (ii)
causal-random, and (iii) correlations-random environments. Assuming p-value thresh-
old of 0.05, the null hypothesis can be rejected for most of the conditions for successful
eating ratio scores and for some of the conditions for temporal success ratio scores, but
only between causal and correlations and causal and random environments. These
conditions mostly include high exploration rate, or uniform exploitation-exploration
rate. If we take p-value threshold to be 0.01, then the significant differences appear
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Absolute Mean SD Ratio
causal 6296 26.9 57.8 0.14
correlations 13385 57.2 69.2 0.31
random 11255 48.1 70.3 0.30
Tab. 3.1.: Successful eating. The absolute number of successes (action ‘eat’ when ‘green
triangle’ was observed), mean and standard deviation, and the ratio of performed successful
action to the number of potential successful actions (the cases when an agent observed ‘green
triangle’, but it didn’t ‘eat’ it).
Absolute Mean SD Ratio
causal 4590 19.6 20.0 0.482
correlations 4331 18.5 17.5 0.486
random 5204 22.2 25.3 0.460
Tab. 3.2.: Successful changing. The absolute number of successes (action ‘change’ when ‘green
square’ was observed), mean and standard deviation, and the ratio of performed successful
action to the number of potential successful actions (the cases when an agent observed ‘green
square’, but it didn’t ‘change’ it).
Absolute Mean SD Ratio
causal 447 1.9 5.5 0.112
correlations 1304 5.6 10 0.151
random 583 2.5 5 0.133
Tab. 3.3.: Temporal Success. The absolute number of temporal successes (action ‘change’
when ‘green square’ was observed in time t−1 and action ‘eat’ when ‘green triangle’ was
observed in time t), mean and standard deviation, and the ratio of performed successful
sequence of actions to the number of potential successful sequence of actions (the cases when
an agent ‘changed’ ‘green square’, but didn’t ‘eat’ ‘green triangle’).
mainly for successful eating scores. This includes conditions poor in food (condition
3, 6, 9) or with uniform food distribution (condition 1, 4). It seems that for conditions
with high exploitation rate, there are no significant differences across the different
environments.
Successful eating
In case of causal environment (CE) agents, the most successful conditions are fully
determined by accessibility to food (conditions 2, 5 and 8), it means that the exploita-
tion rate didn’t make a difference here. A high level of food, combined with a high
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exploitation rate (condition 8), creates the best condition for causal environment
agents to be successful (almost 30% success score). Condition 8 is also a condition
with the highest standard deviation (0.43). CorrE and RE agents are also successful
in this condition (31%- and 42%). There is no significant difference between these
scores.
There is no significant difference between correlations environment (CorrE)
agents and random environment (RE) agents, across all conditions. For CorrE agents,
the most successful condition is rich in food and has a higher exploration rate (condi-
tion 5), the standard deviation for this condition is also relatively high (0.27). For RE
agents, many conditions seem to be (relatively) successful, with the most successful
being condition 8. The standard deviation in case of RE agents was always high,
across all conditions.
Interestingly, for CE agents, almost all (except condition 7), conditions that were
not (relatively) successful, were especially unsuccessful. Conditions 1, 3, 4, 6 and 9
yielded poor results. These conditions are low in food and/or have low exploitation
rate.
Successful changing
For CE agents, condition 7 is the most successful, reaching the score of almost 70%
of correct actions. The success under this condition is determined by the high ex-
ploitation score (the food distribution is uniform here). On average, CE agents scored
similarly. There is no significant difference between the different conditions. For CorrE
agents and RE agents, the best condition was condition 8 (high exploitation, rich in
food). None of the conditions is particularly unfavorable for performing success-
ful actions. Condition 3 that was the worst for CE agents for eating, now it’s (48%)
successful. The standard deviation is high across all conditions and environments.
Temporal success
For CE agents, condition 8 was the most successful condition in terms of performing
the right sequence of actions: (1) ‘change’ green square and ‘eat’ green triangle. The
standard deviation for this condition is high (almost 0.4). For CorrE agents, condition
8 was also the most successful condition, with an equally high standard deviation.
For RE agents, conditions 1 (uniform for both food and exploitation rate) was the
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most successful (with a high standard deviation). Significantly worse for CE agents,
compared to CorreE and RE agents, were conditions 1, 3, and 6.
Summary of the results
Eat Change Temporal
causal 8 7 8
correlations 5 8 8
random 8 8 1
Tab. 3.4.: Most successful conditions
Eat Change Temporal
causal 3 9 3
correlations 9 6 4
random 9 5 2
Tab. 3.5.: Least successful conditions
For CE agents, the most successful conditions are 8 and 7 (both high exploitation
rate). The least successful are 3 and 9 (low in food). For CorrE agents, best conditions
are also 5 (high exploration) and 8 (high exploitation), the least 9, 6 and 4 (low or
uniform in food). For RE agents, best are 8 (high exploitation) and 3 (low food). The
least successful is 9 (low in food, high exploitation), 5 (high food, exploration) and 2
(high in food).
On average, for all three types of agents, condition 8 was the most successful.
This condition is rich in food and has a high exploitation rate. As for the least success-
ful condition, there is no clear winner, however, it seems that it’s mostly determined
by food accessibility. All the conditions low in food (3, 6, 9) are among the least
successful.
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SDCS SDCR SDR pval(CS-CR) pval(CS-R) pval(CR-R)
condition 1 0.4 0.29 0.39 0.48 0.69 0.79
condition 2 0.36 0.29 0.36 0.55 0.89 0.46
condition 3 0.4 0.35 0.41 0.68 0.96 0.64
condition 4 0.31 0.15 0.25 0.66 0.92 0.70
condition 5 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.76 0.58 0.78
condition 6 0.3 0.19 0.25 0.77 0.28 0.1
condition 7 0.39 0.43 0.47 0.12 0.05 0.67
condition 8 0.41 0.28 0.45 0.2 0.79 0.13
condition 9 0.48 0.42 0.47 0.5 0.98 0.48
Tab. 3.10.: Standard deviation and significance scores for successful changing. There is no
significant difference among ratio scores of causal (CS), correlations(CR) and random (R)
environments agents.
SDCS SDCR SDR pval(CS-CR) pval(CS-R) pval(CR-R)
condition 1 0.08 0.18 0.3 0.039 0.02 0.36
condition 2 0.33 0.19 0.16 0.32 0.03 0.09
condition 3 0.04 0.19 0.32 0.003 0.007 0.46
condition 4 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.38 0.08 0.26
condition 5 0.2 0.16 0.1 0.3 0.09 0.51
condition 6 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.026 0.03 0.6
condition 7 0.3 0.33 0.3 0.52 0.84 0.41
condition 8 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.94 0.64 0.58
condition 9 0.12 0.33 0.21 0.06 0.58 0.18
Tab. 3.11.: Standard deviation and significance scores for temporal success score. There is a
significant difference between causal (CS) and correlations (CR) environments ratio scores for
conditions (in red) 1, 3, and 6. And between causal and random (R) environments ratio scores
for condition 1,2, 3, and 6. There is no significant difference between ratio scores of correlations
and random environments agents.
Results: Cognitive Success
In this section we present a measure of agents’ internal success, cognitive success,
expressed in terms of the degrees of beliefs of an agent about the world. In what
follows, first, we query agents’ model (an average model per condition) to check how
well the agents’ model captures the true world model. For the purpose of analyzing
conditional probabilities of ‘Action’, we follow the notion of ‘correct action’ from the
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previous measure. Further, we present a measure based on the degrees of beliefs – a
query score.
Successful eating
Fig. 3.6.: The plots show probability distributions of action given green triangle under dif-
ferent conditions and in different environments. Each row of the plots represents different
environment: causal, correlations and random. Each column represents different values of
exploitation-exploration rate parameter: uniform rate, high exploration, high exploitation.
Lastly, every single plot represents different values of the second parameter: food distribution.
The bars represent degrees of beliefs of agents in which action to take given the observation.
Figure 3.6 represents the probability distribution P(action|color = green, shape =
triangle) of an average agent per condition. In all of the conditions, the probability of
‘eat’ (which would be the successful action) is lower than 0.5. Only in conditions 5
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(high exploration rate and rich in food) for CorrE agents, and conditions 4 (uniform
food distribution, high exploration) and condition 8 (high exploitation rate, rich in
food) for RE agents, the probability of ‘eat’ was higher than any other possible action.
The probability distributions for CE agents implies that the agents did not learn to
‘eat’ ‘green triangle’. Below, we analyze conditions for the cases when the agents
actually did ‘eat’ ‘green triangle’ which resulted in the change in their mental state.
Additionally, conditioning action on agent’s mental state, allows us to analyze
which conditions were the most successful only in the cases when agents did ‘eat’
‘green triangle’. Now, we can see that condition 5 (high exploration, rich in food)
was the most successful, yielding the highest probability of ‘eat’. This is interesting
because according to the measure of success from the previous section, condition 5
was not the most successful (avg. of 0.2). The probability distributions for CorrE and
RE agents gives similar results as for P(action|color = green, shape = triangle).
In Figure 3.8 we see that all types of agents learned (with a very high probability,
especially for CE agents), that ‘green triangle’ is edible.
Successful changing
In the case of choosing the successful action for ‘green square’ (Fig. 3.9), almost all
CE agents were successful here, with an exception of agents from condition 6 (high
exploration, poor in food) and 9 (high exploitation, poor in food). Similarly, for CorrE
agents, almost all conditions led to a success, except from condition 6. For RE agents,
only condition 4 (high exploration, uniform food distribution) was unsuccessful. The
‘success’, however, is not really big, as the degrees of belief are not high. The highest
probability of the successful action for CE agents is in condition 7 (high exploitation,
uniform food distribution).
Temporal success
Below we present a series of queries that constitutes temporal success. The temporal
aspect is captured by ‘previous action’. If the ‘previous action’ was changed, the
agents could expect an edible object next.
Almost all agents learned that if the previous action was changed, then the next
object most likely will be edible (Fig. 3.13), with color = green (Fig. 3.11) and shape
= triangle (Fig. 3.12). In case of action (Fig. 3.10), almost none (except from CorrE
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Fig. 3.7.: The plots show probability distributions of action given green triangle and mental
state under different conditions and in different environments. Each row of the plots represents
different environment: causal, correlations and random. Each column represents different
values of exploitation-exploration rate parameter: uniform rate, high exploration, high ex-
ploitation. Lastly, every single plot represents different values of the second parameter: food
distribution. A combination of exploitation rate and food distribution constitutes a condition.
Each row contains 1 (left)–9 (right) conditions. For example, condition 4 is a condition with
high exploration rate and uniform food distribution. The bars represent degrees of beliefs of
agents in which action to take given the observation.
agents in condition 5) of the agents learned the temporal dependency that changing
the object in time t−1 will more likely require eating the object in time t.
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Fig. 3.8.: The plots show probability distributions of whether the green triangle is edible,
under different conditions and in different environments. Each row of the plots represents
different environment: causal, correlations and random. Each column represents different
values of exploitation-exploration rate parameter: uniform rate, high exploration, high ex-
ploitation. Lastly, every single plot represents different values of the second parameter: food
distribution. A combination of exploitation rate and food distribution constitutes a condition.
Each row contains 1 (left)–9 (right) conditions. For example, condition 4 is a condition with
high exploration rate and uniform food distribution. The bars represent degrees of beliefs of
agents in whether the object is edible given the observation.
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Fig. 3.9.: The plots show probability distributions of action given green square under dif-
ferent conditions and in different environments. Each row of the plots represents different
environment: causal, correlations and random. Each column represents different values of
exploitation-exploration rate parameter: uniform rate, high exploration, high exploitation.
Lastly, every single plot represents different values of the second parameter: food distribution.
A combination of exploitation rate and food distribution constitutes a condition. Each row con-
tains 1 (left)–9 (right) conditions. For example, condition 4 is a condition with high exploration
rate and uniform food distribution. The bars represent degrees of beliefs of agents in which
action to take given the observation.
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Fig. 3.10.: The plots show probability distributions of action given that the previous action
was ‘change’ under different conditions and in different environments. Each row of the plots
represents different environment: causal, correlations and random. Each column represents
different values of exploitation-exploration rate parameter: uniform rate, high exploration, high
exploitation. Lastly, every single plot represents different values of the second parameter: food
distribution. A combination of exploitation rate and food distribution constitutes a condition.
Each row contains 1 (left)–9 (right) conditions. For example, condition 4 is a condition with
high exploration rate and uniform food distribution. The bars represent degrees of beliefs of
agents in which action to take given the previously taken action.
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Fig. 3.11.: The plots show probability distributions of a color of an object given that the
previous action was ‘change’ under different conditions and in different environments. Each
row of the plots represents different environment: causal, correlations and random. Each
column represents different values of exploitation-exploration rate parameter: uniform rate,
high exploration, high exploitation. Lastly, every single plot represents different values of the
second parameter: food distribution. A combination of exploitation rate and food distribution
constitutes a condition. Each row contains 1 (left)–9 (right) conditions. For example, condition
4 is a condition with high exploration rate and uniform food distribution. The bars represent
degrees of beliefs of agents in the object’s color given the previously taken action.
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Fig. 3.12.: The plots show probability distributions of a shape of an object given that the
previous action was ‘change’ under different conditions and in different environments. Each
row of the plots represents different environment: causal, correlations and random. Each
column represents different values of exploitation-exploration rate parameter: uniform rate,
high exploration, high exploitation. Lastly, every single plot represents different values of the
second parameter: food distribution. A combination of exploitation rate and food distribution
constitutes a condition. Each row contains 1 (left)–9 (right) conditions. For example, condition
4 is a condition with high exploration rate and uniform food distribution. The bars represent
degrees of beliefs of agents in the object’s shape given the previously taken action.
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Fig. 3.13.: The plots show probability distributions of a edibility of an object given that the
previous action was ‘change’ under different conditions and in different environments. Each
row of the plots represents different environment: causal, correlations and random. Each
column represents different values of exploitation-exploration rate parameter: uniform rate,
high exploration, high exploitation. Lastly, every single plot represents different values of the
second parameter: food distribution. A combination of exploitation rate and food distribution
constitutes a condition. Each row contains 1 (left)–9 (right) conditions. For example, condition
4 is a condition with high exploration rate and uniform food distribution. The bars represent
degrees of beliefs of agents in edibility of the object given the previously taken action.
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Summary and Total Score
There was only one condition under which agents were successful in all dimen-
sions: condition 5 for CorrE agents. Condition 5 is high in food and features higher
exploration rate.
To assess the cognitive success across different conditions, we introduce a query
score. Given a query, first, it is checked in which conditions agents made a correct
inference, second, a scale of the conditions is created: from the conditions with the
highest probability to the lowest. Then, a score is assigned depending on the place on
the scale. The highest possible score is 9 (the total number of conditions), the lowest
0. For example, a condition X scored 9 means that (a) the agents learned the correct
distribution in all nine conditions; (b) condition X is a condition with the highest
probability from the query.
Using the query score measure (Fig. 3.14), we can see which of the conditions
were the most successful (in terms of having the highest, correct probability dis-
tribution per query). For CE agents, the most successful, in total, was condition 5
causal environment correlations environment random environment
conditions conditions conditions
Sc
or
e
Fig. 3.14.: Query score per condition per environment. In case of the causal environment,
condition 5 has the highest score. For correlations and random environments, condition 8 is the
highest.
(rich in food, high exploration rate). According to the behavioral success measure,
the most successful condition (8) was rich in food, with high exploitation rate. The
most successful for ‘eating’ was condition 5, for ‘changing’ was condition 7. For
temporal success, the most successful was condition 2. For CorrE agents, the most
successful, in total, was condition 8. For ‘eating’, the most successful was condition
5. For ‘changing’, condition 8. For temporal success, condition 5. For RE agents, the
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most successful condition was also condition 8. For ‘eating’, it was condition 8, for
‘changing’, condition 3, and for temporal success, condition 2.
Results: Entropy success
The entropy success measure aims at calculating and comparing conditional entropy
of agents’ model across different conditions. It is important to distinguish entropy
conditioned on an agent’s model (conditional entropy) H(X|m) from entropy H(X)
(Friston and Ao, 2011; Schwartenbeck et al., 2013). Conditional entropy is equivalent
to minimizing the long-term surprise given a specific generative model. What is, and
what is not, surprising for an agent is determined by prior beliefs that are built-in
by evolution (Schwartenbeck et al., 2013). States that are surprising for one agent (a
fish being out of the water), might be not surprising for the other agent (a cat being
out of the water). This is why it important to condition entropy on agents’ generative
model.
In case of our simulations, we are interested in H(Action|Color, Shape), the
conditional entropy of action given color and shape:
H(Action|Color, Shape) = − ∑
c∈C,s∈S,a∈A
p(c, s, a) log p(c, s, a)+
∑
c∈C,s∈S
(∑
a∈A
p(c, s, a))× log p(c, s)
First, we present the general results (Tab. 3.12) , then we redefine the conditional
entropy to make it directly comparable with other success measures by conditioning
on a particular value assignment for Color and Shape (Tab. 3.13).
As we can see in the Table 3.12, for causal environment (CE) agents, the lowest
conditional entropy of action given shape and color is achieved in condition 8. This
condition is rich in food and features high exploitation rate. For correlations environ-
ment (CorrE) agents, it is also condition 8. For random environment (RE) agents, the
condition leading to the lowest conditional entropy measure is condition 5 (rich in
food, featuring high exploration rate).
Next, we are interested in calculating a modified version of conditional en-
tropy (H∗) of ‘Action’, specifically H∗(Action|green triangle) and H∗(Action|green
square). This way, we can directly map the entropy measure of H∗(Action|green
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triangle) to the measures of successful (both behaviorally and cognitively) eating;
and H∗(Action|green square) to successful changing.
As we can see in the Table 3.13, the lowest entropy for CE agents for successful
eating is in condition 9 (high exploitation, poor in food). Interestingly, this condition
was among the least successful for behavioral and cognitive eating success. The
conditions that were the most successful for behavioral (condition 8) and cognitive
(condition 5) eating success, are among the least successful in terms of entropy eating
success. For changing success, the most successful condition was condition 8 (high
exploitation rate, rich in food). This condition is again different from the successful
cognitively and behaviorally conditions.
For CorrE agents, the conditions for successful eating and changing are similar
to CE agents. Condition 9 and 8 results in the lowest entropy for ‘green triangle’.
Condition 8, for ‘green square’. The value is, however, higher for ‘green triangle’
than for ‘green square’ (it’s the highest across all environments, but still the lowest
in this case). For RE agents, the most successful condition for successful eating was
condition 6, for successful changing, condition 5. Condition 6 is poor in food and has
high exploration rate; condition 5 is rich in food, with high exploration rate.
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4Counter-factual
mathematics of
counterfactual predictive
models
Based on: Otworowska, M., Kwisthout, J., & van Rooij, I. (2014). Counter-factual
mathematics of counterfactual predictive models. Frontiers in psychology, 5.
A commentary on:
A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of percep-
tual presence and its absence in synaesthesia by Anil Seth (2014)
Abstract The question how a brain may give rise to cognition, such as the abil-
ity to form beliefs about the world and act upon them, has been a subject of
decades of interdisciplinary research. Currently, a leading theory about how a
brain may just do this is Predictive Processing theory. However in its current
version, Predictive Processing is based on a Laplace assumption - it means that
causes of sensory input are assumed to be represented probabilistically (so-called:
recognition density) as an unimodal probability density function. We explain
why this assumption poses unrealistic simplification of a perception of the world
and how it would prevent agents from distinguishing between simple objects.
Predictive Processing theory could be adjusted to explain agents perception,
but this requires multimodal distributions, violating the Laplace assumption.
This raises important questions about the possible (neural) representation and
approximation of such multimodal distributions within the Predictive Processing
framework.
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In order to explain the distinct phenomenology of veridical and non-veridical percepts,
Seth (2014) introduces the concept of counterfactual predictions to the Predictive
Processing (PP) framework proposed by Clark (2013). The PP framework assumes
that the brain generates predictions of its own sensory inputs based on generative
models of the world that are learned over time. Seth (2014) proposes to extend this
framework by assuming that the brain not only makes predictions of actual sensory
inputs, but also of the possible sensory consequences of a variety of possible actions.
These so-called counterfactual predictions are presumed to be based on generative
models that encode previously learned sensorimotor dependencies. Seth then argues
that counterfactually rich generative models can explain why the phenomenology
of veridical percepts differs from that of non-veridical percepts, such as arise in
synaesthesia.
While Seth deliberately—and understandably, given the aims of his paper—
decided to put “the detailed mathematics aside" (Seth, 2014, p. 8), we would like to
point out that these details become of primary concern when assuming that coun-
terfactual models can encode learned sensorimotor dependencies. The only current
candidate formalization of counterfactual predictive processing is given by Friston
et al. (2012b), work on which Seth says to build. Yet, this particular formalization
does not seem to provide the degrees of freedom required to accommodate the coun-
terfactual richness of generative models as envisioned by Seth. The reason is that
this formalism is committed to the Laplace assumption: the brain encodes probabil-
ity distributions as (potentially, multidimensional) Gaussian densities. Friston has
consistently defended the Laplace assumption for its neural plausibility and repre-
sentational efficiency (Friston et al., 2007; Friston et al., 2008; Friston, 2009; Friston
et al., 2012b). Be that as it may, the Laplace assumption seems to be too restrictive for
encoding the distributions corresponding to learned sensorimotor dependencies. We
illustrate this point with an example scenario.
Assume one perceives a fruit lying on the table, and it is tilted such that only its
bottom is visible. From this perspective it is not possible to tell what type of fruit it
is exactly (e.g., it could be an apple or a pear), and hence there is ambiguity about
the counterfactual predictions that apply about the sensory consequences of possible
actions that can be performed on the fruit. For instance, it could be that if one were
to grasp the bottom of the fruit and turn it, one would see that the other side of
the fruit is round (e.g., if it were an apple), or alternatively, one may see that the
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fruit is cone shaped (e.g., if it were a pear). Similarly, it could be that if one were to
grasp the non-visible top of the fruit that the aperture of the fingers will be relatively
large when the fingers touch the surface (e.g., if it were an apple), or alternatively,
relative small (e.g., if it were a pear). In our world, fruits are often round (e.g., when
they are apples), sometimes cone shaped (e.g., when they are pears), but rarely do
fruits have shapes in-between round and cone. Given these relative frequencies of
fruit shapes, learned sensorimotor contingencies will lead to probability densities for
counterfactual predictions that are multimodal; e.g., have a peak around ‘round’ and
a peak around ‘cone’, but lower probabilities for shapes in between (see Figure 1 for
an illustration).1
Note that in our example scenario the Laplace assumption made by Friston et al.
(2012b) is violated. Given that we can distinguish between the sensory consequences
of acting upon round shapes (such as are characteristic of apples) and cone shapes
(such as are characteristic of pears) there must exist at least one dimension—and
possibly multiple dimensions— in the multidimensional density that constitutes the
counterfactual generative model with the property that there is a range of values
representing shapes in-between the value on that dimension for ‘round’ and the
value for ‘cone’ (otherwise the value of ‘round’ and ‘cone’ would be equal for all
dimensions, making it impossible for us to tell them apart). The Laplace assumption
would imply that the probability of each of these intermediate values would need to
be at least as high as the probability of the values corresponding to ‘round’ or ‘cone’
shape (otherwise the density would be multimodal, and hence not Gaussian). Yet, as
illustrated in our scenario, this is arguably not true for fruits in our world.
Given the above considerations, the existing formalization of counterfactual
PP seems to lack the degrees of freedom required for counterfactual PP explanations
of phenomenological experience as envisioned by Seth.2 This does not mean that
such a formalization is unattainable, but it may look substantially different from the
1To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that in ambiguous cases such as these, that humans experience the
ambiguity between ‘seeing an apple’ versus ‘seeing a pear’ when presented with an ambiguous view
from the bottom. For all we know, no such ambiguity is ever experienced. Our point is merely that if
counterfactual predictions are based on learned veridical sensorimotor dependencies, then the densities
corresponding to those predictions need to capture the actual frequencies of those dependencies in the
world, which can be multimodal distributions.
2We note that this concern is not specific to Seth’s theory, and may in fact apply more broadly to other PP
explanations in the current literature. For instance, the prominent account of binocular rivalry as put
forth by Hohwy et al., 2008 seems to also appeal to multimodal distributions within a PP framework
(see their Figure 5, p. 693).
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Fig. 4.1.: Probability density for a dimension for which we can distinguish the round shapes
characteristic of an apple from the cone shape characteristic of a pear, conditioned on (i) the
sensory input generated by the bottom view of the fruit, (ii) the prior density describing the
frequency of different shaped fruits in the world, and (iii) the hypothetically performed action
of, say, grasping the fruit from the bottom and turning it so as to view it from the side.
one presumed by Seth. For instance, there exist mixture models that can perform
inferences on the types of mixtures of Gaussians illustrated in our Figure 1, and
contrary to Friston (2009), it has been argued that these mixture models have neural
(Pecevski et al., 2011) and representational (Gershman et al., 2009) plausibility. Yet, the
integration of these models in the PP framework is highly non-trivial, because simple
formalizations of central concepts in PP that hold under the Laplace assumption
(such as ‘precision’ defined as 1
σ2
) do not straightforwardly translate to multimodal
distributions. Hence, Seth’s proposal looks promising, but to reach its full explanatory
potential, work urgently needs to be done on the mathematical formalization of his
theory.
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5Demons of Ecological
Rationality
Based on: Otworowska, M., Blokpoel, M., Sweers, M., Wareham, T., & van Rooij, I.
(2017). Demons of Ecological Rationality. Cognitive Science. doi:10.1111/cogs.12530
Abstract
The Adaptive Toolbox theory redefines human rationality in terms of ecological
rationality, that is a degree of adaptation of decision strategies to different envi-
ronments. This theory is considered a tractable alternative to intractable classical
theories of human rationality based on logic or probability theory. In this letter,
we present a mathematical argument that, contrary to common belief, the Adap-
tive Toolbox theory hasn’t tamed the intractability demon. Rather, the demon
is hiding in the theory’s cornerstone assumption that ecological rationality is
achieved by processes of adaptation, such as evolution, development or learn-
ing. We believe that this finding is of general interest for the cognitive science
community, as it can serve to reopen the debate between logicists, Bayesians
and heuristicists on what genuinely constitutes the computational strengths and
weaknesses of their respective approaches.
How can resource-bounded minds like our own, make rational or otherwise ‘good’
decisions in an uncertain and complex world (Simon, 1957; Simon, 1990a; Oaksford
and Chater, 1998)? The Adaptive Toolbox theory answers this question by defining
human rationality in terms of a degree of adaptation of decision strategies (heuristics)
to different environments (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012).
When heuristics are adapted to the environment and lead to ‘good enough’ (or even
high quality) decisions, they are said to be ecologically rational. For almost two decades,
this theory has been considered a tractable alternative to classical theories of human
rationality based on logic or probability theory (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigeren-
zer, 2015). These classical theories have been criticized for postulating intractable (e.g.,
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NP-hard)1 computations (Arkes et al., 2016; Gigerenzer, 2008; Oaksford and Chater,
1998), which suggests that humans must possess demonic computational powers
in order to make rational decisions (so-called demons of rationality; Gigerenzer and
Todd, 1999; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999). It is widely assumed that the Adaptive
Toolbox theory circumvents the intractability problem that plagues classical accounts
of human rationality, because heuristics are by definition tractable. Yet, the notion
of ecological rationality hinges on the existence of tractable adaptation processes.
Here, we present an argument that, contrary to common belief, the Adaptive Toolbox
theory has not tamed the intractability demon yet. Rather, the demon is hiding in the
theory’s cornerstone assumption that ecological rationality is achieved by processes
of adaptation, such as evolution, development or learning.
The Adaptive Toolbox theory provides an influential account with many empir-
ical successes (Todd, 2002b; Todd and Gigerenzer, 1999; Gigerenzer and Goldstein,
1996; Bröder, 2000; Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2012b; Pohl, 2006; Brighton and Gigeren-
zer, 2012a; Schooler and Hertwig, 2005; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012) which has led to
its adoption in cognitive science, psychology, business, economics, law, philosophy,
cultural studies, and medicine (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012; Marewski and Gigerenzer,
2012). Despite its empirical successes, the theory remains incomplete to date (Todd
and Gigerenzer, 2012). So far, research has focused on hypothesizing and testing the
various heuristics in the toolbox, while two key aspects of the theory so far remained
unresolved: (1) the meta-decision process of selecting the right heuristic for a given
environment (the selector) (Hafenbrädl et al., 2016; Todd and Brighton, 2016) and (2)
the adaptation process by which the adaptive toolbox of heuristics evolves, develops
or is learned (Schulz, 2011).
First, several proposals about the nature of the selector have been suggested,
but none so far is considered satisfactory (Marewski and Link, 2014). Be that as it
1Given the famous mathematical conjecture that P 6= NP (Fortnow, 2009), NP-hard problems cannot be
computed in polynomial time, but instead require non-polynomial (e.g. exponential) time (Garey and
Johnson, 1979; Arora and Barak, 2009). Here, P is the class of problems that are efficiently (polynomial-
time) solvable, and NP is the class for which solutions are efficiently verifiable. Because of the com-
binatorial explosion inherent in non-polynomial computations, NP-hard computations are generally
regarded intractable and therefore models that postulate such functions are considered computationally
implausible (Rooij, 2008). Or as Gigerenzer and colleagues have put it: “The computations postulated
by a model of cognition need to be tractable in the real world in which people live, not only in the
small world of an experiment with only a few cues. This eliminates NP-hard models that lead to
computational explosion, such as probabilistic inference using Bayesian belief networks (Cooper, 1990),
including its approximations (Dagum and Luby, 1993). Tractability is one condition for psychological
plausibility that is easily met by simple heuristics” (Gigerenzer et al., 2008, p. 236).
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may, it seems that to ensure tractability of the whole toolbox, minimally the selector
must be fast and frugal like the heuristics that it selects (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999, p.
32). Therefore—and to safeguard that our argument is not an artifact of a potentially
intractable selector (cf. Rooij et al., 2012)—we will work with the assumption that the
selector itself is a heuristic as well. Second, the adaptation process involves creating
and adapting the heuristics and the selector to be ecologically rational. It is assumed
that both ontogenetic and phylogenetic adaptation processes can play a role (Todd
and Brighton, 2016), but no explicit account of how this works has been put forth yet.
To ensure generality of our result, we will make no assumption about the nature of
the adaption process other than that it yields toolboxes that are ecologically rational
(cf. Otworowska et al., 2015).
Earlier work (Schmitt and Martignon, 2006) has already shown that optimal
toolbox adaptation (defined as a problem of cue ordering in the toolbox) is intractable.
These results were used as a supporting argument for the idea that ecological ratio-
nality is not defined in terms of optimality but in terms of ‘good enough’ cue orders
(Gigerenzer, 2008). This presupposes that ‘good enough’ toolbox adaptation would
be tractable. Here we show, however, that even ‘good enough’ toolbox adaptation is
intractable.
Importantly, intractability is not a property that can be derived from simulations,
but given a proper formalization it can be mathematically proven (Rooij et al., 2008;
Rooij, 2008). We have proven the intractability of toolbox adaptation as follows: We
have formalized the notions of a toolbox (heuristics + selector), ecological rationality,
and the environment (Box 1). Using these notions, we have formally defined the Tool-
box Adaptation problem (i.e., given an environment, create an ecologically rational
(‘good enough’) toolbox for that environment) (Box 1). Lastly, we have constructed
a mathematical proof that Toolbox Adaptation, so defined, is intractable (NP-hard)
(Box 2). Boxes 1 and 2 sketch properties of the formalization and give the intuition
behind the proof. Full details of the formalization and the proof can be found in the
last section.
The NP-hardness proof for Toolbox Adaptation establishes that there does not
exist any general polynomial-time computable process (neither deterministic nor
probabilistic2; see also Rooij, 2008) that can adapt toolboxes to be ecologically rational
2The notion of probabilistic algorithms is captured by the class BPP of problems which have bounded-
error probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. It is assumed that the class BPP is equal to P, so that
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Box 1. To investigate claims about the
computational (in)tractability of adaptive
toolboxes, a formal, computational model
of toolbox adaptation is required. Such
a model can be represented by an input-
output mapping (i.e., what Marr (1982)
would refer to as ‘computational level
model’; see also Rooij (2008)) as follows:
Input: An environment, that is, a set of ac-
tions, and a set of situations (formal-
ized as truth assignments for possi-
ble events). An upperbound on the
number of heuristics (#h) and the size
of a heuristic (|h|). A lowerbound for
the level of adaptation that counts as
ecologically rational (ermin ∈ [0, 1]).
Output: A toolbox T, of bounded size, that
is ecologically rational.
Fig. 5.1 illustrates a possible (toy example)
input and output for Toolbox Adaptation.
Note that in this computational-level model,
the toolbox T consists only of fast and fru-
gal trees (i.e., both the selector and heuris-
tics are fast and frugal trees). A fast and
frugal tree is a chain of cues with associ-
ated actions (in case of a heuristic) or a
chain of cues with associated heuristics (in
case of the selector). Each cue c(e, s) is a
boolean function, evaluating whether an
event (e ∈ E) is true in a given situation.
If the cue c(e, s) evaluates to true, then the
heuristic associated with that selector cue is
used (in case of the selector) or an action as-
sociated with that heuristic cue is executed
(in case of a heuristic). If the cue is false,
the next cue is evaluated until the last cue
is reached. If this last cue is false, the first
heuristic is used (in case of the selector) or
the last action in the tree is performed (in
case of a heuristic).
The choice for fast and frugal trees is with-
out loss of generality, because (a) many
other heuristics pro- posed for the Adaptive
Toolbox theory, such as for example, fluency
heuristic, take the Best, satisficing, 1/N, de-
fault heuristic, tit-for-tat, imitate the major-
ity, and imitate the successful (Gigerenzer,
2008), can be formally rewritten as fast and
frugal trees (Sweers, 2015); and (b) if adapta-
tion of toolboxes is intractable for some sub-
set of heuristics, then it is also intractable
for toolboxes for any superset of that.
Given that our computational model of
Toolbox Adaptation is an input-output map-
ping, it is neutral with respect to the na-
ture of the adaptation process by which the
output is reached. For instance, this pro-
cess could be an ontogenetic or phyloge-
netic process, or a mixture of these. Fur-
thermore, it does not make specific assump-
tions about how these processes are real-
ized, for example, algorithmically. The re-
sults of (in)tractability analyses of a model
like this will therefore hold for any type
of algorithmic-level implementation, which
could be either evolutionary, neural net-
work, probabilistic, incremental, hill climb-
ing, or any other type of algorithm. The
reason is that computational intractability
(i.e., NP-hardness) is a property of the input-
output mapping, and not of a specific algo-
rithm for computing it (Garey and Johnson,
1979).
c(e,s)
action
c(e,s)
Input Output
process of
adaptation
#h
|h|
Selector
Heuristic 2
Heuristic 3
Heuristic 1
Events Actions
Si
tu
at
io
ns
e1 e2 e3 e4 ae1 ae2 ae3 ae4
s1 T T T F 1 1 1 0
s2 T T F F 1 1 0 0
s3 T F T T 1 0 1 1
s4 F F T T 0 0 1 1
#h=3, |h|=2, ermin=0.5
Fig. 5.1.: Formalization of toolbox adaptation
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(‘good enough’), for all possible environments. This applies regardless of the nature of
this process.3 More importantly, it demonstrates that Toolbox Adaptation is as difficult
to compute as many other known NP-hard functions, including logic problems, such
as deciding logical satisfiability of a set of logical clauses (Garey and Johnson, 1979;
Oaksford and Chater, 1998) and probabilistic inference problems, such as exact or
approximate inference in Bayesian networks (Abdelbar et al., 2000; Kwisthout et al.,
2011). This is an interesting observation given that one of the prime motivations for
the Adaptive Toolbox theory was to move away from classical notions of rationality,
based on logic or probability, in order to ensure tractability.
Our proof that Toolbox Adaptation is intractable may be surprising given that it
is so widely believed that the Adaptive Toolbox theory is a tractable account of human
rationality. We suspect that the belief could persist, however, because researchers have
been focusing on Toolbox Application, while taking Toolbox Adaptation for granted.
Here, Toolbox Application refers to the process of making ecologically rational de-
cisions in a given environment, using a toolbox of heuristics that has already been
adapted to that environment by some unspecified process. Even if Toolbox Appli-
cation is free from computational demons, the demons are still hiding in Toolbox
Adaptation.
It is not uncommon for cognitive scientists to try to discredit theories in compet-
ing frameworks by pointing out that those frameworks run into intractability issues.
But this is to no avail and is in no way our purpose here. We see intractability not as a
problem for specific theories, or even for specific theoretical frameworks, but an ubiq-
uitous feature of theoretical frameworks with high degrees of generality (Rooij, 2008;
Rooij, 2015). For instance, Bayesians originally criticized logical accounts of rationality
for their intractability (Chater and Oaksford, 1993; Oaksford and Chater, 1998), only
to later discover that Bayesian theories themselves face intractability charges that are
not easily fenced off by appeals to ‘approximation’ or ‘as if’ explanation (Kwisthout
et al., 2011; Rooij et al., 2018). Similarly, Gigerenzer and colleagues have criticized both
logical and Bayesian accounts of rationality for their intractability (Gigerenzer and
Todd, 1999; Todd, 2002b). By overlooking the question how adaptation of toolboxes
functions which can be solved probabilistically in polynomial time can also be solved deterministically
in polynomial time (Wigderson, 2006). Hence, NP-hard functions cannot be solved (with bounded
error) by any probabilistic polynomial time running algorithm (assuming P 6= NP; see also footnote 1).
3Given that NP-hardness is a property of the function computed and not of the algorithm used to compute
the function, the NP-hardness result applies to any such process. See also Box 2.
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Box 2.
NP-hard models are considered to be in-
tractable, because there do not exist any
tractable (formally, polynomial-time) algo-
rithms for computing them (unless P = NP,
see footnote 1). How can one prove that
a computational model is NP-hard (and
thus intractable)? A model is NP-hard if
it is at least as hard as another NP-hard
model, that is, one can use the former to
compute the latter with minimal (only poly-
nomial) overhead. We can prove such a rela-
tionship using polynomial-time reduction,
a technique from computational complex-
ity (Garey and Johnson, 1979). In the sup-
plementary materials (section 5A. Formal
details), we use this technique to prove that
Adaptive Toolbox is NP-hard. Specifically,
we reduce from the known NP-hard graph
problem Dominating Set (which takes as
input any graph and asks as output a so-
called dominating set, that is, a subset of
vertices with the property that for each ver-
tex v in the graph, either v or one of its
neighbors is in the subset). This is done as
follows:
a. Provide a tractable (polynomial-time) al-
gorithm that transforms any input iDS for
Dominating Set into input iAT for Tool- box
Adaptation (proof step 1 in supplementary
materials).
b. Show that after the transformed input is
processed as specified by Toolbox Adapta-
tion, the resulting output oAT can be trans-
formed back into a solution oDS for Domi-
nating Set (proof steps 2 and 3).
c. Both transformations only take polyno-
mial time to compute. This means we can
use Toolbox Adaptation to solve Dominat-
ing Set with minimal (only polynomial)
overhead.
d. Toolbox Adaptation is NP-hard, because
it is at least as hard as the NP-hard prob-
lem Dominating Set. This is, in a nutshell,
the strategy we used to prove that Toolbox
Adaptation is NP-hard. Fig. 5.2 illustrates
this strategy.
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Input iDS Input iAT
Output oDS Output oAT
Fig. 5.2.: Proof intuition
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of heuristics can itself be tractable, Gigerenzer and colleagues may not have realized
that the Adaptive Toolbox theory faces exactly the same intractability charge, albeit
in a different guise. From a complexity-theoretic perspective this is not surprising,
but a natural consequence of the theory’s high degrees of expressiveness (i.e., it has
the degrees of freedom needed to encode NP-hard problems).
Does this mean that the Adaptive Toolbox account is irreparably flawed? Cer-
tainly not. In fact, there exists a well-defined methodology with which it could be
repaired. Using proof techniques from parameterized complexity theory (Downey
and Fellows, 1999) it is possible to identify parameters of an intractable model that
are sources of the intractability, in the sense that they can confine the non-polynomial
time complexity inherent to a model (Rooij and Wareham, 2008; Rooij et al., 2008).
The model can then potentially be rendered tractable by assuming that the relevant
parameters are, in the real world, bounded in the right ways. In other words, these
bounds limit the degrees of freedom of the theory so that it becomes tractable for
ecologically relevant parameter ranges. Importantly, taking this approach would re-
quire that Adaptive Toolbox theorists extend their research program with a ‘tractable
design cycle’ (analogous to, and interlaced with, the ‘empirical cycle’; cf. Rooij (2008,
p. 962):4
4This cycle could be implemented in practice using concepts and techniques from parameterized com-
plexity theory. It can be shown that some intractable (NP-hard) functions f : I → O can be computed
in fixed-parameter (fp-) tractable time O(g(K)|i|c), i.e., where g can be any function of the parameters
k1, k2, ..., km in set K = {k1, k2, ..., km }, |i| denotes the input size, and c is a constant. Note that in such
an event, the intractable f can be computed efficiently (in polynomial-time), even for large inputs,
provided the assumption that f operates only on inputs in which the parameters in K are restricted to
relatively small values (each k << |i|). The use of such formal proof techniques is no luxury, as it is
known that intuitions about what are (and are not) the sources of intractability in a model can often
be mistaken (Rooij et al., 2008). For instance, one may intuitively conjecture that Toolbox Adaptation
is tractable for toolboxes of bounded size (e.g., a small (fixed) number of heuristics available in the
toolbox), but a corollary of our proof is that this is false. In the reduction in our proof the parameter #h
is set to 1, which shows that Toolbox Adaptation is NP-hard even if the toolbox would contain only a
single heuristic.
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1. Consider parameters of the model (these can be one or more properties of the
toolbox, the environment or ecological rationality).
2. Use formal proof techniques to analyze if these parameters are sources of
intractability for the model.
3. If Yes, then consider if the parameters can plausibly be assumed to be
bounded in real-world situations (not just in toy domains).
4. If Yes, then revise the model by explicating bounds on these parame-
ters.
5. Else, return to step 1.
6. Else, return to step 1.
Adopting this methodology not only has the benefit that it can potentially render
a tractable version of the Adaptive Toolbox theory, but it may also sharpen the
debate among logicists, Bayesians and heuristicists. After all, classical approaches to
rationality have the same methodology at their disposal (see also Kwisthout et al.,
2011; Rooij et al., 2018; Rooij and Wareham, 2008). Applying the ‘tractable design
cycle’ to both ecological and classical accounts of rationality is a rigorous way to move
forward on the question how rationality can be “tractable in the real world in which
people live, not only in the small world of an experiment” (Gigerenzer et al., 2008,
p. 236), as well as to assess whether or not the ecological account can really explain
this better than classical accounts.
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5A. Formal details
In these supplementary sections we describe the mathematical details of the formal-
ization of the Adaptive Toolbox and the computational intractability proof. In Section
1, we present formalizations of the environment, ecological rationality, heuristics, the
selector, and Toolbox Adaptation. In Section 2, we present the mathematical proof
that Toolbox Adaptation is computationally intractable (NP-hard).
Formalizing the Adaptive Toolbox
In this part we present a formalization of the adaptive toolbox account (Otworowska
et al., 2015; Sweers, 2015). This involves formalizing the components of the adaptive
toolbox: the environment (including ecological rationality), heuristics and a selector,
and the process of toolbox adaptation. We formalize the heuristics and selector compo-
nents as fast and frugal trees (see Figure 1), but first we formalize the environment.
Environment
The environment Γ consists of a set of situations S, and a set of possible actions to
take, A. The environment implicitly includes a set of events E = {e1, e2, . . . , en}. Each
event ei ∈ E is a boolean variable that can be true or false. A truth assignment for all
events in E is called a situation s. A situation s is a function s : E→ {true, f alse} that
assigns a truth value to all events ei ∈ E. We denote the set of situations that an agent
can come across as S, which is a subset of all possible situations S ⊆ {true, f alse}n.
For each situation s ∈ S, it is assumed to be known which actions are satisfactory
(good enough) and which are unsatisfactory (not good enough). There is at least
one satisfactory action in each situation and it is possible that multiple actions are
satisfactory. The set of actions which are satisfactory in at least one situation in S is
called A. A multivalued function D : S→ 2A maps each situation in the environment
to the set of actions that are satisfactory for that situation. An example environment is
shown in Table 5.1. It contains 5 events and 6 of all 32 possible situations. For each
situation the satisfactory actions are listed.
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Tab. 5.1.: An example environment. Each row is one situation. Columns one to five denote
whether an event is true (T) or false (F) in the situation and columns six to ten denote whether
an action is satisfactory (1) or unsatisfactory (0) in the situation. For example, row one states
that in the situation when the sun is shining, an agent is hungry, not tired and outside and it is
not raining, the satisfactory actions are eating an ice cream and eating a sandwich.
Ecological rationality
Ecological rationality er of a toolbox T captures how well T is adapted to an environ-
ment Γ. The environment (as formalized above) contains satisfactory and unsatisfac-
tory actions. The ecological rationality of a toolbox is formalized as the number of
situations for which the toolbox chooses a satisfactory action, divided by the total
number of situations. Say that T(s) is the action chosen by toolbox T in situation
s and D(s) is the set of satisfactory actions according to environment Γ. Ecological
rationality can then be formalized as follows:
er =
|{s : s ∈ S ∧ T(s) ∈ D(s)}|
|S|
We say that a toolbox is ecologically rational when its ecological rationality er is
greater than or equal to some minimal ecological rationality ermin, 0 ≤ ermin ≤ 1. For
instance, if er = 0.5, this means that the toolbox is ecologically rational if it chooses a
satisfactory action in 50% of all situations in S. Accordingly, er < 0.5 means that the
toolbox is more often wrong than right in terms of choosing a satisfactory action.
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Heuristics
Each heuristic in the toolbox is represented as a f ast and frugal tree5 (Martignon et al.,
2003) which is essentially a sequence of cues with associated actions (see Figure 1).
Each cue is a boolean function c : E× S → {true, f alse} that evaluates whether an
event e is true in a given situation s. When executing a heuristic, the tree is traversed
starting at the root. Step by step each cue function is evaluated, checking whether
the cue holds in the current situation. If the cue c(e, s) evaluates to true for event e
in situation s, then the action a associated to that cue c is executed. If the cue is false,
then the next cue is evaluated until the bottom cue is reached. If this last cue is false,
the last action in the tree is performed as the default action for that heuristic.
c1
a1 c2
a2 a3
T F
T F
Fig. 5.3.: A single heuristic represented as a fast and frugal tree. The tree contains cues
C = {c1, c2} and associated actions {a1, a2, a3}. Each cue c ∈ C is a simple boolean function
which evaluates whether an event ej ∈ E is true or false, depending on the situation c(ej, sk). If
the cue function returns ’true’, the tree traversal stops and the action associated with the cue is
executed; otherwise the next cue function is executed. For example, if c1 is false, but c2 is true,
then the action a2 will be executed.
Selector
A selector determines which heuristic to use in a given situation. We represent the
selector as a fast and frugal tree as well. Hypotheses about the exact nature of the
selector mechanism have not been developed to the same extent as hypotheses about
the structure of individual heuristics. Nevertheless, the common idea seems to be
5Our choice to formally represent all heuristics in the Adaptive Toolbox as fast and frugal trees is less
limiting than it may appear at first sight. Many other heuristics such as e.g., Take The Best, satisficing,
1/N, default heuristic, tit-for-tat, imitate the majority and imitate the successful (Gigerenzer, 2008;
Gigerenzer and Sturm, 2012), can be formally rewritten as fast and frugal trees (Sweers, 2015). Hence,
the assumption is general enough to include a majority of known heuristics.
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that the selector, like the heuristics, is fast and frugal. For our purposes, we assume
that the selector can be modelled by a fast and frugal tree. The internal nodes in
the selector heuristic are cues associated with heuristics (see Figure 2). A heuristic is
executed when its associated cue in the selector is evaluated to be true. If no cue in
the selector evaluates to true, the heuristic associated with the first cue is executed as
the default heuristic.6
c4 ¬c2 c1 c3
c3
¬c2
a12
¬c3
a8
a4
a9
c5
¬c1
a2
a1
a3
a5 ¬c5a7
a10
SELECTOR
HEURISTIC 1
HEURISTIC 2
HEURISTIC 3
HEURISTIC 4
F
F
T
Fig. 5.4.: The adaptive toolbox selector and heuristics as fast and frugal trees. The selector is
represented by the pink nodes. The tree is traversed from left to right (selecting a heuristic) and
from top to bottom (executing a heuristic). For instance, let’s assume a situation such that c4("it
is sunny outside") = F, ¬c2("I have not read any book in a while") = T, and c5(‘my favorite
book is on the shelf") = T; in such a case the action a2 = "read the book" will be executed. Note
that when the last cue of the selector (c3) returns false, the first heuristic is executed by default.
6By formalizing the selector as a fast-and-frugal tree we inherit the notion of a default heuristic (analogous
to the default action; see Fig. 1). There are at least two straightforward ways to formalize the default
heuristic: (1) The default heuristic is an additional heuristic that is triggered after the final cue in the
selector is evaluated to false or (2) the default heuristic is the first heuristic in the selector. We opted
for (2), which is in line with intuitions expressed in the literature that cues can be ordered by some
pre-computed criterion related to the cues’ usefulness (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000), or based on how
successful a cue was previously when making the same decision (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000). Applied
to the selector this would imply that the first heuristic has the highest probability to succeed in a given
situation. Regardless, for purposes of assessing the (in)tractability of Toolbox Adaptation, the choice
between (1) and (2) is immaterial. Because (1) is a generalization of (2) all intractability results for (2)
also hold for (1).
102 Chapter 5 Demons of Ecological Rationality
Toolbox Adaptation
Using the formalizations of environment, ecological rationality, heuristic and selector
given above, we are now in a position to formalize Toolbox Adaptation. This model
characterizes the process of adapting a toolbox to an environment from scratch. The
input of the model is an environment Γ and a minimal ecological rationality ermin; the
output is an adaptive toolbox T (with certain characteristics) which performs good
enough, i.e., has an ecological rationality equal to or higher than ermin. To ensure
frugality of both the heuristics and the selector in T we assume a maximum size for
each heuristic |h| and a maximum size for the selector #h (defined as the number of
heuristics). This computational level characterization is defined as follows:
TOOLBOX ADAPTATION
Input: An environment Γ = (S, A, D), the positive integers #h and |h|
denoting the maximum number of heuristics in the selector and the maxi-
mum size, i.e., the maximum number of cues in, of a heuristic respectively,
and the minimal ecological rationality ermin ∈ [0, 1].
Output: An adaptive toolbox T with at most #h heuristics, each of size at
most |h|, and with an ecological rationality er ≥ ermin for environment Γ,
if such a toolbox exists, and special symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Proof of intractability of Toolbox Adaptation
In this section, we prove that TOOLBOX ADAPTATION is NP-hard via a polynomial-
time reduction from DOMINATING SET. First, we introduce concepts from computa-
tional complexity analysis, then DOMINATING SET followed by our polynomial-time
reduction from DOMINATING SET to TOOLBOX ADAPTATION.
Computational complexity analysis
We assume the reader is familiar with basic notions from complexity theory (Garey
and Johnson, 1979; Arora and Barak, 2009). When a problem7 is NP-hard this means
that it is at least as difficult to compute as any other problem in the complexity class
NP. The basic idea of proving NP-hardness of a problem M is to prove that computing
M is at least as hard as all other problems in the complexity class NP. This can be done
7In computational complexity theory, the term problem refers to any function or mapping. For the
purposes of this paper, it can be considered synonymous to a computational model.
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via polynomial-time reduction from a problem which is already known to be NP-hard.
A polynomial-time reduction from a problem D to a problem M transforms each
instance (input) of D into an input of M in polynomial time. These transformations
have the special property that the output of M on the transformed input is yes if
and only if the output of D on the given input is yes. This means that, with only
polynomial time overhead, one can use any algorithm for M to solve D. This proves
that M is at least as difficult to compute as D, and hence that if problem D is NP-hard
then M must be NP-hard as well.
This methodology uses so-called decision versions of computational problems,
i.e., problems whose output is either yes or no. It is known (Fortnow, 2009) that if
the decision version of a computational problem is NP-hard then that computational
problem is not solvable in polynomial time unless P = NP. Given that contemporary
Computer Science works with the assumption that P 6= NP (Fortnow, 2009), a proof
of NP-hardness is a proof of polynomial-time unsolvability. In our proof below, we
will use the following decision version of TOOLBOX ADAPTATION:
TOOLBOX ADAPTATION (Decision version)
Input: An environment Γ = (S, A, D), the positive integers #h and |h|
denoting the maximum number of heuristics and the maximum size of a
heuristic respectively, and the minimal ecological rationality ermin ∈ [0, 1].
Question: Does there exist an adaptive toolbox T with at most #h heuris-
tics, each of size at most |h|, and with an ecological rationality er ≥ ermin
for environment Γ?
Dominating Set
The problem that we will use to show that the decision version of TOOLBOX ADAP-
TATION is NP-hard involves the computation of dominating sets in graphs. A vertex
set V′ ⊆ V is a dominating set for a graph G = (V, E) if for every vertex v ∈ V
either v ∈ V′ or v has a neighbor u ∈ V′, where vertex u is a neighbor if it is directly
connected to v with an edge. The entire set of neighbors of a vertex v is called the
neighborhood of v and the neighborhood combined with v is called the closed neigh-
borhood of v. The size of an instance of DOMINATING SET is defined as a number of
vertices |V| (see Figure 5.5 for an example of an instance of DOMINATING SET of size
|V| = 7).
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Fig. 5.5.: An example of an instance, iDSx = (G, k), of DOMINATING SET of size |V| = 7, where
parameter k is 3. As there is a dominating set with size 3 (nodes 2, 6 and 7), this is a yes-instance.
Note that no dominating set of size 2 exists, making the instance with k is 2 a no-instance.
We can now define the following problem, Dominating Set, which is known to
be as hard as Vertex Cover (Garey and Johnson, 1979, Problem GT1) and 3-Satisfiability
(Garey and Johnson, 1979, Chapter 3). Since these other problems are all NP-hard,
Dominating Set is also NP-hard.
DOMINATING SET (Garey and Johnson, 1979, Problem GT2)
Input: A graph G = (V, E) and a positive integer k ≤ |V|.
Question: Is there a dominating set V′ for G with |V′| ≤ k?
To illustrate our reduction, we will use the example yes-instance of DOMINATING
SET, iDSx = (G, k), given in Figure 5.5 in which the requested maximum size k of the
dominating set is 3.
Polynomial-time reduction from Dominating Set to Toolbox
Adaptation (Decision version)
We define the polynomial-time reduction from DOMINATING SET to TOOLBOX ADAP-
TATION (Decision version) in three steps:
1. Provide an algorithm ATA that transforms any instance of DOMINATING SET
to an instance of TOOLBOX ADAPTATION (Decision version) and prove that
this algorithm runs in time polynomial in the size of the given instance of
DOMINATING SET.
2. Prove that if the given instance iDS of DOMINATING SET is a yes-instance, then
the transformed instance ATA(iDS) is a yes-instance for TOOLBOX ADAPTATION
(Decision version).
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3. Prove that if the transformed instance ATA(iDS) is a yes-instance for TOOLBOX
ADAPTATION (Decision version), then the given instance iDS of DOMINATING
SET is a yes-instance.
To simplify the proof of correctness of this reduction, we assume a minimal ecological
rationality ermin = 0.5. In Section 5, we show how this reduction can be generalized
for any value of ermin ∈ [0, 1].
Step 1. Provide a polynomial-time transformation algorithm ATA
We start with an instance iDS from DOMINATING SET, which has a graph G = (V, E)
and an integer k. This instance is transformed by algorithm ATA to an instance of
TOOLBOX ADAPTATION with the following parameter-settings:
• #h = 1
• |h| = k− 1.
• ermin = 0.5
Algorithm ATA constructs the environment Γ = (S, A, D) by specifying the following
situations, events and actions:
• Two types of situations are made, neighborhood-situations and x-situations. A
neighborhood-situation, n(v), codes for the closed neighborhood of v. There is
one such situation for each vertex v ∈ V so that there are |V| such situations.
An x-situation does not code for anything in iDS. There are |V| of those and the
set of x-situations is called X.
• A set of 2|V| events is made. For each vertex vi ∈ V one event is made, called
vi. These are set to true in a neighborhood-situation n(v) if vi is in the closed
neighborhood of v. For all x-situations these events are set to false. For each
x-situation xi ∈ X there is one event, xi, which is true only in situation xi. Each
event xi is thus true for only one situation.
• Lastly, 2|V| actions are made. There are |V| vertex-actions, denoted as av. An
action avi is called a vertex-action and is satisfactory in a neighborhood-situation
n(v) if vi is in the closed neighborhood of the vertex v, otherwise it is unsatisfac-
tory. For the x-situations, all avi actions are unsatisfactory. The other |V| actions
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Situation v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 av1 av2 av3 av4 av5 av6 av7 ax1 ax2 ax3 ax4 ax5 ax6 ax7
n(v1) T F T F F F T F F F F F F F 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(v2) F T T F F F F F F F F F F F 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(v3) T T T T F F F F F F F F F F 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(v4) F F T T T T F F F F F F F F 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(v5) F F F T T F T F F F F F F F 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(v6) F F F T F T F F F F F F F F 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(v7) T F F F T F T F F F F F F F 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x1 F F F F F F F T F F F F F F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
x2 F F F F F F F F T F F F F F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
x3 F F F F F F F F F T F F F F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
x4 F F F F F F F F F F T F F F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
x5 F F F F F F F F F F F T F F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
x6 F F F F F F F F F F F F T F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
x7 F F F F F F F F F F F F F T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Tab. 5.2.: The environment of the instance of TOOLBOX ADAPTATION with ermin = 0.5 which is
constructed from the example instance iDSx of DOMINATING SET given in Figure 5.5. Each row
is one situation and its name is displayed in the first column, where n(vi) is a neighborhood-
situation and xi is an x-situation. Columns 2 to 15 denote the events E, where each vi ∈ E
(column 2 to 8) is a vertex event and each xi ∈ I (column 6 to 15) is an x event. A value T or F
in column i and row s denotes that event i is true or false, respectively, in situation s. Columns
16 to 29 denote the set A of actions that are satisfactory in at least one situation, where each avi
is a vertex-action and each axi is an x-action. A value 1 or 0 in column a and row s denotes that
action a is correct or incorrect, respectively, in situation s.
are x-actions, denoted as ax. An x-action axi is only satisfactory for situation xi
and is unsatisfactory for all other n(v)- and x-situations.
For example, from instance iDSx shown in Figure 5.5, we make an instance iTAx in
which #h = 1, |h| = 2, ermin = 0.5, and environment Γ is as shown in Table 5.2.
The running time (in basic computation steps) of the transformation algorithm
ATA is expressed as a function of the input size of the given instance of DOMINATING
SET. Setting the parameters takes one step for each parameter (3 steps in total). Each
of the |V| situations n(v) in the environment is set by looking up the neighbors of v in
G, which takes time |V| for each situation. Setting the value of all events and actions
takes one step for each event and action, and hence time 4|V| for each n(v) situation.
This requires |V|(|V| + 4|V|) = 5|V|2 steps over all n(v)-situations. By a similar
argument, setting up the x-situations requires 4|V|2 steps. The operation of ATA thus
requires 3+ 9|V|2 basic computation steps, which shows that the transformation runs
in polynomial time with respect to the size of the given instance of DOMINATING
SET.
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Step 2. Prove that if iDS is a yes-instance for DS then iTA = ATA(iDS) is a
yes-instance for TA.
Given a yes-instance iDS = (G(V, E), k), there is a set of vertices V′ ⊆ V, V′ =
{v1, v2, . . . , vk}, which dominates all of the vertices v ∈ V. That is, for every vertex
v ∈ V, a vertex in its closed neighborhood is in V′. For instance iTA constructed by
ATA from iDS, a toolbox can be constructed in which a selector based on the single
cue v1 has an associated heuristic with size k− 1. Note that the selector can in fact use
any cue, as the lone heuristic is also the default heuristic. All vertices in dominating
set V′ except vk are cues in this heuristic. That is, for each vi ∈ V′, vi 6= vk, there is
an event vi as cue. Each cue vi has a corresponding action avi and the default action
is avk, the action belonging to vk. Figure 5.6 illustrates the constructed toolbox for
instance iTAx.
There are |V|+ |X| = 2|V| situations in the environment, so in order for the
toolbox to obtain an ecological rationality ≥ 0.5, a satisfactory action needs to be
given in at least |V| situations. For all |V| neighborhood-situations n(v) a satisfactory
action is given because the actions of the heuristic are set as the dominating set. That
is, in any neighborhood-situation n(v), a cue vi is true if and only if an action avi is
satisfactory, which in turns holds if and only if vertex vi is in the closed neighborhood
of v. This is so because there is a dominating set for iDS, there is at least one such
vi cue and action for each n(v). Either this vi is a cue-action pair in the heuristic,
and then a satisfactory action is chosen for situation v, or none of the cues vj in the
heuristic are vi and the default action is performed. However, as there is at least one
vertex vi for each v in the dominating set, and none of the cue pairs corresponding
to the dominating set (except vk) were true, the last vertex, vk, must dominate v
and thus vertex vk corresponding to action avk must dominate v. As such, for any
neighborhood-situation a satisfactory action is chosen. There are no ax actions in this
toolbox and thus no actions which satisfy any x-situation. The ecological rationality
of this toolbox is thus exactly
er =
|V|
2|V| = ermin = 0.5. (5.1)
Moreover, the single heuristic has the correct length (k− 1). This proves that if the
given instance iDS of DOMINATING SET is a yes-instance then the transformed instance
iTA of TOOLBOX ADAPTATION is also a yes-instance.
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v1
v1 av1
v2 av2
v(k−2) av(k−2)
v(k−1) av(k−1)
avk
Fig. 5.6.: The toolbox which is constructed for a yes-instance of TOOLBOX ADAPTATION. All
actions avz correspond to a vertex vz in a dominating set V′.
Step 3. Prove that if iTA = ATA(iDS) is a yes-instance for TA then iDS is a
yes-instance for DS.
Given a yes-instance iTA = (Γ, #h = 1, |h| = k− 1, ermin = 0.5), there is a toolbox T
such that the ecological rationality is equal to or higher than 0.5 in environment Γ
with one heuristic of length k− 1. This means that T gives a satisfactory action for at
least |V| situations as there are 2|V| situations in Γ. We show that it is only possible
to satisfy |V| situations if there is a dominating set of size at most k in graph G of
iDS = (G, k). The selector cue may evaluate any event, since the default heuristic is
always applied because there are no other heuristics. We go through three toolbox
types:
1. Only satisfying x-situations: Each x-situation has a single satisfactory action.
Since there are at most k actions in the toolbox, at most k x-situations can
be satisfied. If the toolbox would only satisfy x-situation it would have an
ecological rationality
er =
k
2|V| < ermin = 0.5 (5.2)
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as k is always smaller than |V|.8 Hence, no toolbox of this type is viable, i.e., has
er ≥ 0.5 and heuristic size at most k− 1.
2. Only satisfying neighborhood-situations: The only way each neighborhood-
situation n(v) is satisfied is if at least one satisfactory action of n(v) is in A′,
the set of actions of the toolbox. If iTA is a yes-instance (while satisfying only
neighborhood-situations), the toolbox satisfies all |V| neighborhood-situations
such that
er =
|V|
2|V| = ermin = 0.5 (5.3)
and there are at most k actions in A′. The k actions in set A′ must correspond
directly to the vertices of a k-dominating set of V, because any situation n(v)
is satisfied only if the vertex vi of action avi is in the closed neighborhood of v.
It does not matter what the value of the cues in the toolbox are, as long as the
toolbox is traversed such that for each neighborhood-situation a satisfactory
action is chosen. This means that we do not even need to assume there may
only be positive cues (as was the case in the toolbox shown in Figure 5.6), as it
does not matter what values the cues have.
3. Satisfying neighborhood-situations and x-situations: It is possible to satisfy
m x-situations and have an ecological rationality of at least 0.5 if at least |V| −m
neighborhood-situations can be satisfied. The ecological rationality is then
er ≥ m + |V| −m
2|V| = ermin = 0.5. (5.4)
The m x-situations are satisfied only if there are m x-actions in the toolbox.
The |V| − m neighborhood-situations must then be satisfied by the k− m ac-
tions which are left, because none of the x-actions are associated with any
neighborhood-situations. If this is possible there is a dominating set of size ≤ k
for iDS. This is so because there are k−m v-actions which correspond to ver-
tices, a partial dominating set, with which at least |V| −m vertices are covered.
There are at most m unsatisfied neighborhood-situations (corresponding to the
vertices not dominated by this partial dominating set). The partial dominating
8In those cases where k = |V|, this would be a yes-instance, but then there would also be a trivial
dominating set which includes all vertices in the graph.
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set may be m vertices larger, since the dominating set is allowed to be size k. The
at-most-m not-dominated vertices can be covered by choosing those m vertices
as the rest of the dominating set. The total size of the dominating set is then ≤ k
and all |V| vertices are covered. Here too, it does not matter how many negative
cues there are in the toolbox, because as long as for all situations a satisfactory
action is chosen, it does not matter how one arrives at that action.
The three types of toolboxes above form the only possible toolboxes that can be
made given a transformed instance of TOOLBOX ADAPTATION. Thus, if an instance of
TOOLBOX ADAPTATION is a yes-instance, there is at least one viable toolbox of one of
the toolbox types, i.e., a toolbox with er ≥ ermin with one heuristic of size k− 1. We
have shown that if a viable toolbox of any of those types can be made for an instance,
there is a possible dominating set of at most size k for the instance of DOMINATING
SET. Thus, we have proved that iDS is a yes-instance if iTA = ATA(iDS) is a yes-
instance. This proves that if the transformed instance iTA of TOOLBOX ADAPTATION is
a yes-instance then the given instance iDS of DOMINATING SET is also a yes-instance.
Generalized polynomial-time reduction
The reduction above establishes that DOMINATING SET polynomial-time reduces
to TOOLBOX ADAPTATION (DECISION VERSION) with ermin = 0.5, which in turn
establishes that TOOLBOX ADAPTATION is not solvable in polynomial time when
ermin = 0.5 unless P = NP. This proof can be modified to hold for any ermin of value
|V|
|V|+ |X| , (5.5)
where |X| is the number of x-situations, which can be any positive integer including
zero (with the resulting ermin = 1.0 when |X| = 0 and asymptotically approaching
zero as |X| goes to infinity). This involves substituting Equations 5.1 to 5.4 in steps 2
and 3 of the proof above with Equations 5.6 to 5.9 below:
er =
|V|
|V|+ |X| = ermin (5.6)
er =
k
|V|+ |X| < ermin (5.7)
er =
|V|
|V|+ |X| = ermin (5.8)
er ≥ m + |V| −m|V|+ |X| = ermin (5.9)
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6The Robo-havioral
Methodology: Developing
Neuroscience Theories with
FOES
Based on: Otworowska, M., Riemens, J., Kamphuis, C., Wolfert, P., Vuurpijl, L., &
Kwisthout, J. (2015). The Robo-havioral Methodology: Developing Neuroscience
Theories with FOES. In Proceedings of the 27th Benelux Conference on AI (BNAIC’15).
Abstract
In systems neuroscience there is a big gap between what theorists postulate (i.e.,
grand unifying theories about the general principles underlying cortical pro-
cesses such as the predictive processing account) and what empiricists measure
(i.e., reaction times, pupil dilations, blood-oxygenated level dependent signal
in brain areas, magnetic pulses). It is becoming increasingly difficult for the
theorists to come up with empirically testable hypotheses and for the empiri-
cists to use their findings to confirm or refute a theory. We propose a research
methodology based on robot simulations that may help bridge that gap. The
methodology is summarized by four keywords: Formalize verbal theories into
computational models; Operationalize this Computational model into a work-
ing robot implementation; Explore the consequences of various design choices
and parameter settings to generate empirically testable hypotheses; and finally
Study these hypotheses in behavioral or imaging experiments. We lay out a
research program that aims at investigating various open issues in predictive
processing and exemplifies our approach in a simple case study.
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The Predictive Processing (PP) account (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013a) is currently one
of the most influential unifying neuroscientific accounts of what drives our cortical
processes. According to this account, the brain continuously makes predictions about
what inputs it will get, based on hierarchical (stochastic) generative models that
maintain the current best hypotheses of the causes of these predictions; updating
the models based on precision-weighted prediction errors. It is claimed that this
prediction principle applies to the entire cortex and that the same broad apparatus
and mechanism is used for both lower and higher cognition, e.g., both low-level
vision and intention attribution (Clark, 2013). While the Predictive Processing account
is fleshed out computationally for low-level vision and motor control (Friston, 2010),
to account also for “higher cognitive phenomena such as thought, imagery, language, social
cognition, and decision-making” there is still “[...] plenty of work to do.” (Hohwy, 2013a,
p. 5). Our research groups have been contributing to this research program both
by empirical research (Kayhan et al., 2015; Pelt et al., 2014) and by theoretical and
computational contributions (Heil et al., 2014; Kwisthout, 2014; Kwisthout et al.,
2017; Kwisthout et al., 2014; Kwisthout and Rooij, 2015; Otworowska et al., 2014;
Zaadnoordijk et al., 2015a; Zaadnoordijk et al., 2015b). One of our key theoretical
contributions is in the formalization of Predictive Processing theory in terms of causal
Bayesian networks (Pearl, 2000), thus allowing for the representation of structurally
rich knowledge domains and complex interactions (Kwisthout, 2014; Kwisthout et al.,
2017).
Ideally, there is an interplay between theoretical advances and empirical re-
search, where the theoretical work suggests hypotheses to test and the empirical work
updates the theory. In current research on PP, however, we experience a huge gap
between theoretical and empirical work, giving rise to many methodological and
foundational questions. In particular since the Predictive Processing account offers a
unifying view on cortical processes, often painting with rather broad strokes, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether a concrete empirical result really is evidence in support of
Predictive Processing; as the theory is so general, almost every result can be explained
to match the general principles of the Predictive Processing account (Rasmussen and
Eliasmith, 2013). It is often questionable whether results and explanations are ‘real’ or
whether they are mere idiosyncrasies of an incorrect, incomplete, ambiguous, or ill-
defined interpretation of the (verbal) theory or the experimental manipulation thereof;
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this problem comes on top of the surprisingly bad reproducibility (Collaboration,
2015) of experiments. The following example may illustrate our concerns.
Model revision or model selection?
Sometimes prediction errors indicate that our current generative models need
to be revised. For example, if we observe our vegetarian friend ordering a ham
sandwich, chances are that our friend decided to quit being a vegetarian. That
event impacts our future expectations. However, if she was not a vegetarian,
but we knew that she just ordered cheese sandwiches more often than ham
sandwiches, the observation perfectly fits with our model and there is no reason
for revision. To put this in terms of Predictive Processing: in the first example the
precision of the prediction error is higher, leading to an increased tendency for
model revision, whereas in the second example the prediction error is damped
due to the expected uncertainty in the prediction. O’Reilly et al. tried to experi-
mentally dissociate different effects of prediction errors, based on the amount
of expected uncertainty in the predictions (O’Reilly et al., 2013). In a saccadic
planning task, participants focused on dots appearing in a particular quadrant
of a unit circle, where sometimes dots appeared in other quadrants. Whether
this indicated a ‘block change’ (i.e., the quadrant of interest was changed) or
just a one-off trial (the quadrant of interest remained the same) was indicated by
the color of the outlier dot. The investigators found different brain patterns and
reaction times for the different conditions and suggested distinct brain networks
associated with ‘surprise’ and ‘updating’ processes. It is debatable, however,
how to fit these results in the Predictive Processing theory. One explanation
may be that the results are evidence that the brain revises its generative models
based on unexpected prediction errors, that is, that it “need[s] to update the internal
model to predict future observations accurately in a changeable environment” (O’Reilly
et al., 2013, p. E3660). An alternative and perfectly fitting explanation is that the
different color acts as a contextual cue that leads to the selection of a different
sub-model that now becomes active in generating hypotheses. Whereas it is
plausible that models are generated and revised during the learning stages of the
experiment, it is quite defendable that what the researchers measured is model
selection based on context, not model revision.
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A crucial assumption in the Predictive Processing account is that the brain tries to
predict its inputs based on previously developed generative models; it processes only
that part of the input that is yet unexplained (i.e., that was not predicted). To stick
with the previous example, our brain may have built up a generative model of what
we expect our friend to order (cheese sandwiches) at lunch time; only if there is a
prediction error—a ham sandwich, rather than a cheese sandwich—the conflicting
part of the input (ham instead of cheese) is processed by the brain. There are multiple
ways how such prediction errors can be dealt with (Kwisthout, 2014). Depending
on the context of the situation and on the confidence we have in the model, we can
potentially lower prediction error by either revising our generative models, updating
our current beliefs without changing the model, obtaining additional observations, or
by actively manipulating the inputs. Respective examples of these mechanisms are to
update the model of our friend’s dietary preferences when we see her ordering a ham
sandwich, updating the belief either heads or tails with uniform probability to definitely
heads on observing the outcome of a coin toss, determining whether either our own
train or the train on the parallel track starts to move by looking at the (stationary)
railway station building, or scratching one’s head to get rid of an unwanted itch.
Currently, the Predictive Processing account is largely silent as to which mecha-
nism is applied under which circumstances (Kwisthout et al., 2017). As the running
example illustrates it is far from straightforward to empirically disentangle these
candidate mechanisms. The reasons therefore are two-fold: On the one side, exper-
imentally controlled manipulations will be based on ambiguous and incomplete
verbal theories. It is next to impossible to decide whether a particular empirical find-
ing captures a ‘real effect’ or whether it is due to implicit ‘design choices’ in the theory
that emerge from the particular experimental setup. On the other side, even if we
are confident that a particular finding captures a ‘real effect’, the gap between verbal
theory and experimental condition hinders the use of that finding as confirmation
or refutation of a particular aspect of the theory. To help overcome both issues we
propose the Robo-havioral methodology as an intermediate step in the scientific process.
The goal of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, to flesh out this methodology in more detail
and to propose a research program built on it; secondly, to present a small case study
that nicely illustrates how even a relatively simple implementation can already reveal
structural gaps in the theory and how we propose to deal with them.
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The Robo-havioral Methodology
Inspired by a longstanding tradition in Artificial Intelligence (already advocated
by Newell et al. (1959), but see also approaches such as Verlag (2012)), we propose
a new research methodology, somewhat tongue-in-cheek called the Robo-havioral
methodology, as an intermediate step between theoretical and empirical investiga-
tions using so-called FOES. Here, FOES is the abbreviation of formalize, operationalize,
explore, and study: transform the verbal theory into a formal computational model,
operationalize the model into a working robot, explore the ‘parameter space’ and
‘design considerations’ of the theory in robot simulations, and study thus obtained
hypotheses in behavioral or imaging experiments; all in a continuous cycle. We need
to emphasize that the goal of this methodology is not to build smart robots or to extend
the state of the art in robotics. In contrast, the goal is to find gaps and ambiguities
in neuroscientific theories, identify ‘design choices’ in such theories, and to explore
the consequences of such commitments. The operationalization into working robots
forces us to be complete and consistent with respect to our theoretical commitments,
thereby improving the theory (understanding-by-synthesis). The exploration allows
us to go beyond thought experiments and purely computational modeling; it gen-
erates empirically testable (i.e., with human participants) hypotheses that naturally
follow from such design considerations and parameter settings. They are grounded
on a full, complete, and consistent operational model, rather than on the scientist’s
speculations. This helps to ensure that whatever experimental results we obtain can
be related to the theory. To summarize, we propose that this methodology forms a
trait d’union between theory forming and experimenting, leading to the following
picture.
1. Conceptual analysis and theory forming
To propose verbal theories that potentially explain phenomena of interest.
2. Robo-havioral exploratory studies
To explore, identify, and fill the gaps in the theories and generate testable
hypotheses.
3. Behavioral and imaging experiments
To empirically test the hypotheses and refine the theories and models.
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Computer simulations can be very worthwhile tools for exploration and hypothesis
generation. We do make extensive use of our Predictive Processing toolbox to compare
different scenarios. However, we propose to operationalize theories into (embodied,
embedded, task-oriented) robots for the simple reason that this forces us to take reality
into account. While by formalizing a verbal theory into computational models already
quite some ambiguities typically can be resolved, the proof of the pudding really
is in the eating—not in writing up the recipe. To cite Barbara Webb (2001, p. 1084):
“Although some simulations may include all the environmental details of the real world, the
simple fact is that the majority of simulations do not. Rather, they include what the modeler
thinks to be important, that is, they tend to be biased towards the hypotheses to be tested.”
In particular since one of the goals of this methodology is to find ambiguities and
missing details in theories, we believe it is vital to have the operationalizations act in
the real world.
Case study: Recognize Sorting Intentions
Many aspects of the Predictive Processing account are still under-defined, in particular
when we move to higher cognitive theories such as action understanding (Kilner
et al., 2007). For example, we do not yet know how the formal theory can account
for the integration of long-term intentions with motor acts on a much shorter time-
scale, how generative models are developed, what the effect of different mechanisms
of prediction error minimization is, etcetera (Kwisthout et al., 2017). In addition,
many such aspects are probably still overlooked. To illustrate our methodology, we
constructed a LEGO Mindstorms RECOGNIZESORTINGINTENTIONS robot whose goal
it is to recognize whether someone is sorting Duplo blocks either by color or by
size (Figure 6.1). There are nine blocks, three colors (red, green, yellow) and three
sizes (2 × 2 × 4, 2 × 2 × 2, 1 × 2 × 4). The blocks thus can be sorted by the three
colors or by the three sizes. When picking up the blocks from a stack, and putting
them into three separate bins, initially it is not clear what the sorting intention is,
but at most after the fourth block is put in one of the three bins, this can be inferred.
The robot is equipped with various sensors and it can move around to change its
sensory inputs. Its “action understanding” is based on a hierarchical generative model,
i.e., a hierarchy of Bayesian networks that generate predictions, at the lowest level
(sensory) predictions for the inputs of its sensors, at higher levels (action) predictions
for movements towards buckets and the grasping of blocks, predictions for where
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Fig. 6.1.: Sorting Duplo blocks either by
color (top) or by form (bottom). We construct
a robot, based on the Predictive Processing
account, that aims to recognize which sorting
intention is applied. Note that in principle
it suffices to observe four blocks at most to
be able to disambiguate the sorting intention
if there are 3× 3 blocks and 3 bins. For ex-
ample, if the three bins contain a red 2× 2, a
green 2× 4, and a yellow 1× 4 block, respec-
tively, any subsequent block disambiguates
the sorting intention.
a particular block is put, which block is selected to pick up, and at the highest level
(intention) predictions about which sorting strategy is used. The robot will encounter
uncertainty (due to noisy sensors or ambiguous situations) and prediction errors; we
implement and compare means of dealing with them (for example, moving closer or
turning its ‘head’ to increase precision of the sensors (Figure 6.2) or get additional
observations, changing beliefs of the actual sorting strategy, etc.).
This simple setup is already quite rich, allowing for many studies. For example, it
allows for studying how a robot can learn causal relationships, how different strategies
of dealing with prediction errors effect the agent’s efficiency or learning capabilities,
etcetera. However simple, the setup is already quite challenging, in particular with
respect to the ‘lower-level capabilities’ of getting to know which block is held at a time
and where it is going to. However, the focus of our methodology is not on this level.
We are not as much interested in aspects of computer vision and object recognition,
but rather in higher-level ways of dealing with uncertainty. For the concrete case
study that we report on in this paper, we have (from the robot’s perspective) discrete
time steps, discrete block movement, and fixed locations of the blocks. This very
implementation of such a highly constrained case study already proved very valuable
in explicating overlooked aspects of the Predictive Processing account (e.g., that
reducing prediction error by acting (relocating the position of its sensors) needs
counter-factual models of how actions potentially change perception) and hinted at
to many interesting follow-up research questions. In the next sub-section we will
describe the computational (Bayesian) model of this case study, highlighting where
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the process of formalization, operationalization and exploration exposed fundamental
or practical issues. We emphasize again that our goal was not to build a smart robot
for recognizing Duplo blocks sorting procedures, but to become aware of such issues,
i.e., understanding-by-synthesis. The description of the computational model and the
pilot will therefore be interleaved with “Theory Insight” comments.
Fig. 6.2.: An ambiguous percept
that can be disambiguated by the
robot by moving the position of
its sensors. In the left panel, the
robot cannot disambiguate between
a 1× 4 or a 2× 4 Duplo block. When
it moves its position (right panel),
thereby changing the inputs of its
sensors, it might reduce the predic-
tion error stemming from this un-
certainty.
Constructing the computational model
We focus our computational model on a time lapse of four blocks that are taken
from a stack and placed in one out of three bins. The model is graphically depicted
in Figure 6.3. At the highest level of the generative model (left panel) is a binary
variable describing the sorting intention with values SORT-BY-COLOR and SORT-BY-
FORM. This variable, together with contextual information (the blocks that are still
on the stack and the contents of the bins), generates predictions for which block will
be picked next from the stack, transported to one of the three bins, and placed in
that bin. In the model this is called a COMPOUND-ACTION. Initially, the probability
distribution of the first action will be uniform. This COMPOUND-ACTION can be
further decomposed in more basic actions PICKUP-X, MOVE-X-TO-Y, and DROP-Y
(right panel). Each of these actions drives predictions for what the robot will observe
in any of the four discrete frames T0 (when the block is picked up), T1 (when the block
hovers above the first bin), and T2 and T3 (when the block is above the second and
third bin). For example, if we expect the red 2× 2 block to be moved to bin 2, then we
expect to see this block in T0, in T1, and in T2, but we expect to see nothing in T3. In
addition there is a dynamic dependence: if we (think we) saw the red 2× 2 block in
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T0, then we don’t expect a green 1× 4 block in T1. The predictions here finally drive
low-level predictions for the color (C) and shape (S) expectations of the robot.
Th
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In the Predictive Processing account, information flows top-down (e.g.,
from hypothesized intentions to predicted actions) and bottom-up (from
observed color and shape to action). However, it seems almost inevitable
to have dependencies in time as well (i.e., whatever block we saw one
frame ago). The Bayesian inference computations must deal with such time-
dependencies, forbidding to (or at least be reluctant to) change belief states
in the past. This aspect is overlooked in the Predictive Processing account.
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Much general world knowledge (e.g., a block cannot be both on the stack
and in one of the bins at the same time; blocks do not change color), needs
to be encoded for predictions to take shape. We operationalized this in the
case study as constraints encoded in the probability distributions. However,
this becomes problematic if one wants to update probability distributions
due to prediction errors: some beliefs (such as the laws of nature) should be
less resilient than others.
So far, we described the top-down predictive stream in Predictive Processing. The
hypothesized sorting intention (initially uniformly distributed) drives a prediction for
the actions, and the hypothesized actions (again initially uniformly distributed) drives
a prediction for the visual stimuli in each of the four frames. The PREDICTION process
in the Predictive Processing account thus is simply the computation of a posterior
distribution (Kwisthout, 2014). At the lowest level, the prediction is matched with the
actual observation of color and shape by the robot. To obtain these observations, we
equipped the robot with a web-cam and processed the raw inputs such as to obtain
probability distributions over the three colors and the three shapes (and ∅ in both
cases to indicate nothing was seen)1. We then computed the PREDICTION ERROR as
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the predicted distributions for color and
shape and the observed distributions. The next step is to update the hypotheses as to
reduce prediction errors. In this simple case study we assume that prediction errors
are always reduced by updating current beliefs. This BELIEF REVISION process seeks
to find a revised prior probability distribution over the set of hypothesis variables
that minimizes the prediction error.
1The details can be found in the supplementary material available at www.socsci.ru.nl/johank/
BNAIC2015/technicalreport.pdf
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ht Color and shape can be seen as multi-modal predictions. We thus have,
for a particular hypothesis, two predictions and two prediction errors. We
may or may not weight the separate prediction errors according to how
influential we want them to be in updating our beliefs. This may or may
not be orthogonal to the confidence in (a particular part of) the generative
model.
Experimental pilot
In the experimental setup four Duplo blocks (red 1 × 4, yellow 2 × 4, green 2 × 2,
and red 2 × 4) were distributed among three bins in sixteen distinct time frames
(four time frames for one block), in a following order: red 1x4 to bin 1, yellow 2x4
to bin 3, green 2x2 to bin 2 and red 2x4 to bin 3. This particular distribution of the
blocks over the bins represents the sorting strategy SORT-BY-FORM. Initially, the
robot has uniform predictions for all actions and observations, yielding the predic-
tion {Pr(red) = 0.5, Pr(yellow) = 0.25, Pr(green) = 0.25, Pr(∅) = 0} for color, and
{Pr(2× 4) = 0.5, Pr(2× 2) = 0.25, Pr(2× 4) = 0.25, Pr(∅) = 0} in T0. According to
the robot’s sensors, in T0, the robot actually perceived the following distribution for
color: {Pr(red) = 0.3719, Pr(green) = 0.1344, Pr(yellow) = 0.272, Pr(∅) = 0.2217}
and for shape: {Pr(2× 4) = 0.3407, Pr(2× 2) = 0.1418, Pr(1× 4) = 0.2957, Pr(∅) =
0.2217}. This yielded a prediction error between predictions and observations of
0.1225 for color and 0.1266 for shape. The prediction errors were minimized by re-
vising the probability distribution over the hypothesis variable T0 to {Pr(red 1×
4) = 0.3239, Pr(yellow 2× 4) = 0.1631, Pr(green 2× 2) = 0.1097, Pr(red 2× 4) =
0.1631, Pr(∅) = 0.2399}, yielding a prediction error of 0.004 for color and 0.002 for
shape. While there is considerable uncertainty, the robot still correctly inferred the
red 1× 4 block to be the most probable one in T0. The now induced prediction error
at the block level was propagated to the action level, giving an updated distribution
for the COMPOUND-ACTION variable. However, our software had great difficulty
to find an updated distribution for the highest level of the hierarchy, SORTING IN-
TENTION. Upon closer inspection this was the case because all combinations of all
contextual influences (the blocks still on the stack and in the bins) need to be taken
into consideration in revising the distribution, giving too much degrees of freedom
for tractable computations.
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Sorting
Intentions
Compound
Action 1
Compound
Action 2
Compound
Action 3
Compound
Action 4
Context:
Box states
Stack state
C S
Compound
Action
Pickup-X Move-X-to-Y Drop-Y
T0 T1 T2 T3
time
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Fig. 6.3.: Description of the computational model of the RECOGNIZESORTINGINTEN-
TIONS robot. The model consists of hierarchical layers, describing intentions, context-
modulated actions (left panel), visual percepts at various points in time, and raw color and
shape information (right panel). Every layer is described by a causal Bayesian network.
Bottom-up inference is done by computing prediction errors between expected and actual
inputs, and revising the probability distribution over the hypothesis nodes such that this
prediction error is minimized. This again induces a prediction error at the level above
which is then propagated upwards.
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Whatever sorting intention is most likely depends on many bits of contextual
information, such as the current state of the stack and the bins. When we
represent such contextual information (and the implicit world knowledge)
as a probability distribution, as we did in this case study, a straightforward
belief revision algorithm will marginalize over all values of all these vari-
ables. A ‘smarter’ way of representing world knowledge and contextual
information is needed for computations to be tractable.
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Halting the inferential stream at the COMPOUND-ACTION variable and making again
predictions for the observations in T1 and T2 and updating the probability distribu-
tions after prediction errors, the robot correctly predicted it will not see any block
in T3, i.e., the block was placed in bin 2. It had some difficulty in discriminating the
red 1× 4 from the red 2× 4 block, however; as we could not further infer the updated
probability distribution of the SORTING INTENTION due to the intractability issues.
Discussion
Even this simple case study is illuminating. Being forced to actually implement Pre-
dictive Processing enforced various design considerations upon us, such as how to
encode world knowledge (e.g., a block does not suddenly change its shape and it
cannot be in two bins at the same time) and how to deal with multi-modal prediction
errors. The consequences are not trivial: for example, one of our assumptions (that
world knowledge can be encoded in probability distributions, disallowing ‘impossible’
combinations of values by attributing a zero probability to them) gives rise to huge
intractability issues when prediction errors need to be minimized. Our conclusion is
that even in this simple pilot much information is gathered that enforces us to rethink
parts of the verbal theory (“go back to the drawing board”).
One could question whether it was really needed for this simple case study to
construct a robot, i.e., whether a computational simulation would not have revealed
similar insights. We agree that the full strength of this methodology will be more
apparent in studies with a closed action-perception cycle, where the robots act upon
the environment and influence their future perceptions; this early report does not
reveal this full strength. However, even in this simple study there were theory insights
(like the issue of multi-model prediction errors and how to weight them in updating
models) that we believe we would have missed had we resorted to a computational
simulation.
Conclusion
We proposed the Robo-havioral methodology for bridging the gap between theoretical
and empirical research in neuroscience. The aim of this methodology is to a) identify
weak spots in verbal theories and b) propose informed empirical hypotheses that are
closely related to theoretical commitments. The methodology is based on the principle
understanding-by-synthesis and can be paraphrased by four keywords: Formalize,
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Operationalize, Explore, and Study. We showed how even a simple case study can
already expose various theoretical issues in the Predictive Processing account, simply
by “trying to make it work in the real world”, providing food for thought and
subsequent experiments.
The methodology, in particular the operationalization and exploration part, is
still under development, as is this particular case study. We are currently finalizing a
Predictive Processing toolbox of algorithms for the various sub-processes in Predictive
Processing (to be publicly available) and initiating a number of research projects that
build on this work. In particular we aim to explore the effects of various mechanisms
for prediction error minimization (model revision, belief revision, passive intervention
and active intervention) and the effects of changing the state space granularity in
making predictions, allowing for more informative predictions with the drawback
of potentially increasing prediction errors. Both aspects are identified as key open
theoretical problems within the Predictive Processing account (Kwisthout and Rooij,
2015; Kwisthout et al., 2017).
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7Discussion
Cognitive science has been on a quest to explain human cognitive processes for more
than six decades. At the heart of cognitive science research lies the assumption that a
cognitive system is computational in nature. It means that to enter into consideration
as an explanation of cognitive processes, proposed models, theories and frameworks
need to take into account human computational limitations (Simon, 1957; Gigerenzer
and Todd, 1999; Oaksford and Chater, 2007). Neglecting or ignoring computational
limitations gives rise to a double paradox: (i) proposed explanations cannot account
for the real world challenges humans face every day, only account for scenarios from
simple, closed setups of an experiment. Prescriptively, it means that, according to
such a theory, humans should not be able to do, what they effortlessly do every day,
like reasoning, communicating, making decisions or inferences. Alternatively, (ii)
accepting explanations that postulate unrealistic and unhuman resource demands,
implies that humans must be omniscient and omnipotent demons (Gigerenzer and
Todd, 1999).
In this thesis, we do not attribute any supernatural powers to humans, instead,
we argue that computational demons are a property of theories, manifested in their
different assumptions and premises. To illustrate this, we used a variety of methods
to challenge, analyze, formalize and test the assumptions of two particular theories:
Adaptive Toolbox (AT) and Predictive Processing (PP). This choice is not accidental,
for (i) both theories give a conceptually broad account of human functioning in an
uncertain and complex world, (ii) according to AT criteria, PP is a demonic theory. We
showed, however, that AT is also not free from computational demons. Importantly,
even if we focused only on these two theories, our conclusions and proposed methods
of detecting and fighting the demons are universal in cognitive science.
In this chapter, we start with discussing and analyzing conceptual commitments
of PP and AT to realize that on many dimensions they make similar assumptions,
also when it comes to postulating demons. Later, we explain how to reconcile compu-
tational demons with a wide empirical success of PP and AT. Further, we present a
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final summary of our results with a more global overview of different manifestations
of computational demons, and lastly, we share the final conclusions.
Predictive machine versus(?) adaptive toolbox
How do humans succeed in an uncertain world? How do they come to evolve, develop
and learn the relevant knowledge about the world to be able to survive and thrive,
given limited computational resources? It seems that one of the key ingredients to
this success is an adaptive interaction between humans and their environments. The
nature of this relation has not been clearly explained yet. Both AT and PP attempt to
give an account of this interaction. According to the Adaptive Toolbox framework,
agents, to be able to survive, need to be ecologically rational. It means that the agents
make a decision using tools from a ‘mental toolbox’ of specialized domain-specific
fast and frugal strategies that ‘fit’ different environmental structures. At first sight,
the assumptions postulated by AT and PP are radically different. According to the
Predictive Processing framework, agents, to survive, develop and learn, need to
minimize their entropy by acting in, and interacting with, the environment. Crucially,
agents are assumed to be Bayesian optimal, making inferences about the causes
of their inputs (Friston, 2010). The optimality assumption is one of the ‘demons of
rationality’, as described by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999), and according to whom, PP
would need to be rejected as a definitely not plausible account of human cognitive
processes. Moreover, another crucial difference between AT and PP, and another
reason to reject PP by AT lies in domain-generality of PP.
“Ecological rationality focuses on the fit between different decision strate-
gies applied by minds in different environmental circumstances. If there
is only ever one decision mechanism to be applied, then the question of
ecological rationality does not even come up. Thus, for those scientists
who still yearn for Leibniz’s dream of a universal calculus that could
solve all problems or a single general-purpose optimizing approach to
make every decision, the fit between the mind and the world is irrelevant.
Logic, Bayesian statistics, and expected utility maximization are among
the systems that have been proposed as general-purpose problem-solving
machines. But they cannot do all that the mind can." (Todd and Gigerenzer,
2012, p. 24)
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PP attempts to fulfill Leibniz’s dream, postulating a universal principle of the work-
ings of not only a cognitive system but also any other non-neurocentric system (Calvo
and Friston, 2017), as well as the whole Universe itself (Friston, 2013). Todd and
Gigerenzer (2012) make the point that for theories, like PP, “the fit between the mind
and the world is irrelevant”. This claim directly contradicts one of the PP-assumptions,
according to which the mentioned ‘fit’ is one of the requirements for successful en-
tropy minimization in (especially in later versions of) PP1. Despite the radically
different foundations, there are quite some striking conceptual commitments shared
by both frameworks that have not been elaborated on before (and most likely not
even realized). Below, we analyze some examples of the dimensions on which the
two frameworks make similar assumptions.
A ‘fit’ between agents and environments
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
“Ecological rationality focuses on the
fit between different decision strate-
gies applied by minds in different
environmental circumstances.”
(Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012, p. 24)
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
“The one thing we know is that the
embodied structure of any biolog-
ical system must in some way be
a good match for the eco-niche in
which it is immersed.” (Calvo and
Friston, 2017, p. 2)
As we pointed out before, both theories postulate that agents’ cognitive structures
(agents’ adaptive toolbox or agents’ generative model) must match the environment
in which the agents live. This is closely related to another common assumption, that
this ‘match’ or ‘fit’ between agents and their environments enables the agents to
exploit different environmental structures.
1PP, as a very influential framework, gained many proponents, that resulted in the development of
different flavors of PP. In chapter 3, we explain it in more details, and we introduce and present
conceptual differences between Radical Predictive Processing (RPP) and Conservative Predicting
Processing (CPP). In more recent literature, most of the theoretical commitments of RPP, such as the
importance of the fit between agents and their environments, have become more dominant.
129
Exploiting Environmental Structures
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
“Different environments can have
different specific fast and frugal
heuristics that exploit their partic-
ular information structure to make
adaptive decisions.” (Gigerenzer
and Todd, 1999, p. 18)
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
“Radical PP thus offers a system-
atic way of combining deep, model-
based flexibility with the use of mul-
tiple, fast, efficient, environmentally-
exploitative, routes to action and re-
sponse.” (Clark, 2015, p. 18)
The ‘match’ and exploitation of environmental structures is critical for agents’ success
and survival. In AT it means to be ecologically rational, in PP it means to minimize
entropy. The nature of the environmental structures both relates to statistical structures
such as redundancies (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2007), or biological/physical structures,
e.g. surfaces for climbing vines (Calvo and Friston, 2017). To be able to efficiently
exploit environmental structures, agents use only a little information to make a
decision. This frugality assumption is partly shared between AT and PP.
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Frugality
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
“Finally, the purest form of bounded
rationality is found in fast and fru-
gal heuristics, which perform lim-
ited search through objects (in satis-
ficing) or cues and exploit environ-
mental structure to yield adaptive
decisions.” (Gigerenzer and Todd,
1999, p. 15)
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
“The vine plant metaphor takes us
to the idea of frugality. Plants are
good at deploying the least complex
model, form or generative model
that will serve their needs” (Calvo
and Friston, 2017, p. 7)
“The [Radical Predictive Processing]
stresses the use of fast and fru-
gal, action-involving solutions of the
kind highlighted by much work in
robotics and embodied cognition.
But it goes further, by showing how
predictive schemes can combine fru-
gal and more knowledge-intensive
strategies, switching between them
fluently and continuously as task
and context dictate” (Clark, 2015, p.
1)
Within the PP framework, both simple, fast and frugal heuristics, as well as more
complex, optimal models, are claimed to be possible and employed depending on a
problem at hand. This claim is a more recent development in these PP-flavors that are
concerned with the importance of the interactions between agents and environments.
In AT, not only optimality and frugality are seen as oppositions, but optimality itself
is one of the ‘demons of rationality’. A theory that assumes any form of optimality
needs to be rejected, as it requires unrealistic computational resources. The simplicity,
fast and frugality of heuristics in AT are the main conceptual building blocks that
ensure heuristics’ psychological and computational plausibility. For both frameworks,
frugality is a measure of a ‘goodness’ of a model.
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Goodness of a model
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
“The function of heuristics is not to
be coherent. Rather, their function
is to make reasonable, adaptive in-
ferences about the real social and
physical world given limited time
and knowledge. Hence, we should
evaluate the performance of heuris-
tics by criteria that reflect this func-
tion. Measures that relate decision-
making strategies to the external
world rather than to internal con-
sistency, such as accuracy, frugal-
ity, and speed [...].” (Gigerenzer and
Todd, 1999, p. 22)
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
“The goodness of a predictive model
is determined by accuracy minus
complexity. Accuracy here names
the ability to predict the task-
salient sensory flux, while complex-
ity varies according to the number
of parameters in the model.” (Clark,
2015, p. 15)
For both frameworks, the ‘goodness’ of either heuristics or generative models is a
measure of the trade-off between accuracy and frugality. In case of AT, it has been
shown that in the environments that the heuristics have been adapted to, the trade-
off doesn’t exist, as the heuristics can outperform optimization methods (Todd and
Gigerenzer, 1999; Todd, 2002b). It means that the heuristics can be both frugal and
accurate. In case of PP, it is not necessarily straightforward how this definition of the
‘goodness’ of a model can be found coherent with another assumption of veridicality
of (a) predictions:
In short, we sample the world to ensure our predictions become a self-
fulfilling prophecy and surprises are avoided. In this view, perception
is enslaved by action to provide veridical predictions (more formally,
to make the free-energy a tight bound on surprise) that guides active
sampling of the sensorium. (Friston, 2009, p. 295)
and (b) perception:
This model is continually updated and entrained by sensory prediction
errors in wakefulness to ensure veridical perception (Hobson, Hong, and
Friston, 2014, p. 1)
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It is not further explained what exactly veridicality means here, or how to reconcile
it with the frugality assumption. Given how complex and uncertain the world is,
can simple models ensure veridical perception and generate veridical predictions?
In the view of AT, fast and frugal heuristics do not need to be or ensure veridicality,
only functionality, in the sense that adaptive toolboxes of heuristics enable agents to
function (Chater et al., 2017).
Evolution
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
“This is the basic idea of the adap-
tive toolbox: the collection of spe-
cialized cognitive mechanisms that
evolution has built into the human
mind for specific domains of infer-
ence and reasoning, including fast
and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer
and Todd, 1999, p. 30)
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
“[...] we are obliged to optimize our
model of the world through evolu-
tion, neurodevelopment, and learn-
ing [...] In this sense, each species
represents the product of evolution-
ary model optimization, and each
phenotype (including our brain) is
a physical model or transcription
of causal structure in its econiche.”
(Friston, 2012b, p. 266-267)
“One might ask: Where do these in-
nate priors come from? The answer
is implicit in their evolutionary mo-
tivation; in that they can be specified
genetically and elaborated through
(Bayes-optimal) learning.” (Friston,
2012b, p. 277)
Evolutionary explanations in cognitive theories are usually inspired by (or are a
part of) a broader field of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychology aims
at explaining human behavior in terms of psychological traits that are assumed to
be a product of evolutionary adaptation (Tooby and Cosmides, 2005; Confer et al.,
2010). In evolutionary biology, however, it is established that not all traits are a
product of adaptation processes (Gould and Lewontin, 1979). It is yet quite common
in psychology and economics (Schulz, 2013) to supplement existing verbal theories
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with adaptationist view. Both AT and PP postulate that some properties or structures,
that are essential for the conceptual foundations of the respective theory – ecologically
rational adaptive toolbox with heuristics and selector for AT, and generative models
with relevant priors for PP – are assumed to be a product of evolutionary adaptation.
An additional argument used by AT proponents against ‘demons of rationality’ (such
as PP) is to appeal to natural selection as a mechanism presumably favoring simple
solutions (heuristics) over more complex ones. Schulz (2011) analyzed this argument
and concluded that it is not convincing, and cannot be used against classical theories of
rationality. The results from our analysis (Chapter 5) go beyond Schultz’s arguments.
We show that from an adaptation perspective simple heuristics are not simpler to
adapt than more complex models.
Without further specification and formalization of the process, both AT and
PP (and any other theory) are guilty of turning evolution into Laplace’s demon2.
The computational demon is manifested by postulating a computational problem —
adapting adaptive toolbox or learning generative models with relevant priors — that
essentially is too difficult for any process (including evolutionary processes) to be
realized in a realistic amount of time. Importantly, a realistic timescale is relative to
the kind of analyzed process. Evolutionary (phylogenetic) timescales are qualitatively
and quantitatively different from ontogenetic timescales. Evolutionary time is not
expressed in years, but by a number of passing generations, as evolution does not
work “daily”. In Chapter 3 we estimated that an evolutionary process would need
to take the order of 10 million years (≈ 666666.666 generations) to produce a single
ecologically rational individual, while early human ancestors, like Australopithecus,
appeared 3.9 million years ago (Haviland et al., 2013).
2This holds regardless of the assumption whether the properties and structures are considered an
adaptation per se, or rather a second-order adaptation, an exaptation, a spandrel or a by-product of the
evolutionary process (Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Buss et al., 1998))
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An example: the outfielder’s problem
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
“The gaze heuristic is the simplest
one and works if the ball is already
high up in the air: Fix your gaze
on the ball, start running, and ad-
just your running speed so that the
angle of gaze remains constant (see
Gigerenzer, 2007). A player who re-
lies on the gaze heuristic can ignore
all causal variables necessary to com-
pute the trajectory of the ball–the
initial distance, velocity, angle, air
resistance, speed and direction of
wind, and spin, among others. By
paying attention to only one vari-
able, the player will end up where
the ball comes down without com-
puting the exact spot.” (Gigerenzer
and Brighton, 2009, p. 108)
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
“The temporary task of visual sens-
ing, in this context, becomes that of
cancelling the optical acceleration of
the fly ball. That means giving high
weighting to the prediction errors as-
sociated with cancelling the vertical
acceleration of the ball’s optical pro-
jection, and (to put it bluntly) not car-
ing very much about anything else.”
(Clark, 2015, p. 16)
The outfielder’s problem is a quite popular explanatory achievement point in psy-
chology and cognitive science (Todd, 1981; McBeath et al., 1995; Fink et al., 2009). It
refers to explaining how a baseball player can catch a flying ball. Both AT and PP
give similar ‘solution’ to this problem, by referring to a simple gaze heuristic (PP
effectively gives a mechanistic account of this heuristic).
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Notions of success and simulations results
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
We present artificial evolution sim-
ulations results showing that evolu-
tion can produce toolboxes of heuris-
tics that are ‘good enough’ to sur-
vive, but that those toolboxes are not
ecologically rational (Chapter 2).
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
We show that PP-agents can sur-
vive in the world without success-
fully minimizing entropy. Apply-
ing mechanisms to minimize predic-
tion error does not guarantee that
the agents will be successful in any
sense (Chapter 3).
The basic notion of success that may be used to describe any agent, is the agent’s
survival. If agents are able to take actions that lead to their survival, they are in
some sense successful. AT and PP share a similar structure of a criterion of success
(understood in the survival sense). According to AT, agents need to take ‘good enough’
actions that are on average more often right than wrong. Then we can say that agents
are ecologically rational. Similarly, in PP, agents need to take ‘good enough’ actions
that on average minimize surprise (average surprise is equivalent to conditional
entropy). In Chapter 2 and 3, we showed that these two criteria for success – ecological
rationality and entropy minimization – are not necessary for agents to survive. In
two simulation studies we showed that agents displayed behaviors that did not meet
the ecological rationality (Chapter 2) nor entropy minimization (Chapter 3) criteria,
and yet, the agents were able to (at least) survive. This, one could argue, might have
been an artifact of our assumptions and simplistic environments, and it might be
that in more complex and more demanding environments, the agents would need
to display the kinds of behaviors, as specified by the theories, else they wouldn’t be
able to survive. To show that this is the case, the next step for the theories would be
to define and show what kinds of environmental structures are necessary to produce
the expected (by the theories) behaviors.
Both AT and PP have different roots (see Chapter 1), and are built on fun-
damentally different premises, yet they share many assumptions. Interestingly, we
may observe different approaches in dealing with competing theories. AT tries to
separate itself from other theories (calling them demons) and builds on arguing its
own conceptual advantages and pointing out others’ conceptual flaws. PP, on the
other hand, tries to encompass other theories and explain them in PP-terms. This
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has happened multiple times already, e.g., with reinforcement learning (Friston et al.,
2009), comparator-based models (Allen and Friston, 2016) or even with explaining
the hard problems of consciousness (Hobson and Friston, 2012). Regardless of which
strategy of dealing with competing theories is more justified or effective, the impor-
tant observation here is that neither of the accounts is truly open to a multidisciplinary
discussion. Showing that these two, so radically different theories, are on so many
conceptual levels the same without realizing it, highlights the need to redirects the
efforts of the broad cognitive science community to multidisciplinary discussions,
inclusion and working together. These are the core values that have been a foundation
for the development of the cognitive science field in the first place.
Why do demons matter in the face of Empirical Successes
Both Adaptive Toolbox and Predictive Processing frameworks are successful and
influential in their respective subfields. In Chapter 5, we have analyzed the case
of the empirical success of the Adaptive Toolbox framework. In AT, the empirical
success is usually defined in terms of speed, frugality and accuracy of performance
of individual heuristics, and how it compares to the performance of rational models
under different environmental conditions. Gigerenzer and colleagues claim that
in the environments that the heuristics have been adapted to, the heuristics can
outperform optimization methods (Todd and Gigerenzer, 1999; Todd, 2002b). For
example, Take-the-Best, a heuristic deciding between two alternatives, is particularly
accurate in noncompensatory environments (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Bröder,
2000; Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2012b), and the recognition heuristic is successful
in making decisions with limited knowledge (Pohl, 2006; Brighton and Gigerenzer,
2012a). Studying heuristics can directly inform other fields, such as economics or
cognitive science. For example3, by studying the Recognition heuristic, researchers
proposed that forgetting leads to making better predictions about the world (Schooler
and Hertwig, 2005).
How can the Adaptive Toolbox be so successful and yet suffer from computa-
tional demons? In Chapter 5, we explain that the empirical success can be attributed to
Toolbox Application. It is a process of making ecologically rational decisions in a given
environment, using a toolbox of heuristics that has already been adapted to that envi-
3For a more comprehensive list of heuristics and their successes, see Todd and Gigerenzer (2012).
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ronment by some unspecified process. It effectively means that the empirical success
is limited to static, small-scale environments, for which the researchers could propose
a set of relevant heuristics to test. For example, Hogarth and Karelaia, 2007 compared
the performance of different heuristics in various well-defined static environments.
In their simulations and analyses, the environment consisted of only three static cues.
Rieskamp and Dieckmann, 2012 followed up on and extended this research, analyzing
problems from both artificial environments (with six cues) and problems from natural
environments (with at most twelve static cues), such as predicting population size
of German cities or dropout rate at high schools. Being limited to static, small-scale
environments goes directly against a claim by Gigerenzer and colleagues that the
Adaptive Toolbox can explain how human decision making can adapt to changing,
complex and uncertain environments. This claim is often used by these same authors
as an argument against classical intractable accounts of rationality which can never
scale to capture real-world problems (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer
and Todd, 1999).
Similarly to AT, Predictive Processing gained substantial attention, proponents
and empirical support. Ever since Predictive Processing has been proposed as a
universal guide to the brain4 (Friston, 2010), offering an explanation for perception
(Friston, 2009), action and behavior (Friston et al., 2010), the ideas behind PP were
spread also to higher level cognition such as action understanding (Friston et al., 2011),
agency (Friston, 2012a), communication (Friston and Frith, 2015), self-recognition
(Apps and Tsakiris, 2014), autism (Palmer et al., 2015), illusions (Brown et al., 2013),
depression (Friston et al., 2011), delusions (Adams et al., 2015), consciousness (Hobson
and Friston, 2014). Even accounting for explanation of behaviors of non-neurocentric
biological systems such as plants (Calvo and Friston, 2017), and ultimately attempting
at explaining the whole meaning of life (Friston, 2013).
How can we explain such a wide empirical success of the theory? Are the
demons still relevant? Definitely. We will argue this by using PP as an example,
however, our observations are general. First, we define the notion of empirical success,
explain how empirical hypotheses are drawn from a theory, and how empirical results
traditionally support the theory. Further, we point out that this support is based on a
logical fallacy, and we argue under which conditions employing this fallacy can be
4More precisely, the free energy principle was proposed as the universal guide (Friston, 2010).
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justified. One of the necessary conditions is drawing hypotheses from a demon-free
theory.
The empirical success in PP is not defined as a performance of the generative
models. The success rather relies on explanatory power and flexibility of PP con-
ceptual foundations, and the ability to localize their neuronal correlates. Despite the
empirical success, PP still mostly remains a verbal theory, even if it is expressed in
mathematical formulas. The theory is verbal in that it has not been formalized and
analyzed at the computational level (for a notable attempt to change this state of
affairs, see Kwisthout et al. (2017)). The theory mainly constitutes of an axiomatic-like
system one can derive empirical hypotheses from. For example, the theory postulates
that agents (must) minimize entropy (H) to resist the natural tendency to disorder, and
therefore survive. On the conceptual level, this amounts to an implication: if min(H)
→ survival. This implication is taken for granted (as it is derivable from the axiomatic
system) and is treated as a theoretical premise. The empirical success then depends on
defining an observable effect that can be attributed to agents’ entropy minimization.
Let’s call it ‘effect X’, it can be e.g. a difference in reaction times between different
tasks, or some specific neuroimaging/EEG pattern. This amounts to an empirical
implication: if min(H)→ ‘effect X’. Once the ‘effect X’ is observed in the experiment,
it usually serves a confirmatory role for the theory.
It is not necessarily an unjustified practice in empirical research (for insights
when it is, and when it is not justified, see: Meehl (1997)). One should, however,
be aware that this type of reasoning is a well known logical fallacy (affirming the
consequent), as the ‘effect X’ could be equally well explained by other theories (Meehl,
1997). If a verbal theory is general and expressive enough (like PP is), then it can
account for a wide variety of ‘effects X’, and generate a substantial body of empirical
evidence. This expressiveness can usually be achieved due to many implicit or ad hoc
assumptions the verbal theory relies on (see Fig. 7.1). And by using these assumptions
as a part of an explanation of the empirical evidence, the theory gives an illusion of a
high explanatory power.
The success of a theory does not, however, lay in its generality and ability to
account for as many observable effects as possible. As long as the theory remains
(a) verbal, (b) unconstrained, (c) based on unrealistic (demonic) assumptions, any
empirical evidence the theory can generate, may, at most, amount to a weak empirical
support of the theory (Roberts and Pashler, 2000). As explained by Roberts and
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Pashler (2000, p. 359) "only when both theory and data provide substantial constraints
does this provide significant evidence for the theory". It also means that no matter
how much empirical support a demon-fueled theory can gain, no amount of empirical
evidence can cancel out the computational demons.
Only by drawing empirical hypotheses and predictions from demon-free, for-
malized and constrained theories, and finding empirical evidence for these theories,
can we ever reach actual insights into a cognitive process of interest, and achieve a
substantial scientific progress.
WHAT THE VERBAL
THEORY NEEDS TO ASSUME
TO ACCOUNT FOR THE EMPIRICAL DATA
EMPIRICAL 
SUCCESS
WHAT  THE 
VERBAL  THEORY CAN 
ACCOUNT FOR
Fig. 7.1.: The figure depicts a diagram of empirical success fueled by computational demons.
Behind every empirical success (based on a not formalized theory), there is a verbal theory that
can account for (explain or predict) the empirical findings. And behind every verbal theory,
there are implicit assumptions made by the theory invoking demonic powers that make the
verbal theory deceptively expressive to account for the empirical findings.
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Summary
When it comes to computational demons, the process of arriving at a demon-free
theory can definitely be described as per aspera ad astra. The first step is to raise
awareness of the importance and devastating consequences of the demons. This is
especially tricky for theories that already assume being free from the demons, such as
AT or PP.
We started by showing that premises based on unconstrained and not formal-
ized theories cannot be easily met, and fall apart when implemented in a simple
simulation setup. In Chapter 2 and 3, we used evolutionary and agent-based simula-
tions to show that the crucial assumptions postulated by AT and PP, do not necessarily
hold. In Chapter 2, we showed that evolution can produce toolboxes of heuristics
that are ‘good enough’ to survive, but that these toolboxes are not ecologically ra-
tional. Similarly, our results from Chapter 3 show that minimizing entropy does
not guarantee that the agents will be successful. PP-agents can survive in the world
without successfully minimizing entropy. For both AT and PP it means that the crucial
assumption that agents match and exploit environmental structures to survive is not
easily met.
Further, in Chapter 4, we focused on PP, and we showed that there is another
problem with the interaction between PP-agents and the world. In order to avoid
computational demons, in Friston’s conceptualization (Friston et al., 2007; Friston,
2017a), PP relies on a Laplace assumption, which means that causes of sensory
inputs are assumed to be represented as unimodal probability density functions. Such
models, as we showed, are too simplistic to account for the complexity of the world.
In Chapter 5, we revisited the discussion about AT and followed up on our
results from Chapter 2. In Chapter 5, we presented a proof showing that not only
evolving but also adapting (evolving, developing, learning) adaptive toolbox is in-
tractable and hence not possible within a realistic amount of time. This result is
important, as it puts AT back together with other demonic theories. The theories,
that AT heavily criticizes and argues against. In this chapter, we also presented and
explained a methodology with which one can deal with and eliminate computational
demons.
Lastly, in Chapter 6, we presented a new methodology based on robot simula-
tions, that tries to bridge the gap between theoretical assumptions and their observable
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correlates that can be empirically tested (recall the discussion about empirical success).
Moreover, we argued that by implementing a model into a working robot that needs
to face real-world uncertainty and complexity, we might uncover problematic proper-
ties or unrealistic promises of the theory. With a working robot implementation, we
may further explore the ‘parameter space’ and ‘design considerations’ of the theory
to obtain empirically testable hypotheses.
Importantly, to arrive at any of our results, we needed to formalize the theories
in the first place. We proposed a formalization of components of AT in Chapter 2, and
a formalization of the Toolbox Adaptation problem in Chapter 5. For the formalization
of PP-components, we followed Kwisthout et al., 2017. It means that our results hold
for these formalizations of the theories and the environments. One cannot argue,
however, that our results are irrelevant because they are based on formalization
that is, e.g., too general. Our formalizations are as general as the verbal theories are,
and whenever possible, we actively prevented any further artificially introduced
generality that could contribute to new demons. As we argued in Chapter 5 and 6,
the process of exorcising computational demons from theories is continuous, and
will not likely happen ‘in one go’. The formalizations must be continuously revised,
changed and constrained, and the verbal assumptions adjusted accordingly.
Final Words
The work presented in this thesis aims to raise awareness about computational
demons and their various manifestations in cognitive theories. Computational demons
manifest in all (formal or verbal) assumptions postulated by a theory that, unwillingly
or not, presumes and implies unrealistic demands of computational resources im-
posed on either cognitive processes per se or on processes that lead to adapt, evolve
and develop cognitive processes. Computational demons are painfully prevalent in
cognitive theories, taking many different forms. Below, as a final summary and a
word of caution, we present a “demonology” illustrating the most common types of
demons and their manifestations in cognitive theories.
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Computations that have been proven to be intracta-
ble, and yet postulated as (parts of) cognitive theo-
ries. These demons usually come from generality 
assumed by the theory (unconstrained inputs).
DEMONOLOGY
Explicit Demons
NAME
CLASS
CHARACTERISTICS
Unconstrained assumptions
NAME
CLASS
CHARACTERISTICS
Implicit Demons
Unformalized assumptions
Assumptions, premises and promises of a theory, that 
have not been formalized. These assumptions usually 
are responsible for theory’s (unrealistic) expressive 
power (see Fig. 1). Once the assumptions are formal-
ized and analyzed, they will turn into Explicit Demons.
NAME
CLASS
CHARACTERISTICS
Implicit Demons
Outsourcing assumptions
A special kind of unformalized assumptions that aim 
at outsourcing the hard computational work that is 
needed for the assumptions to hold, to intuitively 
deﬁned processes, such as evolution, adaptation or 
(neuro)development.
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Assumptions made by a theory to actively avoid postu-
lating computational demons. This usually leads to 
postulating assumptions that are too simplistic, and 
cannot either scale or account for the complexity of the 
real world.
NAME
CLASS
CHARACTERISTICS
Demon avoidance
Simplifying assumptions
Demon avoidance
Misguided assumptions
Misguided attempts to eliminate the demons. These 
assumptions can result in multiplication of the demons, 
as they involve trying to account for an existence of one 
demon (e.g. Bayesian inference) by postulating anoth-
er demon (e.g. approximate Bayesian inference). 
NAME
CLASS
CHARACTERISTICS
What we hope for the reader to take away from this thesis is the following: (i)
computational demons are a serious impediment to scientific progress, and cannot
be ignored, (ii) all theories are equal in the face of computational demons, and the
demons come in many different shapes and forms. Even if a theory claims otherwise,
as long as the theory remains not formalized and analyzed, it most likely will hide
some manifestation of a demon, (iii) computational demons are not a reason to reject
a theory, rather an opportunity to revise and reformulate it. Importantly, the demons
need to be confronted directly, all misguided attempts to avoid the demons instead, will
only further obstruct the theory, and inhibit its explanatory power.
Only then we have a chance to eventually attain a demon-free, realistic, testable
and falsifiable theory, which may help us unravel at least some parts of the big
black-box mystery that human cognition is.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Hoe denken we? Hoe werkt ons geheugen? Hoe leren we? Hoe communiceren we?
Hoe kunnen we beslissingen nemen, Kleuren waarnemen, en de stemmen van onze
vrienden onderscheiden? En hoe kunnen we dat allemaal doen terwijl we in een
onzekere en complexe wereld leven? Dit zijn de vragen die een lange traditie van
onderzoek naar de aard van menselijke cognitieve processen vormen. Hoewel het
debat over menselijke cognitie al eeuwen duurt, hebben wetenschappers pas sinds
kort een reële kans om op zijn minst enkele van de vragen te beantwoorden. De
cognitiewetenschap als een onderscheidend vakgebied is relatief nieuw, gebouwd
op het besef dat om ooit de menselijke cognitie te kunnen verklaren men het vanuit
meer dan één perspectief deze vragen moet benaderen. Door haar interdisciplinaire
aard, combineert cognitieve wetenschap een breed scala aan methoden en expertise
uit vele verschillende disciplines, zoals biologie, psychologie, neurowetenschappen,
kunstmatige intelligentie, taalkunde en filosofie. De kern van cognitief wetenschap-
pelijk onderzoek ligt in de veronderstelling dat een cognitief systeem i computaties
tuitvoert. Het betekent dat een cognitief proces in wezen een computationeel proces
is van het transformeren van inputs (bijvoorbeeld geluidsgolven) naar outputs (bi-
jvoorbeeld een stem van een vriend die ons groet). Een belangrijke uitdaging bij het
verklaren van de menselijke cognitie ligt in het feit dat het r computationeel proces
van het transformeren van inputs in outputs een black box is en niet direct waarneem-
baar is. Cognitiewetenschappers proberen die black box te ontcijferen en bieden een
wiskundige beschrijving (een model) van computationele processen. Hoewel deze
aanpak succesvol is geweest in het geven van een verklaring voor sommige cogni-
tieve processen, blijven de essentiële vragen over menselijk denken, leren, redeneren
en communiceren onbeantwoord. Het probleem met veel bestaande modellen van
verschillende cognitieve processen is dat ze geen rekening houden met menseli-
jke computationele beperkingen. Onze informatieverwerking wordt begrensd door
beperkte tijd, kennis en rekenkracht, terwijl voorgestelde modellen berekeningen
beschrijven die eenvoudigweg te moeilijk voor ons zijn om in real time uit te voeren.
In plaats daarvan hebben ze tijd nodig in de omvang van miljoenen jaren (soms zelfs
langer dan de leeftijd van het universum zelf). Dergelijke modellen lijken de pro-
cessen die ze proberen te beschrijven niet op een aannemelijke manier vast te leggen.
Als cognitiewetenschappers veronderstellen dat dergelijke modellen een computa-
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tioneel proces verklaren, impliceert dit dat het menselijk brein onbegrensd is in haar
rekenkracht en daarom demonische vaardigheden moet bezitten: almachtigheid en
alwetendheid. In dit proefschrift schrijven we geen bovennatuurlijke vermogens toe
aan mensen. In plaats daarvan beweren we dat dergelijke modellen een eigenschap
zijn van theorieën die zich manifesteren in hun verschillende veronderstellingen en
premissen. We noemen dergelijke modellen computationele demonen.
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan een algemene cognitiewetenschappelijke dis-
cussie. De hier gepresenteerde resultaten en inzichten zijn relevant voor de cogni-
tiewetenschap als een heel vakgebied, niet alleen voor een enkel deelgebied. Ons
werk heeft tot doel het bewustzijn te vergroten over computationele demonen en hun
verschillende manifestaties die op pijnlijke wijze de boventoon voeren in cognitieve
theorieën. Om dit te illustreren hebben we verschillende methoden gebruikt om de
aannames van twee invloedrijke theorieën uit te dagen, te analyseren, te formaliseren
en te testen: Adaptive Toolbox (AT) en Predictive Processing (PP). Beide theorieën
geven een conceptueel breed beeld van het menselijk functioneren in een onzekere
en complexe wereld. PP postuleert een universeel principe waarmee alle cognitieve
processen werken, terwijl AT stelt dat one-size-cannot-fit-all, en stelt voor dat er in
plaats van één principe eigenlijk een hele toolbox van strategieën is waar mensen
mee kunnen werken. Niet alleen lijken deze theorieën beweringen te maken uit het
tegenovergestelde spectrum, maar terwijl ze dezelfde vragen proberen te beantwo-
orden komen ze van een andere school van gedachten en herkennen ze elkaar als
tegengesteld. Vooral cruciaal in deze differentiatie is dat AT PP als een demonische
theorie erkent terwijl AT beweert zelf demon-vrij te zijn. We hebben claims van de
theorieën afzonderlijk geanalyseerd en met elkaar vergeleken, en we hebben aange-
toond dat deze beweringen veel gemeen hebben, niet alleen conceptueel, maar ook
doordat ze allebei last hebben van computationele demonen. Bovendien presenteren
we een korte handleiding en een voorbeeld van hoe om te gaan met computationele
demonen, en introduceren we een nieuwe onderzoeksmethodologie die het proces
van het uitdrijven van computationele demonen uit cognitieve theorieën verder kan
verlichten. Wij geloven dat onze bevindingen van algemeen belang zijn voor de cog-
nitieve wetenschappelijke gemeenschap, wijzend naar een richting die kan leiden tot
het ontrafelen van ten minste sommige delen van het grote black-box-mysterie dat
menselijke cognitie is.
Translated by Iris van Rooij
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Podsumowanie
W jaki sposób mys´limy? Zapamie˛tujemy? Uczymy sie˛? Widzimy kolory? Słyszymy
przedmioty? Jak podejmujemy decyzje? Komunikujemy sie˛? Posługujemy je˛zykiem?
Pytania te stawiane sa˛ od pocza˛tku istnienia ludzkos´ci, jednak do tej pory nie udało sie˛
w pełni na nie odpowiedziec´. Zaledwie kilka dekad temu zrozumiano, z˙e ludzki mózg
jest zbyt skomplikowana˛ jednostka˛, by tylko pojedyncza dziedzina nauki (np. tylko
biologia, tylko fizyka, czy tylko filozofia) była w stanie skonstruowac´ metodologie
potrzebne do badania, opisania i wyjas´nienia tych niewiadomych. Tak oto zrodził sie˛
interdyscyplinarny projekt maja˛cy na celu wykorzystanie metod, ekspertyz i wiedzy
z dziedzin takich jak: psychologia, biologia, informatyka, lingwistyka, antropologia,
czy filozofia, by wyjas´nic´ jak działa mózg. Tak powstała kognitywistyka.
Głównym załoz˙eniem kognitywistyki na temat natury mózgu jest to, z˙e mózg
jest jednostka˛ obliczeniowa˛. Wszystkie procesy poznawcze (takie jak m.in. widzenie,
słyszenie, czucie, pamie˛c´, je˛zyk, wnioskowanie czy komunikacja), w swojej esencji,
sa˛ problemami obliczeniowymi. Problem obliczeniowy, ujmuja˛c ogólnie, jest prob-
lemem przetwarzania informacji przez dany system. Systemem takim moz˙e byc´
komputer, organizm jednokomórkowy, Wszechs´wiat, czy ludzki mózg. Bardziej pre-
cyzyjnie, problem obliczeniowy jest to proces przekształcenia danych wejs´ciowych
(do systemu) i otrzymanie danych wyjs´ciowych spełniaja˛cych konkretne warunki.
Formalnie, jest to definicja funkcji matematycznej. Oznacza to, z˙e aby opisac´ problem
obliczeniowy musimy zdefiniowac´ funkcje˛, za pomoca˛ której dane przekształcenie
zachodzi. Istotna˛ cecha˛ kaz˙dego systemu obliczeniowego sa˛ jego ograniczenia, a w
szczególnos´ci ograniczone zasoby obliczeniowe, takie jak czas, wiedza, pamie˛c´ czy
moc obliczeniowa. Nie istnieje taki system obliczeniowy, który nie podlegałby tym
ograniczeniom. Nawet Wszechs´wiat ma ograniczone zasoby obliczeniowe.
Kognitywistyka zakłada, z˙e kaz˙dy proces poznawczy jest opisywalny za po-
moca˛ funkcji matematycznych. By zrozumiec´ i wyjas´nic´ jak, na przykład, działa
percepcja głe˛bi, nalez˙y zacza˛c´ od odpowiedzi na pytanie jaka funkcja odpowiada za
transformacje˛ fal s´wietlnych padaja˛cych na siatkówke˛ oka (dane wejs´ciowe) w widze-
nie obiektu w 3D (dane wyjs´ciowe). Głównym problemem, czy raczej wyzwaniem
kognitywistyki jest to, z˙e odpowiedzi na te pytania nie sa˛ bezpos´rednio mierzalne.
Nie wystarczy zmierzyc´ pobudzenia komórek s´wiatłoczułych, by wyjas´nic´ prob-
lem widzenia głe˛bi; nie wystarczy równiez˙ zmierzyc´ przepływu tlenu w mózgu
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funkcjonalnym rezonansem magnetycznym, by zrozumiec´ jak mózg działa (co ni-
estety, okazuje sie˛ byc´ obecnie cze˛sta˛, i bardzo zwodnicza˛, praktyka˛). Wie˛kszos´c´ prob-
lemów obliczeniowych pozostaje ‘czarna˛ skrzynka˛’, która po wypełnieniu formułami
matematycznymi staje sie˛ modelem (matematycznym opisem) danego procesu. Mod-
ele moz˙na analizowac´ zarówno teoretycznie, jak i testowac´ empirycznie, poprzez, na
przykład, porównywanie zachowania modelu z zachowaniem ludzi w takich samych
warunkach.
Załoz˙enie, z˙e mózg jest systemem obliczeniowym musi implikowac´, z˙e mózg
podlega ograniczeniom obliczeniowym. Co oczywis´cie, nawet intuicyjnie, ma sens –
jako ludzie, stanowczo mamy ograniczone zasoby obliczeniowe: nie jestes´my wszech-
wiedza˛cy, wszechmocni, o nieskon´czonej pamie˛ci i nieskon´czonym czasie. Wre˛cz prze-
ciwnie, podlegamy wielu takim ograniczeniom. Koniecznym jest zatem, by modele,
które opisuja˛ procesy poznawcze, równiez˙ podlegały takim samym ograniczeniom.
Oznacza to, z˙e jes´li dany proces zajmuje ludziom sekundy (np. wywnioskowanie,
która z wielu osób w sklepie jest pracownikiem), modelowi testowanemu w takich
samych warunkach (tym samym sklepie), równiez˙ zaja˛c´ to powinno czas podobnego
rze˛du. Bardzo cze˛sto jednak modele potrzebuja˛ o wiele, wiele wie˛cej czasu (rze˛du
milionów lat), by dojs´c´ do takich samych wniosków jak ludzie. Taki model jest wtedy
błe˛dnym lub niewystarczaja˛cym opisem danego procesu, i musi zostac´ zrewidowany.
Nie jest to jednak łatwe.
W s´wiecie kognitywistycznych badan´ istnieje wiele takich modeli, które ig-
noruja˛ ograniczenia obliczeniowe. Oznacza to, z˙e nawet jes´li istnieje model, który
z powodzeniem wyjas´nia i opisuje dany proces poznawczy w małej skali (ekspery-
mentu empirycznego), gdy przeanalizujemy taki model w wie˛kszej skali (codzien-
nego ludzkiego z˙ycia), model ten nie uwzgle˛dnia w swoim działaniu ograniczonych
zasobów obliczeniowych jakimi dysponuja˛ ludzie. By taki model zachowywał sie˛ tak
samo jak ludzie, musiałby posiadac´ dos´c´ ‘demoniczne1’ włas´ciwos´ci, takie jak wszech-
1Tytułowe ’obliczeniowe demony’ odnosza˛ sie˛ włas´nie do modeli, które cechuja˛ sie˛ nieograniczonymi
zasobami obliczeniowymi. W historii nauki koncept ‘demonów’ nie jest nowy. Na przestrzeni wieków,
cze˛sta˛ forma˛ eksperymentów mys´lowych było powoływanie do z˙ycia istot niemoz˙liwych (czy de-
monów). Główna˛ cecha˛ takich demonicznych istot była ich umieje˛tnos´c´ osia˛gnie˛cia czegos´, co
wydawało sie˛ naruszac´ przyje˛te normy czy prawa, np. fizyki; ich istnienie rzucało wyzwanie przyje˛temu
poziomowi wiedzy. Rozwia˛zaniem tak postawionego problemu była próba pozbycia sie˛ demonów
(próba udowodnienia, z˙e nie moga˛ istniec´), co ostatecznie przyczyniało sie˛ do pogłe˛biania wiedzy i
poziomu zrozumienia danego zagadnienia. Najbardziej znanymi eksperymentami mys´lowymi tego
rodzaju sa˛ demon Maxwella, który rzucał wyzwanie prawom termodynamiki, czy demon Laplaca,
który reprezentował determinizm przyczynowy. Istnienie obu tych demonów zostało ostatecznie (w
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wiedza, omnipotencja, czy nieograniczony czas. Istotnym tutaj jest to, z˙e obliczeniowa˛
analize˛ modeli moz˙na przeprowadzic´ matematycznie przy uz˙yciu doste˛pnych metod,
nie potrzeba czekac´ nieskon´czonos´ci, by ocenic´ jakie zasoby obliczeniowe sa˛ wyko-
rzystywane przez dany model. Oczywistym jest zatem, z˙e takie ‘demoniczne’ mod-
ele, które by zachowywac´ sie˛ tak jak ludzie potrzebuja˛ nieskon´czonych zasobów
obliczeniowych, nie moga˛ byc´ traktowane jako realistyczne próby opisu ludzkich
procesów poznawczych.
W mojej pracy skoncentrowałam sie˛ na analizie nierealistycznych, ‘demon-
icznych’ modeli, które sa˛ rezultatem proponowanych przez dana˛ teorie˛ załoz˙en´ na
temat zasad funkcjonowania mózgu. W szczególnos´ci, podje˛łam sie˛ formalizacji i
analizy załoz˙en´ dwóch wpływowych teorii, które reprezentuja˛ status quo obecnej
wiedzy na temat działania mózgu. Obie te teorie przedstawiaja˛ bogaty koncepcyjnie
opis funkcjonowania człowieka i postuluja˛, z˙e ich proponowane załoz˙enia lez˙a˛ u
podstaw odpowiedzi na wiele pytan´ dotycza˛cych działania mózgu i wyjas´nienia pro-
cesów poznawczych. Niestety, w obu przypadkach teorie te implikuja˛ ‘demoniczne’
modele, przez co ich postulowane załoz˙enia traca˛ na wartos´ci eksplanacyjnej. Nie jest
to jednak powód, by całkowicie odrzucic´ te teorie, nalez˙y je jednak zrewidowac´. W
mojej pracy opisałam krótki przewodnik metodologiczny (wraz z przykładami) jak
radzic´ sobie z ‘demonicznymi’ modelami. Ponadto, opracowałam nowa˛ metodologie˛
badawcza˛, która moz˙e w wie˛kszym stopniu upros´cic´ moz˙e proces identyfikacji ta-
kich nierealistycznych modeli i zapobiec postulowaniu nierealistycznych załoz˙en´.
Co wie˛cej, publikuja˛c moje wyniki i wnioski zainicjowałam (ponowne) otwarcie
interdyscyplinarnej dyskusji na temat róz˙nych perspektyw obliczeniowego uje˛cia
mózgu. Moja praca wskazuje kierunek i pierwsze kroki, które doprowadzic´ moga˛ do
rozwikłania przynajmniej cze˛s´ci tajemnicy ‘czarnej skrzynki’ naszego mózgu.
przypadku demona Maxwella zaje˛ło to ponad sto lat) obalone. W mojej pracy i badaniach korzystam z
analogicznej metafory.
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